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Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to pro-
tect liberty when the government's purposes are beneficent.
Men born to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of
their liberty by evil-minded rulers. The greatest dangers to
liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-
meaning, but without understanding.t
Introduction
It is ironic that in the year rock 'n' roll' emerged as a substan-
tial beneficent social force it was also roundly chastised by the
United States Senate.2 Even as it received wide acclaim as an
t Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928)(Brandeis, J., dissenting).
1. Throughout this Note the terms "rock 'n' roll" and "rock" are used inter-
changeably, though musicologists have sometimes drawn a distinction between the
two. See, e.g., C. HAMM, YESTERDAYS 465 (1979). A definition of rock, like that of any
other art form, is problematic and subjective. See J. ORMAN, THE POLITICS OF ROCK
Music x (1984) ("A definition of rock music often says more about the values of the
person who is doing the defining than the actual concept"). Nevertheless, the diction-
ary defines rock as "popular music usu[ally] played on electronically amplified instru-
ments and characterized by a strong beat and much repetition." MERRIAM-WEBSTER
DIcTIoNARY 605 (pocket ed. 1974). The derivation of the term may cast some light:
"Rock 'n' roll" was a euphemism for sexual intercourse in the early twentieth cen-
tury. Palmer, Early Blues Lyrics Were Often Blue, N.Y. Times, Nov. 7, 1985, at C33,
col 4.
2. See Record Labeling: Hearing Before the Senate Committee on Commemr, Sei-
ence and Transportation, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985). This irony has not escaped no-
tice. Eg., Davis, Rock Music: Parental Guidance Suggested, CHRISTIAN CENTURY,
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idealistic unifying force for raising millions of dollars for a vari-
ety of worthy causes,3 rock was vehemently denounced as an
anti-social corruptive influence on American youth.4 Popular
Nov. 13,1985, at 1032; Pollock, On Record Popular Music, WILSON LmR. BuLL, Dec.
12, 1985, at 2; Brother, Can You Spare A Song?, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 28,1985, at 94; Hil-
burn, The Boss--From Idol To Symbol, L.A. Times, Sept. 20, 1985, § VI, at 1, col. 2,4,
col. 1; Goldstein, Parents Warn: Take The Sex & Shock Out Of Rock, L.A. Times, Aug.
25, 1985, Calendar, at 67, col. 1, 72, cols. 1, 3. Other commentators have suggested that
the outcry against rock lyrics was calculated - designed to reduce musicians' influ-
ence. E.g., Cocks, Rock Is a Four-Letter Word, TmE, Sept. 30, 1985, at 70, 71; Kelly,
Rock's War of Words, MAcLEANS, Oct. 14,1985, at 95; Levin, Lay Off Of Them Blue
Suede Shoes, PEOPLE WEEKLY, Nov. 4,1985, at 42, 44; Marsh, Sympathy For The Devil,
Village Voice, Oct. 8, 1985; at 13, col. 1, 18, col. 3; McCarthy, Lyrics: On the Wrong
Track, Wash. Post, Sept. 29, 1985, at H2, col. 4.
Rock's purported bright and dark sides have clashed in at least one instance. First
lady Nancy Reagan was dropped as the spokeswoman for a proposed anti-drug rock
benefit because she demanded that acts of questionable character be dropped from the
bill. It was reported that she "tried to turn the international event into a debate about
offensive lyrics and music censorship." Nancy Reagan fails to censor rock concert,
S.F. Examiner, Mar. 7, 1986, at E-5, col. 1.
3. See generally Cocks, Songs from the High Ground, TIME, Oct. 7, 1985, at 78;
Brother, Can You Spare a Song?, supra note 2, at 94; Harrington, Rock's Newfound
Humanism, Wash. Post, Jan. 15, 1984, at K1, cols. 1, 2. Rock musicians were praised
for their fundraising efforts on behalf of world hunger victims and debt-ridden
American farmers, e.g., Hamill, A Day To Remember, ROLLING STONE, Aug. 29,1985,
at 28; Rock Around the World, NEWSWEEK, July 22, 1985, at 56, and for protesting
apartheid, e.g., Barol, 'I Ain't Gonna Play Sun City,' NEWsWEEK, Oct. 28, 1985, at 94.
Rock musician Bruce Springsteen was praised by both presidential candidates in the
1984 election campaign as a champion of American values. Wiener, Rockin' With
Ron, THE NATION, Oct. 6, 1984, at 309; Palmer, Springsteen's Music Hits Chord of
America, N.Y. Times, Aug, 6, 1985, at C13, col. 1. A year later the Parents Music
Resource Center (PMRC), a citizen's organization leading the "porn-rock" crusade,
criticized Springsteen as a rock pornographer for his song "I'm on Fire." Moran,
Sounds of Sew Why Daddy took the T- Bird Away, NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 12 & 19,1985,
at 14, 15.
4. E.g., Bruning, The Devilish Soul of Rock n' Roll, MACLEANS, Oct. 21, 1985, at
13; Davis, Pop Lyrics: A Mirror and a Molder of Society, 42 ET CETERA 167 (1985)
[hereinafter Davis, Pop Lyrics]; Gergen, X-Rated Records, U.S. NEWs & WORLD REP.,
May 20, 1985, at 98; Stroud, Stop Pornographic Rock, NEWSWEEK, May 6, 1985, at 14;
Will, No One Blushes Anymore, Wash. Post, Sept. 15, 1985, at D7, col. 2; Musician,
Heal Thyself, AMERICA, Oct. 5,1985, at 182; Hughes, Merchants of Filth, Christian Sci.
Monitor, Nov. 1, 1985, at 14, col. 1; Safire, Sex on a Platter, N.Y. Times, Oct. 10, 1985,
at A31, col. 1; Goodman, Rock Ratings, Wash. Post, Sept. 14,1985, at A19, col. 1; Weiss,
PornRock: A Script For Censorship, Billboard, June 29, 1985, at 10, col. 1; Raspberry,
Filth on the Air, Wash. Post, June 19, 1985, at A21, col. 2; see also Cocks, Rock Is A
Four-Letter Word, supra note 2, at 70, 78; Zucchino, Big Brother Meets Twisted Sister,
ROLLING STONE, Nov. 7,1985, at 9,16 (senators outraged by PMRC porn-rock presen-
tation); Weinraub, Rock Lyrics Irk Reagan, N.Y. Times, Oct. 10, 1985, at C17, col. 3
(President Reagan's criticism of the music industry); Kurtz, No Sympathy for the
Devil, PROGRESSIVE, Apr. 1983, at 19 (rock musicians denounced as "minions of
mephistopheles" and "Satan's puppets" by the Maranatha Christian Fellowship).
The PMRC itself has been the target of criticism. E.g, Heard, Porn In The USA,
NEW REPuBuc, Oct. 14, 1985, at 12; Hentoff, The Disc Washers, PROGRESSIvE, Nov.
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music has always been both a target and a vehicle for social
criticism. But the tone and volume of current opinion con-
firms that rock now exerts an unprecedented level of influ-
ence.' Because rock is an influential social force it is important
to determine the degree to which the government can control
its content.
Rock, like other forms of popular music, enjoys a symbiotic
relationship with radio.7 Radio attracts listeners by playing
popular music; popular music attracts record buyers through
radio exposure. Since 1912, the radio spectrum has been com-
prehensively regulated by the federal government.8 It follows
that, to the extent the popular music industry depends on the
radio industry, it is within the reach of government regulation.
1985, at 29; Moran, supra note 3, at 14; Pollock, supra note 2, at 52; Hamlin, Would-Be
Censors Should Know: Rock and Roll Is Here to Stay, L.A. Daily J., Dec. 18,1985, at 4,
col. 3; Marsh, Sympathy For The Devil, supra note 2, at 13, col. 1; Molotsky, On The
Uses of Power By Marriage, N.Y. Times, Sept. 29,1985, at 60, col. 3; Mann, Rock and a
Hard Place, Wash. Post, Sept. 25, 1985, at C3, col. 5; Ratings Aren't Lyrical, L.A.
Times, Sept. 25,1985, § II, at 4, col. 1; Krauthammer, X Ratings For Rock?, Wash. Post,
Sept. 20, 1985, at A27, col. 1; Tipper Gored By Radio Panel on Porno Lyrics, Daily
Variety, Sept. 18, 1985, at 1, col. 5; Hentoff, The Devil's Music, Wash. Post, Aug. 23,
1985, at A23, col. 1; Cockburn, Mrs. Grundys Give Record Ratings a Spin, Wall St. J.,
Aug. 22, 1985, at 23, col. 3. If nothing else, the controversy has produced a wealth of
literary indignation that makes interesting reading.
5. See irfra notes 13-46 and accompanying text.
6. See J. ORMAN, supra note 1, at ix; Buckley, I Confess, NATIONAL REV., Sept. 6,
1985, at 63. f. Levin, supra note 2, at 43 (describing the unprecedented reader re-
sponse to a report in PEOPLE WEEKLY and a survey by advice columnist Ann Landers
on the porn-rock issue). The July 13, 1985 Live Aid benefit concert to raise funds for
African famine victims was the most viewed television program in history with an
estimated audience of 1.5 billion people in 160 countries. Rock Around the World,
supra note 3, at 6.
The massive increase in influence is due mostly to the infiltration of the broadcast
and cable television media by rock videos. See Pollock, supra note 2, at 52; Brother,
Can You Spare a Song?, supra note 2, at 94; Frost, White Noise: How Heavy Metal
Rules, Village Voice, June 18, 1985, at 46, col. 1, 47, cols. 1, 2; Pareles, Should Rock
Lyrics Be Sanitized?, N.Y. Times, Oct. 13, 1985, § II, at HI, col. 1, H5, col. 1. Music
videos have also been widely criticized for containing excessive sex and violence. See,
e.g., 'Washington wives'set their sights on video, ROLLING STONE, Oct. 10, 1985, at 18.
The subject of the regulation of music videos is beyond the scope of this Note.
7. See S. FRIT, SouND EFFECTS: YOUTH, LEISURE, AND THE POLTIcs OF ROCK
'N' ROLL 117 (1981); Leonard, The Impact of Mechanization, in AMERICAN MusIc:
FROM STORYVILLE TO WOODSTOCK 46-47 (C. Nanry ed. 1972); see also Marsh, What'd I
Say?, PLAYBOY, Mar. 1986, at 46, 47 (describing the interrelationship between rock
and radio).
8. Radio Act of 1912, ch. 287, 37 Stat. 302; Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169, 44 Stat. 1162,
both repealed by Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, § 602(a), 48 Stat. 1064, 1102.
Since 1934, regulation of the airwaves has been authorized by the Communications
Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-09 (1982).
ROCK LYRICS
The broadcasting field has been legally dynamic of late. In
1978, broadcast speech reached a nadir in constitutional protec-
tion with the United States Supreme Court's decision in FCC v.
Paefkc Foundation.9 This decision capped a decade marked
by Federal Communications Commission (FCC) content regu-
latory initiatives largely unimpeded by judicial review.'0 More
recently, the Commission, guardian of the airwaves, has admin-
istratively altered its regulatory mission by adopting extensive
policy changes oriented towards deregulation."
These social, constitutional, and statutory changes, all occur-
ring since the last major censorship battle in the early 1970s,' 2
have significantly altered the regulatory landscape. The net ef-
fect is an increase in the vulnerability of rock speech.
This Note seeks to ascertain the extent of that vulnerability.
Preliminarily, it examines the role popular music has played in
American society, past and present. It then examines the
FCC's power and historical role as defined by the federal judici-
ary in regulating electronic media content, and the potential
and practical regulability of rock speech under modern (post-
Pacifwa) notions of FCC power and policy. The Note con-
cludes that popular music has played an important role in
political and social change in America, for better or worse; that
the federal judiciary has been overly deferential in reviewing
FCC content regulation; that as a result the FCC's power to
regulate broadcast speech is swollen beyond the contours con-
templated by the first amendment and the Communications
Act of 1934; that this power includes the power to restrain rock
speech; and that, in deference to first amendment values, any
such restraints should be the product of citizen, rather than
governmental, action.
I
American Popular Music in Perspective
A. The Historical Perspective
American popular music'3 has been closely associated with
9. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
10. See infra notes 146-277 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 401-16 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 186-208 and accompanying text.
13. For a comprehensive definition of popular song, see C. HAMM, supra note 1, at
xvii.
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social change and controversy since before the Civil War. In
the mid-nineteenth century the Hutchinson family, a traveling
musical group, alienated Eastern audiences with ballads pro-
testing the prosecution of the Mexican-American War and ad-
vocating temperance, abolition, and suffrage.14 The rise of
ragtime at the turn of the century sparked calls for censorship
which were fueled considerably by racial animosities. 15 Jazz
met similar opposition when it rose to prominence in the
1920s.16 Folk music was linked to the leftist workers move-
ments of the 1930s.17 Even popular opera functioned as agit-
prop in the years before World War II.18
14. See generally C. HAMM, supra note 1, at 141-61. Professor Hamm is convinced
that the Hutchinsons greatly affected American history:
It may well be that the Hutchinsons altered the course of American history,
that their music hastened the confrontations and conflicts that led inexora-
bly to the Civil War, that their songs fanned passions and created the sense of
togetherness and resolve necessary to convert ideas and ideals into action,
that their singing of "John Brown's Body" converted more people to the anti-
slavery cause than all the speeches and sermons of the time.
Id. at 156.
15. See C. HAMM, MUSIC IN THE NEW WORLD 398-99 (1983). "[Ragtime] is sym-
bolic of the primitive morality and perceptible moral limitations of the negro race."
Id. at 398 (quoting Kenilworth, Demoralizing Rag Time Music, Music COURIER, May
28, 1913, at 22-23). It was thought that the music would lower moral standards and
inevitably lead to a decline in the quality of American life and culture. C. HAMM,
supra, at 398. Compare 3 R. DAVIS, A HISTORY OF MUSIC IN AMERICAN LIFE 296-97
(1981) (jazz, at its ascension to popularity, condemned as "nigger music" and blamed
for deterioration of the nation's morals and the rise in frequency of illegitimate
births); C. HAmm, supra, at 625; infra note 22 (early rock 'n' roll denounced by white
supremacy group as a plot to "mongrelize" the South).
16. See generally 3 R. DAVIS, supra note 15, at 298-303. The jazz era provides a
fascinating analogue to the porn-rock controversy. Throughout the 1920s, there was
pressure on the music industry to "clean up" jazz. See Leonard, supra note 7, at 44,
51-56. The Music Publishers Protective Association, an industry group concerned
with indecent musical material entering the home, was formed in 1921 to censor pop-
ular songs. Id. at 51. Compare Goldstein, supra note 2, at 72, col. 3 (PMRC demanded
formation of industry panel to rate rock lyrics). Radio broadcasters were especially
sensitive to public complaints. Leonard, supra note 7, at 52. Compare Horn, Rock
Porn? Stations Are Warned, L.A. Times, June 11, 1985, § VI, at 1, col. 4 (National
Association of Broadcasters (NAB) highly sensitive to song lyric complaints). Finally,
in 1938 the FCC addressed the question of jazz suitability for broadcast by urging
licensees to use "a high degree of discrimination" in programming the music. Leo-
nard, supra note 7, at 54 (quoting N.Y. Times, Nov. 3, 1938, at 25). Compare Horn,
supra, at 1, col. 4 (NAB President Eddie Fritts "implicitly admonished broadcasters
to think twice" about programming porn-rock); In re Licensee Responsibility to Re-
view Records Before Their Broadcast, Public Notice 71-205, 28 F.C.C.2d 409 (1971)
(warning broadcasters of their public interest responsibilities with regard to records
that tend to promote or glorify illegal drug use).
17. S. FRITH, supra note 7, at 27, 28.
18. Marc Blitzstein's opera The Cradle Will Rock, in which workers rise up and
ROCK LYRICS
The postwar era saw rock 'n' roll replace bland, innocent pop
as the music of the baby boom generation. Rock sprang from
black rhythm and blues to challenge traditional values, inspir-
ing alarm and contempt in American adults.19
Rock was stigmatized and vilified from the beginning.'e One
reason was its black roots. Rock rose in a period of racial ten-
sion-the post-Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka 21 inte-
gration of American schools. Segregationists were appalled to
find that rock was appreciated by youths of all stripes and that
integrated audiences were freely mixing at local rock shows.?
Another reason for the hostility towards rock was that the
songs, and the youth culture which embraced them, rejected
traditional American societal values and attitudes.0 Even the
beat was threatening compared to the smooth jazz and docile
pop it replaced.
The Vietnam era produced significant changes in popular
music and the attitudes of its audience. The folk music revival
of the early 1960s was intimately associated with student anti-
war activism and the civil rights movement.2 Later in the dec-
ade, rock music came to be regarded as an accessory to recrea-
tional drug usage and sociopolitical protest.?
overthrow Mr. Mister, the symbol of capitalism, was targeted for censorship by the
Federal Theater Project in 1937. 3 R. DAVIS, supra note 15, at 178-80.
19. See generally Dougherty, From 'Race Music' to Heavy Metal: A Fery History
Qf Protests, PEOPLE WEEKLY, Sept. 16, 1985, at 52.
20. See generally C. RA"M, supra note 15, at 623-26; Dougherty, supra note 19.
Pandemonium at rock shows led the press to link the music with juvenile delin-
quency. C. HAMM, supra note 15, at 625.
21. 347 U.S. 483 (1954); 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (remedial phase).
22. C. HAM&% supra note 15, at 618-19. Professor Hamm believes that rock 'n' roll
"was in the forefront of social reform in America." I& at 632. This is evident from the
reaction of the North Alabama Citizens Council, a white supremacist group which
viewed the music as part of a plot to force "Negro culture" on the South in the wake
of desegregation. IS at 625.
23. C. HAMM, supra note 15, at 646. Rock music was condemned for threatening "a
total breakdown of all reticences about sex. . . ." IS at 623 (quoting from a Variety
editorial of Feb. 23, 1955).
24. See generally C. HAMbf, supra note 15, at 632-37; Gonczy, The Folk Music
Movement f the 1960 Its Rise and Fall, 10 POPULAR Music & SOC'Tf 15 (No. 11985).
The most notable example was the music of Bob Dylan.
25. The music and the drug culture seem to have enjoyed a symbiotic relation-
ship. The influence of drugs on musicians led to "psychedelic music," meant to am-
plify a drug-induced ("stoned") state. Psychedelic music in turn may have led to
increased drug use. See infra note 32. Musicians advocated the use of drugs and drugs
helped create a bond between the musicians and their audience. See C. HAMM, supra
note 1, at 454.
The connection was nowhere closer than in San Francisco where the Grateful Dead
1987]
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With the end of the war in the early 1970s, rock shed a good
portion of its politicism and grew more commercial and hedon-
istic, reflecting similar changes in its original baby boom
audience.2
B. The Modern Perspective and the Current Regulatory Climate
In the 1970s and 1980s, the range of rock's audience widened
and Jefferson Airplane rock groups helped fuse rock and drugs into the "hippie" life-
style. This served to cement the idea that rock and drugs were inextricably linked, a
development which was to have dramatic repercussions during the Nixon administra-
tion. See infra notes 186-98 and accompanying text. During this period, rock fans
came to be regarded as a counterculture rather than a subculture. See generally C.
HAMM, supra note 15, at 643-46. According to one commentator, today's music exerts
an anti-drug influence. Palmer, What Pop Lyrics Say to Us Today, N.Y. Times, Feb.
24, 1985, § 2, at H1, col. 2.
26. See C. HAMM, supra note 1, at 454:
By the late 1960s, rock was solidly and openly at the center of the protest
movements that characterized this decade. No Antiwar rally was complete
without rock; student protests and demonstrations against policies of Ameri-
can colleges and universities marched and surged to rock bands.... Rock
music was heard by many of its followers not as sound but as propaganda....
[M]illions of Americans ... openly questioned the motives and methods of
their own government, on moral and philosophical grounds, and... popular
music-in the form of rock-was a central and critical part of this process.
Not since the decades before the Civil War, the era of the Hutchinson Fam-
ily, had popular song played such an active role in political and social dia-
logue and action.
Another commentator, although acknowledging the proliferation of political songs
in this period, believes that rock music was not very political on the whole. J. ORMAN,
supra note 1, at 154. This position too has some merit, but the two views are reconcila-
ble. The politically-oriented rock product in this era was never predominant but did
exert a disproportionate influence on society because of its passion and that of its
admirers.
27. See W. LEUCHTENBERG, A TROUBLED FEAST 232 (1979); J. ORMAN, supra note
1, at 10-11, 161-65, 176; Palmer, What Pop Lyrics Say to Us Today, supra note 25, at
H1, col. 2. Rock idealism peaked at the Woodstock festival in 1969; rock soon became
big business. C. HAMM, supra note 1, at 474; see also Rice, The Content of Popular
Recordings, 7 POPULAR Music & SOC'TY 140, 140 (No. 3 1979); Comment, Drug Lyrics,
The FCCAnd The First Amendment, 5 LOY. L.A.L. REV. 329, 329 n.2 (1972) [hereinaf-
ter Comment, Drug Lyrics]. See generally S. Fnrm, supra note 7, at 137-50. Symboli-
cally, San Francisco's revered concert hall, the Fillmore West, was eventually
purchased by Howard Johnsons. W. LEUCHTENBERG, supra, at 234.
One writer describes the recent surge of rock idealism as "a renewal of hope that
goes against the passivity and isolationist tendencies of the '70s." Harrington, supra
note 3, at K2, col. 1. Accord Cocks, Songs from the High Ground, supra note 3, at 78;
Hamill, supra note 3, at 74; see also Palmer, What Pop Lyrics Say to Us Today, supra
note 25, at H1, col. 3 ("There have probably been more angry protest lyrics written
.and recorded in the last three or four years than in any comparable period of the
60s."). But see Hoskyns, Agitpop, NEW STATESMAN, Jan. 25, 1985, at 37; Brother, Can




and rock grew increasingly segmented. Today, discrete forms of
rock music are characterized by disparate themes and styles,
and by sharply delineated audiences. Some rock artists reflect
the anomie and social disorganization generated by an over-
whelming nuclear threat, sending shockingly ugly messages to
a young and impressionable audience.a Other artists symbolize
hard work and the American Dream, or sketch poignant tales
of everyman. Still others create disposable, vacuous, but me-
lodic, froth. Today, rock has expanded to the point that it has
almost swallowed the designation "popular music." But the-
matically, lyrically, and musically, diversity survives within it's
confines,-" rendering naive any attempt to generalize as to its
"value," or lack thereof.
One characteristic that has not changed is the musicians'
penchant for challenging prevailing values.3° Accordingly,
28. A glaring example is some heavy metal artists. Heavy metal is the extreme
genre of rock music that has attracted most of the vitriolic criticism. Some heavy
metal groups regularly deal with outrageous, antisocial themes in blunt and uncom-
promising terms. It is not surprising that this music inspires widespread fear and out-
rage in parents-in fact, that is the key to its popularity. See Pareles, supra note 6, at
H5, col. 2 ('What heavy-metal bands unabashedly deliver is shock value-a taste of
noisy, authority-threatening, vulgar thrlls .... [They] fulfill a function-public bad
taste-that has always been served by some kind of popular culture, from bear-baiting
to burlesque."); Marsh, Sympathy For The Devil, supra note 2, at 17, col. 3, 18, col. 4.
("It's difficult... to defend these musically primitive and socially barbaric groups....
[H]eavy metal's audience is the incarnation of James Watt's 'undesirable element.' ");
see also infra note 30. For an excellent discussion of heavy metal and its audience,
see Eddy, Heavy Metal, in THE FIRST ROCK & ROLL CONFIDENTIAL REPORT 183 (D.
Marsh ed. 1985); Frost, supra note 6. Ironically, the PMRC campaign publicity and the
labeling of heavy metal albums can only make some of these groups more profitable
and extend their otherwise brief careers. Many of the "culprits" are marginal acts;
suddenly they are prominent forbidden fruit-with a sticker to prove it. See Cocks,
Rock Is a Four-Letter Word, supra note 2, at 70; McDougall, 'Porn Rock': The Sound
Draws Fury, L.A. Times, Nov. 1, 1985, § 1, at 1, col. 1, 33, col. 6; Krauthammer, supra
note 4, at A27, col. 1.
One social scientist believes that the shift in rock themes was greatly motivated by
the assassination of John F. Kennedy. Hoffman, Rock and Roll and JF" A Study of
Thematic Changes in Rock and Roll Lyrics Since the Assassination of John F. Ken-
nedy, 10 POPULAR Music & SocIrY 59 (No. 2 1985).
29. See C. HAmm, supra note 15, at 649-50; see also Hirsch, Sociologicl Approaches
to the Pop Music Phenomenon, 14 AMERiCAN BEHAvIORAL SCIENTIST 371, 379 (1971)
(teenage music audience is stratified into sub-audiences).
30. This explains the extremism personified by heavy metal. A significant aspect
of rock's popularity has always been its symbolic attack on elder values. Rock bonds
adolescents by distancing them from their parents culturally. As modern cultural
norms grow increasingly permissive the music and its audience grow more extreme to
perform this distancing function. See Comment, Regulating Rock Lyrics" A New
Wave Of Censorship?, 23 HARv. J. ON LiEGs. 595, 618 (1986) [hereinafter Comment,
Regulating Rock Lyric]. One commentator suggests:
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many rock lyricists do not confine themselves to paeans of sen-
timental love and romance as was the case in an earlier, more
sedate and inhibited era. x Instead, in characteristically (and
symptomatically) blunt terms, they evoke nuclear peril, apa-
thy, illiteracy, sadism, satanism, violence, jingoism, drug abuse,
and promiscuity. Some songs celebrate the darker side of
human nature. Rock's critics charge that its influence today is
so pervasive that it has become not just a chronicler of contem-
porary cancers, but, indeed, a contributing cause.3
[Tihe PMRC... could just as well be describing prime-time America, from
Miami Vice to Dynasty to the latest sorority-girls-as-budding-witches
schlock TV movie. Rock music has to be viewed in the larger context of
American pop culture; Madonna's sex kitten persona is really Just a cheekier
version of a Charlie's Angel. Kids' natural anti-authoritarianism is going to
drive them to the frontiers of sexual fantasy in a society where most aspects
of the dirty deed have been appropriated by racy advertising and titillating
TV cheesecakery. The country has rotted, and rock music is simply taking
the decay to its scarifyingly logical conclusion.
Moran, supra note 3, at 15. See also Frost, supra note 6:
"A kid puts on a [shirt featuring a heavy metal band's logo] and it makes a
statement.... Hall and Oates don't make a statement."
So what statement is the kid making? He's telling society where he stands
- outside of it. He's telling the adult world to fuck off.
Id at 46, col. 4 (quoting in part heavy metal band manager Cliff Burnstein); see also
infra note 32 and text accompanying notes 42-45. Moreover, as rock continues to ap-
peal to the parents who grew up listening to it, modern youths search out more outra-
geous forms of the music. The music industry responds by supplying the market, and
many bands compete to exploit it, increasingly deviating from community standards
of decency and taste.
31. 3 R. DAVIs, supra note 15, at 348,350; Hoffman, supra note 28; Luce, The Great
Rock Conspiracy, NATIONAL REV., Sept. 23, 1969, at 959; Robinson, Pilskaln & Hirsch,
Protest Rock and Drugs, 26 J. COMM. 125 (Fall 1976); The Children of Bobby Dylan,
LIFE, Nov. 5, 1965, at 43; Message Time, TIME, Sept. 17, 1965, at 102; Some Place Near
Despairsville, TIME, June 5, 1964, at 60; Palmer, What Pop Lyrics Say to Us Today,
supra note 25.
32. See, e.g., Davis, Pop Lyrics, supra note 4, at 168. Commentators are divided
over the merit of this claim. Compare J. ORMAN, supra note 1, at 175 (rock is a re-
gime-maintaining institution); Pareles, supra note 6, at H5, col. 2 (no clinical evidence
that lyrics inspire antisocial behavior); Mann, supra note 4 (preadolescents do not
understand the messages contained in the lyrics) with 119 CONG. REC. 37,849-53 (1973)
(statement of Sen. Buckley) (rock is a former of attitudes which make drug experi-
mentation possible); Comment, Drug Lyrics, supra note 27, at 330 & n.17 (then Vice
President Spiro T. Agnew charged rock lyrics cause drug abuse); Davis, Pop Lyrics,
supra note 4, at 168 (lyrics can mold society); Cieply, Records May Soon Carry Warn-
ings That Lyrics Are Morally Hazardous, Wall St. J., July 31,1985, at 21, col. 4 (PMRC
charges some rock musicians are "Pied Pipers of evil"). A recent study by sociologist
Lorraine Prinsky and criminologist Jill Rosenbaum entitled "Sex, Violence and Rock
n' Roll: Youths Perceptions of Popular Music" found that lyrics have very little im-
pact on youth. See DeCurtis, Study Refutes PMRC Claims, Says.Kids Don't Listen to
Lyrics, ROLLING STONE, Aug. 14, 1986, at 11; Rockwell, Music May Come Firsl but
Words Are Important Too, N.Y. Times, July 6, 1986, at H17, ol. 1; Lewis, The Beat
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This is the crux of the current controversy. There is a grow-
ing tendency to blame rock for society's loose ends and fear its
impact on America's children." Thus far, the result has been a
high-profile parental campaign to wash the recording indus-
try's mouth out with soap. The Parents Music Resource
Center (PMRC) and the National Parent-Teachers Association
demanded, among other things, that the industry create and
administer a record rating system to aid them in sanitizing
their children's cultural diet. Many commentators joined a
general call for industry self-restraint in expression."4 The in-
dustry and the liberal press reacted by minimizing rock's role
in contemporary societal excesses and accusing rock's detrac-
tors of censorship.3 This otherwise healthy dialogue took on
Goes On, but Not the Words, S.F. Chron. & Examiner, June 22,1986, Sunday Punch,
at 3, col. 1. But qf Comment, Drug Lyrics, supra note 27, at 329 (rock has a staggering
impact on youth). The study appears to corroborate the conclusions of many modern
social scientists. Compare Hirsch, supra note 29, at 378 (study found that fewer than
30% of high school students were able to identify the messages in controversial hit
songs) with Rockwell, supra, (Prinsky-Rosenbaum study found that less than 3% of
teens pay strict attention to lyrics; most cannot describe the subject matter of the
songs). See also Harmon, Meaning in Rock Music: Notes Toward A Theory of Commu-
nication, 2 POPULAR Music & Soc'TY 18,31 (Fall 1972) (rock "reflects and reinforces
moods and attitudes in existence"); Hirsch, supra note 29, at 377 (teenagers attracted
by sound and beat, not verbal content; "systematic social research has yet to demon-
strate any effects of popular song lyrics upon their listeners"); Robinson, Pilskaln &
Hirsch, supra note 31, at 133 (rock does not cause drug use, but creates a favorable
climate for experimentation-"an openness and willingness to explore new ways of
looking at the new world"). But see Cole, Top Songs in the Sixties: A Content Analy-
sis of Popular Lyrics, 14 AMERcAN BEHAVIORAL ScIENTIST 389 (1971) (lyrics are an
important part of rock music's impact). Though the great weight of scientific author-
ity finds rock to be reflective and perhaps reinforcing rather than coercive, the social
scientists agree that rock and drug use are strongly associated. Qf Shain & Higgins,
Middle Class Delinquents and Popular Music: A Pilot Study, 2 POPULAR Music &
SOC'TY 33 (Fall 1972) (pop music more popular with delinquents than nondelin-
quents). The effect of rock music on children has received little study. See Stipp, Chil-
dren's Knowledge Of and Taste In Popular Music, 10 POPULAR Music & SOc'Ty 1 (No.
2 1985).
Perhaps more important for regulatory purposes, a recent survey indicates that 51%
of American adults believe rock music has a negative effect on children while less
than 40% believe it has no influence. Many adult rockersfavor warnings, S.F. Exam-
iner, Jan. 16, 1986, at E-3, col. 3. For a discussion of the debate over the impact of
offensive expression on youths, see infra notes 327-31.
33. See Rohde, Don't Blame the Rock Stars IfJa Fan Runs Amok, L.A. Times, July
14, 1986, § 2, at 5, col. 2; Note, Song Lyric Advisories: The Sound Of Censorship, 5
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L. 225, 227 n.10 (1986) [hereinafter Note, Song Lyric
Advisories].
34. See authorities cited supra note 4.
35. See authorities cited supra note 4. Some charge that the PMRC is using a few
extremist songs to label the entire industry. See Cocks, Rock Is a Four-Letter Word,
supra note 2, at 71; McCarthy, supra note 2, at H2, coL 4.
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ominous first amendment overtones when the forum moved to
the Senate floor.3 Eventually, a private compromise was
reached that appears to be unsatisfactory to both sides." In
36. On September 19, 1985, the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and
Transportation held hearings on the porn-rock issue and the PMRC proposals. See
Record Labeling: Hearing Before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and
Transportation, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); see also Note, Song Lyric Advisories,
supra note 33, at 231-33. For critical accounts of the Senate hearings, see Zucchino,
supra note 4; Congress all shook up over rock lyrics, BROADCASTING, Sept. 23, 1985, at
28; Marsh, Sympathy For The Devil, supra note 2. The Senators seized the moment to
publicly air their indignation. One commentator described some of the Senators as
"'Cosby congressmen' who are not afraid to flex for family values." Heard, supra
note 4, at 12. The posturing was also accompanied by some "cogent" legal analysis:
"There is no absolute right to free speech. In my experience, no one has the absolute
right to yell "fire" in a theater. And I'd like that statement to be placed in the rec-
ord." Id. (quoting Florida Senator Paula Hawkins). Commentators agree that the
hearings were nothing short of a circus.
Industry self-restraint, public agitation therefor, and public debate and awareness
in general on moral and family issues are of course to be encouragedL The first amend-
ment only prohibits government involvement. It is questionable whether the Senate
hearings rise to modern restrictive notions of "state action," see Blum v. Yaretsky, 457
U.S. 991 (1982); Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982), since the ultimate agree-
ment reached was a private one. But considering the condemnatory atmosphere and
the marital affiliation of PMRC members with many high-ranking Senators, includ-
ing members of the hearing panel, it is reasonable to contend that the state impermis-
sibly lent its weight to the final agreement. See Molotsky, supra note 4; Hentoff, The
Disc Washers, supra note 4; cf Comment, Regulating Rock Lyrics, supra note 30, at
609 ("Political leverage often blurs the distinction between governmental and non-
governmental powers"). Compare Writers Guild of Am., West, Inc. v. FCC, 423 F.
Supp. 1064, 1140-41 (C.D. Cal. 1975) (FCC coercion culminating in private agreement
abridging free expression sufficient for finding of state action), vacated and re-
manded sub nom. Writers Guild of Am., West, Inc. v. American Broadcasting Co.,
609 F.2d 355 (9th Cir. 1979), cert denied, 449 U.S. 824 (1980), dismissed on remand
sub nom. NAB TV Code, 95 F.C.C.2d 700 (1983), discussed infra notes 160-85 and
accompanying text. See Walden, The Applicability of State Action Doctrine to Private
Broadcasters, 7 CoMM/ENT L.J. 265, 307-18 (1985); of Kamenshine, The First
Amendment's Implied Political Establishment Clause, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 1104, 1106
(1979) (suggesting that governmental assistance to private groups' expression of polit-
ical views poses a threat to free expression and implicitly violates the first amend-
ment). Professor Kamenshine's theory would implicate the first amendment only
when the assisted speech is political in nature, but his test for "political"--"a contro-
versial issue of public importance," id. at 1113- would easily encompass the Senate
hearings on the porn-rock issue. Moreover, the mode of government assistance-the
provision of a political forum (the Senate floor) and the moral and politically coercive
weight of the United States Senate- should render the hearings sufficiently "polit-
ical." This assumes what was obvious to all observers-that the inquiry was hardly
neutral. See Note, Song Lyric Advisories, supra note 33, at 231. On the concept of
state action, see generally L.TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, §§ 18-1 to 18-7,
at 1147-74 (1978); id at 105-09 (Supp. 1979); Choper, Thoughts on State Action." The
"Government Function" and "Power Theory" Approaches, 1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 757.
37. Under the compromise reached by the PMRC and the Recording Industry As-
sociation of America (RIAA), record companies have the option of either affixing a
warning label reading EXPLICIT LYRICS PARENTAL ADVISORY on the back of the al-
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the aftermath, rock remains a scapegoat for a troubled society
and an important moral issue. It is not unlikely that the elec-
tronic media, already implicated, will become the next battle-
ground. In that context, rock will become a legal issue as
well.se
bum cover or displaying a lyric sheet under the shrink wrap. Cassettes refer to the
album for lyric content. See Goldberg, Censorship Compromise, ROLLING STONE, Jan.
16, 1986, at 10; Recording Industry Agrees to Warn of 'Explicit Lyrics, L.A. Times,
Nov. 1, 1985,. § 1, at 2, col. 4.
The accord is too much for the Musical Majority, an industry anti-censorship group
which objects to the label, and too little for the PMRC, which sought a movie-type
rating system. Frank Zappa, the most strident foe of the PMRC, was vocal in his criti-
cism of the pact, terming it "the equivalent of treating dandruff with decapitation."
Kelly, supra note 2, at 95. Zappa has retaliated by placing his own warning label on his
albums. It reads:
WARNING/GuARANTEE
This album contains material which a truly free society would neither fear
nor suppress.
In some socially retarded areas, religious fanatics and ultra-conservative
political organizations violate your First Amendment Rights by attempting to
censor rock & roll albums. We feel that this is un-Constitutional and un-
American.
As an alternative to these government-supported programs (designed to
keep you docile and ignorant), Barking Pumpkin is pleased to provide stimu-
lating digital audio entertainment for those of you who have outgrown the
ordinary.
The language and concepts contained herein are GUARANTEED NOT TO
CAUSE ETERNAL TORMENT IN THE PLACE WHERE THE GUY WITH
THE HORNS AND POINTED STICK CONDUCTS HIS BUSINESS.
This guarantee is as real as the threats of the video fundamentalists who
use attacks on rock music in their attempt to transform America into a na-
tion of check-mailing nincompoops (in the name of Jesus Christ). If there is a
hell, its fires wait for them, not us.
Note, Song Lyric Advisories, supra note 33, at 234 n.55. Zappa also released an album
and video called Porn Wars based on the hearings and featuring cameo appearances
by many of the Senators. Rense, Senators Unflapped By Zappa, L.A. Times, Nov. 1,
1985, Calendar, at 1, col. 6.
38. It is difficult to gauge the possibility of federal legislation designed to regulate
the content of sound recordings. The signals emanating from the Senate hearings
were conflicting. Zucchino, supra note 4, at 16. Committee Chairman Senator Dan-
forth claimed that there was "zero chance" of legislation. Molotsky, supra note 4, at
60, cols. 1, 2. Senator Hollings, however, was outraged by the filth he heard. He
warned he would "ask the best constitutional minds if there isn't some way to legis-
late." He also noted that broadcasters enjoy less than full constitutional protection.
Mann, supra note 4, at.C3, col. 5. Senator James Exon warned that "unless the music
industry cleans up its act,, there might well be legislation." Cocks, Rock is a Four-
Letter Word, supra note 2, at 70; Congress all shook up over rock lyrics, supra note 36,
at 28; McDougall, Zapping The Threat of Censorship, L.A. Times, Sept. 20, 1985,§ VI,
at 1, col. 6, 21, col. 1. For an analysis of the constitutional issues posed by government
regulation of the content of sound recordings, see Note, Song Lyric Advisories, supra
note 33; Comment, Regulating Rock Lyrics, supra note 30.
At least thirteen states have recently considered some form of legislation regulating
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II
The Legal Status of Rock Speech
Rock music is protected speech.3 9 But the vagaries of modern
first amendment jurisprudence require a further inquiry: How
protected is it?' Today, the degree of protection enjoyed by
the sale of albums with obscene or indecent packaging or offensive lyrics. See Selig-
man, T1welve states consider 1porn rock'legislation, ROLLING SToNE, June 19, 1986, at
19 (Alabama, Arizona, Florida, Hawaii, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey,
New York, South Carolina, South Dakota, West Virginia and Wisconsin); Sheinfeld,
The Big Chill, FILM COMMENT, June 1986, at 9, 10. Mississippi is the only state thus
far to enact an antipornography law which includes sound recordings. See MISS. CODE
ANN. § § 97-5-27, 97-5-29 (Supp. 1985). While many of the constitutional issues consid-
ered here can be applied to such laws, an analysis of the government's ability to regu-
late in this area is beyond the scope of this Note.
Regulatory action by the FCC is more likely than federal or state legislation. It has
been reported that the PMRC engineered a June 1985 informal meeting with a
number of Senators and FCC Chairman Mark S. Fowler. After hearing the PMRC
presentation "Fowler was heard to whisper 'Something needs to be done.' "Wolmuth,
Parents vs. Rock, PEOPLE WEEKLY, Sept. 16,1985, at 49. But see Fowler Still Stumping
for Deregulation, BROADCASTING, Sept. 30, 1985, at 86, 87:
In response to a question about the Parents Music Resource Center and the
National Council of Churches of Christ, beth of which have complained
about programming aired by broadcasters, Fowler said the two organizations
would get a "chilly reception" at the FCC.
He said it was appropriate for them to complain to the broadcasters and the
record companies, but that they should not ask the government to intervene.
This Note concludes that the FCC has the power to act if it so chooses. See infra
notes 374-400 and accompanying text for an assessment of the potential for FCC regu-
lation. The likelihood of such regulation is dealt with at irfra notes 402-16.
39. The Supreme Court has never directly ruled on the question, but a number of
federal courts have. See Calash v. City of Bridgeport, 788 F.2d 80, 82 (2d. Cir. 1986);
Cinevision Corp. v. City of Burbank, 745 F.2d 560, 567 (9th Cir. 1984), cert denied, 105
S. Ct. 2115 (1985); Reed v. Village of Shorewood, 704 F.2d 943,950 (7th Cir. 1983) (rock
music); ef Tacynec v. City of Philadelphia, 687 F.2d 793, 796 (3d Cir. 1982) (string
music), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1172 (1983); Goldstein v. Town of Nantucket, 477 F.
Supp. 606, 608 (D. Mass. 1979) (traditional folk music). The Supreme Court has held
that live musical entertainment is protected. Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim,
452 U.S. 61, 65 (1981).
It is worth repeating that the constitution shields rock speakers from governmental
interference only. Thus, consumer and citizens groups remain free to pressure the
industry to conform its expression to community standards. Indeed, such protest is
itself constitutionally protected. But such groups are prohibited from enlisting the
government as an ally, or bringing government influence to bear on the record indus-
try, as was arguably done by the PMRC. See supra note 36. One commentator advo-
cates record industry self-restraint but believes that such restraint represents a
greater threat to first amendment values than government regulation. Comment, Reg-
ulating Rock Lyrics; supra note 30, at 597, 610.
40. See infra note 254. Judicial value judgments concerning rock 'n' roll are not
unheard of; see Henry v. FCC, 302 F.2d 191, 194 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (Bazelon, C.J.) (dis-
cussing the comparative merits of programming opera and rock). Today, however,
such value judgments can result in the denial of constitutional protection in certain
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particular expression may depend on a subjective judicial as-
sessment of its value to society.41
As well-illustrated by its newsworthy presence in 1985, rock
has many faces which range from the beautiful to the hideous,
the inspiring to the evil. But at those extremes, and within
them, rock is a reflection of the society that creates it, listens
to it, and demands it.4 Though some forms of rock music may
seem more valuable than others, they all tell us a great deal
about our society, portraying and exposing critical truths either
through the music or by their very presence. Thus, like all as-
pects of our culture, rock music clearly performs a substantial
"mirroring" function.4'
Another function performed by rock music, as well as other
aspects of youth culture, is one of "bonding"." Rock music
circumstances. .Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 106 S. Ct. 3159, 3163-65 (1986);
FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 742-47 (1978) (plurality opinion); Young v.
American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 70-71 (1976) (plurality opinion).
41. See Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 318 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting);
Goldman, The Doctrine of Worthier Speech: Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc.,
21 ST. Louis U.L.J. 281, 300 (1977).
42. See Davis, Pop Lyrics, supra note 4, at 167-69; Hamlin, supra note 4, at 4; see
also 119 CONG. REc. 37,849, 37,851 (1973) (statement of Sen. Buckley) ("Music is a
reflection of a culture; a footnote to the events within a society." (quoting record
executive Clive Davis)); S. SPAETH, THE IMPORTANCE OF Music 181 (1963): "[P]opular
music is the best possible index to the everyday life, the manners, customs and idi-
osyncracies of every generation.... (Tihe absurdities of rock 'n' roll truly reflect the
violence, illiteracy and sex obsession of the present generation." Note that Spaeth
was writing in 1963. For a more modern perspective, see Yardley, Explicit Lyrics,
Explicit Society, Wash. Post, Sept. 2, 1985, at C2, col. 1: Porn rock lyrics are
not so much exceptions to the norm as exaggerations of it.... [W]e can't
excoriate Prince on the one hand and then snigger over "Three's Company"
on the other, any more than we can deplore Madonna and then moon over
"General Hospital." The real problem isn't with rock 'n' roll but with us.
Id. at col. 3. See also supra note 32.
43. C. Farber, Civilizing Public Discourse: An Essay on Professor Bickel, Justice
Harlan, and the Enduring Significance of Cohen v. California, 1980 DuKE L.J. 283,
302 (offensive expression serves the important function of revealing the existence of
ugliness and important but unpleasant truths). Commentators have posited that
falsehoods have value in the realm of debate because they bring truth into sharper
focus. Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REv.
964, 972 (1978); Redish, Advocacy of Unlawful Conduct and the First Amendment: In
Defense of Clear and Present Danger, 70 CALIF. L. REv. 1159, 1161-62 (1982). See also
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,279 n. 19 (1964) ("even a false statement
may be deemed to make a valuable contribution to public debate, since it brings about
'the clearer perception and livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision with
error.' ") (quoting J. MILL, ON LIBERTY 15 (Blackwell ed. 1947)). Similarly, "ugly"
messages can be considered valuable for increasing society's appreciation of beautiful
messages.
44. See Carey, The Ideology of Autonomy in Popular Lyric& A Content Analysis,
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unites youth by providing common icons, language, and tokens
which bridge demographic gaps. This is one of the very reasons
rock was feared by segregationists at its inception.4
Most importantly, some rock artists use their music to make
political statements that reach wide audiences. Some rock mu-
sic therefore enters what has been identified as the "core" of
the first amendment-political speech.4 Indeed, if Thomas
Paine surfaced in 1985, Common Sense might be a rock song
with an accompanying video.
But the interrelationship between the rock and radio indus-
tries renders the foregoing discussion somewhat academic. Re-
gardless of its intrinsic value, rock speech, like poetry, prose,
theatre and public affairs discussion,, is subject to greater gov-
ernmental interference when disseminated via the broadcast
media.47 Therefore, while live rock shows and sound record-
ings may be protected against government restriction (absent a
32 PSYCHIATRY 150, 152 (1969); Frost, supra note 6, at 46, col. 4; supra note 30. Rock's
ability to bond its audiences is reduced somewhat by the growing diversity in the
forms of rock music. See supra text accompanying notes 28-29. But the modern
youthful rock fan often sees his choice of bands as a social statement. See Frost, supra
note 6, at 46, col. 4. Thus there may be a greater sense of unity within a faction - but
a greater number of factions. See Hirsch, supra note 29, at 379.
45. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
46. See, e.g., FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 380 n.13, 381, 382
(1984). The "core" speech concept derives from the widely held view that a core func-
tion of the first amendment is to inform the polity towards improving its capacity for
self-government. Thus speech relating to political matters was most clearly relevant
to the framers' vision. See Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment
Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971). Commentators have theorized that the first amend-
ment serves the additional goal of helping to define our individual identities, promot-
ing self-realization and generally furthering our spiritual liberty. See generally L.
TRIBE, supra note 36, at § 12-1; Baker, supra note 43, at 990-92; Cox, Foreword Free-
dom Of Expression In The Burger Court, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1, 1-3 (1980); Emerson,
Toward A General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 879-81 (1963);
Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IowA L. REv. 1405, 1409-13 (1986); Quadres,
Content-Neutral Public Forum Regulations: The Rise Of The Aesthetic State Interest
The Fall Of Judicial Scrutiny, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 439, 484 n.234 (1986); Redish, supra
note 43, at 1164. Thus the naked ability to speak freely on all matters of interest is
viewed as a significant, though not "core" goal of the first amendment.
Social scientists studying rock music and its functionality have identified its utility
in performing both of these functions. See Carey, supra note 44, at 150, 162 (rock lyrics
celebrate autonomy, self-realization and choice); Hoffman, supra note 28 (politiciza-
tion); Robinson, Pilskaln & Hirsch, supra note 31, at 132-35 (politicization; rock also
expresses and perhaps creates "a greater audience regard for intimacy, spontaneity,
and the search for identity"). It thus appears that rock furthers the oft-identified
goals of the first amendment.
47. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 378; FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S.
726,742 n.17, 748-50 (1978); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). See
Quadres, supra note 46, at 482 n.224.
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finding of obscenity, other legitimate categorical proscrip-
tions," or a weighty government interest), broadcast rock
speech is susceptible to direct regulation if deemed "inde-
cent, '49 or to indirect regulation if deemed inconsistent with
the public interest.50 More importantly, broadcast rock speech
is subject to intformal regulation through the FCC's power of
persuasion incident to its licensing authority. 1 Since airplay is
crucial to the vast majority of rock acts, the ability to regulate
broadcast speech is rock's Achilles heel. It is therefore neces-
sary to examine the scope of permissible regulation of broad-
cast speech under the first amendment and the Commu-
nications Act of 1934 to determine the extent of the govern-
ment's ability to restrain rock expression.
III
FCC Authority To Regulate Program Content
A. The Foundations of Content Regulation
The statutory basis of the FCC's authority to regulate con-
tent in the broadcast media is the Federal Communications Act
of 1934.53 By the Act's terms, the FCC was granted a wealth of
48. Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 213-14 (1975).
49. 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1982); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978). See irnjra
notes 67-86, 211-77 and accompanying text. Section 1464 provides:
Whoever utters any obscene, indecent, or profane language by means of ra-
dio communication shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not
more than two years or both.
This Note distinguishes between direct, indirect and informal FCC regulation. Di-
rect regulation is regulatory action predicated on a determination that a licensee has
violated section 1464. Indirect regulation is the denial of a license renewal for the
broadcasting of material which is contrary to the public interest. It also includes
rulemaking proceedings and policy statements which define the contours of the public
interest. Informal regulation is Commission action short of direct or indirect regula-
tion which is based on the Commission's ability to regulate directly or indirectly.
50. See Pacifica Found., 36 F.C.C. 147, para. 3 at 148 (1964) (hereinafter Pacifica
(1964)]. See infia notes 89-106 and accompanying text. The possibility that musical
expression may become a lesser protected category of expression is discussed ifi'rn
notes 359-68 and accompanying text.
51. See Note, Regulation Of Program Content By The FCC, 77 HARV. L. REv. 701,
703-04 (1964); infra notes 136-45 and accompanying text.
52. See S. FRrrH, supra note 7, at 117; Marsh, What'd I Say?, supra note 7, at 47;
Sumrall, The Rating Game: Are rock lyrics too raw?, San Jose Mercury News, Oct. 13,
1985, Arts & Books, at 16, col. 1, 20, col. 2.
53. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1982). See FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S.
134,137 (1940); Note, The Future of Content Regulation in Broadcasting, 69 CALIF. L
REV. 555, 561 (1981). For discussion of the events leading to the enactment of the
1934 Act's predecessor, the Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169, 44 Stat. 1162 (1927), repealed, 48
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discretion, its regulatory authority bounded only by the "pub-
lic convenience, interest, or necessity, ' ' the duty to refrain
from censorship,5 and the then cloudy limitations of the first
amendment."
The Commission's authority to regulate content withstood a
first amendment challenge in National Broadcasting Co. (NBC)
v. United States.57 After deciding that the grant of power em-
bodied in the public interest criterion was a permissible delega-
tion of congressional power,58 Justice Frankfurter created a
constitutional talisman by theorizing that the scarcity of radio
spectrum space was a sufficient ground to justify governmental
Stat. 1102 (1934), see Deregulation of Radio, Notice of Inquiry and Proposed
Rulemaking, 73 F.C.C.2d 457, paras. 13-16 at 462-64 (1979) [hereinafter Deregulation
qf Radio]; E. BARNOUW, A TowER IN BABEL (1966); W. EMERY, BROADCASTING AND
GOVERNMENT 26-34 (1971); L WHITE, THE AMERICAN RADIO 126-54 (1947); Fowler &
Brenner, A Marketplace Approach To Broadcast Regulation, 60 TEX. L. REv. 207, 2i3
(1982); Mander, The Public Debate About Broadcasting in the 7Twenties: An Interpre-
tive History, 28 J. BROADCASTING 167 (1984); Severin, Commercial vs. Non-Commer-
cial Radio During Broadcasting's Early Years, 22 J. BROADCASTING 491, 491-96 (1978);
Note, The Future of Content Regulation in Broadcasting, supra, at 558-61; see also
National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 210-14 (1943).
The constitutional basis for Congress' authority to regulate the broadcast media is
its power to regulate interstate commerce. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
54. 47 U.S.C. § 303 (1982). The public interest standard pervades the Act. E.g., 47
U.S.C. §§ 303(f), (g), 307(a), (d), 309(a).
55. 47 U.S.C. § 326 (1982) provides:
Nothing in this Act shall be understood or construed to give the Commission
the power of censorship over the radio communications or signals transmit-
ted by any radio station, and no regulation or condition shall be promulgated
or fixed by the Commission which shall interfere with the right of free
speech by means of radio communication.
56. The first amendment of the United States Constitution provides, in pertinent
part
Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press....
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
The post-depression era was marked by an "undeveloped and unenlightened First
Amendment jurisprudence . .. that tolerated government suppression of speech
based on any evil tendencies that it potentially could provoke." Fein, Rqflections on
First Amendment Protection of Broadcast Speech, 31 FED. BAR NEWS & J. 424, 424
(1984).
57. 319 U.S. 190 (1943). NBC challenged the FCC's Chain Broadcasting Regula-
tions which limited the extent of network control over affiliate programming. The
Court decided that the promulgation of the regulations was a valid exercise of the
Commission's authority to license and regulate in the public interest. Id. at 224.
58. I at 226. Compare Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936); Schechter
Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293
U.S. 388 (1935) (striking down broad delegations of congressional power) with FRC v.
Nelson Bros. Bond & Mortgage Co., 289 U.S. 266, 285 (1933) (upholding the broad
delegation of power in the Radio Act of 1927).
1987] ROCK LYRICS
intrusion in the area of program content."
The decision has been widely criticized,' but it definitively
established the broadcasting field as sui generi for first
amendment purposes.61 Thus, within the broad limits of the
Act, the Commission can scrutinize licensee programming to
enforce the FCC's conception of the public interest without of-
fending the first amendment--even though the same power
59. "Unlike other modes of expression, radio inherently is not available to all.
That is its unique characteristic, and that is why, unlike other modes of expression, it
is subject to government regulation." 319 U.S. at 226. The Court further held that the
Act called for inquiry into content. Justice Frankfurter construed the overriding pur-
pose of the Act to be "to secure the maximum benefits of radio to all," and reasoned
that this could not be accomplished without adjudicating license applications on the
basis of program content. Id. at 215-17. Contrust FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station,
309 U.S. 470, 475 (1940) (dictum that "[t]he Commission is given no supervisory con-
trol of the programs"). The Court's approach in NBC was aptly criticized by the late
Professor Harry Kalven, Jr.: "The question is not what does the need for licensing
permit the Commission to do in the public interest; rather it is what does the man-
date of the First Amendment inhibit the Commission from doing even though it is to
license." Kalven, Broadcasting, Public Policy and the First Amendment, 10 J.L. &
ECON. 15, 37 (1967) [hereinafter Kalven, Broadcasting].
60. E.g., T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 657 (1970); E.
SMEAD, FREEDOM OF SPEECH BY RADIO AND TELEVISION 108 (1959); Bollinger, Free-
dom Of The Press And Public Access: Toward A Theory Of Partial Regulation Of The
Mass Media, 75 MICH. L_ REV. 1, 7 n.21 (1976); Fowler, The Public's Interest, 56 FLA.
B.J. 213, 214-15 (1982); Fowler & Brenner, supra note 53, at 218-19; Kalven, Broad-
casting, supra note 59, at 41-45; Robinson, The FCC and the First Amendment- Obser-
vations on 40 Years of Radio and Television Regulation, 52 MINN. L. REv. 67, 143-44
(1967) (hereinafter Robinson, Observations]; Note, The Limits of Broadcast Sef-Regu-
lation Under The First Amendment, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1527, 1540 n.55 (1975) and au-
thorities cited therein. Some have argued that the decision has been misread. E.g., F.
KAHN, DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN BROADCASTING 100 (3d ed. 1978); Kalven, Broad-
casting, supra note 59, at 41-45; Krasnow, Cole & Kennard, FCC Regulation and
Other Oxymoron. Seven Axioms To Grind, 5 COMM/ENT L.J. 759, 762 n.8 (1983).
61. See, e.g., Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 388 (1969) ("Where
there are substantially more individuals who want to broadcast than there are fre-
quencies to allocate, it is idle to posit an unabridgeable First Amendment right to
broadcast comparable to the right of every individual to speak, write or publish.");
Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082, 1093-94 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert denied, 396 U.S. 842
(1969).
The rationale advanced for reduced protection of broadcast speech has not been
limited to the spectrum scarcity doctrine. The supplemental themes in the reduced
protection refrain have been loosely handled by judges and commentators alike. The
concepts are often blurred in analysis under general umbrellas of pervasiveness, in-
trusiveness, nuisance, scarcity, public ownership/domain, privilege, impact and power.
The common denominator is that each exacts a quid pro quo from the licensee which
entails government regulation. On the various rationales, see generally Bazelon, FCC
Regulation Of The Telecommunications Press, 1975 DUKE L.J. 213,218-29; Robinson,
Observations, supra note 60, at 150-63; Note, Offensive Speech and the FCC, 79 YALE
L.J. 1343, 1350-54 (1970).
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wielded over the print media would clearly be impermissible."
With the NBC decision tucked safely in its holster, the Com-
mission wasted little time in unveiling its vision of the public
interest. In both its 1946 Bluebook e and its 1960 Enbanc Pro-
gramming Inquiry,"' the Commission counseled licensees as to
what types of programming would assure license renewal. Be-
cause the industry has been singularly eager to please, the
Commission has seldom found it necessary to mobilize its con-
siderable weaponryes against a licensee for failure to broadcast
in the public interest. The threat itself is usually sufficient to
keep broadcasters in line.6e
B. Direct Regulation of Program Content
When a licensee does transgress the public interest, the Com-
mission has an assortment of devices to remind the licensee of
its fiduciary responsibilities. The tools available to maintain de-
62. Compare Red Lion, 395 U.S. 367 with Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Tornillo, 418
U.S. 241 (1974). But see Kalven, Broadcasting, supra note 59, at 24: "The legal issues
as to the status of broadcasting and the Amendment have never been confronted by
the Court, despite the oft quoted dictum in the NBC [sic] case in 1943. There still
remains therefore, the chance for a major collision of broadcasting with existing
First Amendment doctrines." Presumably Red Lion and FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438
U.S. 726 (1978), discussed infra notes 211-17, were such collisions and the doctrine of
NBC has not merely survived but prospered and propagated.
63. FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMIsSIoN, PUBLIC SERVICE RESPONSIBILITY OF
BROADCAST LICENSEES (1946). This public interest manifesto stressed the importance
of providing an adequate amount of local, live and sustaining programs, and made it
clear that the failure to meet Bluebook requirements would jeopardize license re-
newal. However, the document left the expected apportionment to licensee surmise,
perpetuating the illusion of licensee discretion while ensuring that conscientious
licensees would err on the side of the public interest. See Deregulation of Radio, 73
F.C.C.2d 457, paras. 22-23 at 466-67 (1979); F. KAHN, supra note 60, at 132-33; H.
WARNER, RADIO AND TELEVISION LAW 453, 457 (1948); Meyer, "The Blue Book", 6 J.
BROADCASTING 197 (1962); Meyer, Reaction of the "Blue Book", 6 J. BROADCASTING
295 (1962).
64. 44 F.C.C. 2303 (1960). See Deregulation of Radio, 73 F.C.C.2d 457, para. 25 at
468; Robinson, Observation, supra note 60, at 112. The policy statement expanded
and specified the FCC's requirements. See 44 F.C.C. 2303 at 2314; F. KAHN, supra
note 60, at 262-63.
65. See infra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
66. See Robinson, Observations, supra note 60, at 115:
Absent very special circumstances, the broadcaster who fails to provide a re-
spectable percentage of programming in the categories which the Commis-
sion has selected as representative of balanced programming in the public
interest does so, or what is substantially the same, reasonably believes that
he does so, at his peril.
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cency in broadcasting range from the cease and desist ordere7 to
the power to revoke a station license,s and run the punitive
gamut from a slap on the wrist to what is euphemistically
known as "the death sentence."6 9
The device falling midway between the two in severity is the
forfeiture, a fine imposed on a licensee for violation of the fed-
eral criminal statute proscribing obscene, indecent, and profane
broadcasts.70 Illustrative is WUHY-FM Eastern Education Ra-
dio.71 The Commission monitored a Sunday evening broadcast 72
by a noncommercial underground station73 featuring an inter-
view with rock musician Jerry Garcia, a member of the Grate-
ful Dead. In the course of a freewheeling discussion about his
personal philosophies, Garcia punctuated his thoughts with an
occasional expletive.7 ' Neither the station nor the FCC re-
67. 47 US.C. § 312(b) (1982). See Mile High Stations, Inc., 28 F.C.C. 795, para. 6 at
797 (1960).
68. 47 U.S.C. § 312(a) (1982). Qf. Mile High Stations, 28 F.C.C. 795, para. 3 at 796
(Commission issued order to show cause why station license should not be revoked;
exercised lenity and issued cease and desist order). See generally Abel, Clift & Weiss,
Station License Revocations and Denials of Renew4 1934-1969,14 J. BROADCASTING
411 (1970); Stanley, Revocation, Renewal of License, and Fines and Forfeiture Cases
before the Federal Communications Commission, 8 J. BROADCASTING 371 (1964);
Weiss, Ostroff & Clift, Station License Revocations and Denials of Renewal 1970-78,
24 J. BROADCASTING 69 (1980).
69. See Pacifica Found., 56 F.C.C.2d 94, para. 7 at 96 n.3 (1975) [hereinafter
Pacifca (1975)], rev'd, 556 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977), rev'd, 438 U.S. 726 (1978). See gener-
ally B. COLE & M. OETTINGER, RELUCTANT REGTJULATORS 189-202 (1978); Note, Writers
Guild of America, West, Inc. v. FCC: A First Amendment Blow to FCCJawboning, 20
ARIz. L. REV. 315, 326-28 (1978); Comment, Musical Expression and First Amend-
ment Considerations, 24 DE PAuL L. REv 143,155 (1974).
70. 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1982), set out supra note 49. The FCC is authorized to impose
a forfeiture for the violation of that statute by 47 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(D) (1982). See
generally Clift, Abel & Garay, Forfeitures and the Federal Communications Com-
mission: An Update, 24 J. BROADCASTING 301 (1980); Clift, Weiss & Abel, Ten Years
of Forfeitures by the Federal Communications Commission, 15 J. BROADCASTING 379
(1971).
71. 24 F.C.C.2d 408 (1970).
72. The Commission had received prior complaints about the station's program-
ming in that time slot (10:00 P.M). 24 F.C.C.2d 408, par. 5 at 409 n.2.
73. The Commission explained that such a station broadcasts avant-garde social
and artistic programs. 24 F.C.C.2d 408, par. 2 at 408 n.1. For a failed FCC attempt to
discipline another underground station, see Jack Straw Memorial Found., 21 F.C.C.2d
833 (granting short term renewal), hearing ordered on reconsideration 24 F.C.C.2d
266 (1970), license renewed, 29 F.C.C.2d 334 (1971), discussed infra notes 107-14 and
accompanying text. For a description of underground radio, see S. FRITH, supra note
7, at 122.
74. Commissioner Cox noted that neither Garcia nor the licensee had uttered the
language for the purpose of shocking or titillating. Rather, this was simply the way
Garcia and his generation speak. 24 F.C.C.2d 408, at 418 (Cox, Comm'r concurring in
COMM/ENT L. J. [Vol. 9:423
ceived any complaints about the broadcast. The Commission,
however, was sufficiently offended to issue a Notice of Appar-
ent Liability7" for broadcasting indecent material. In defining
the term "indecent" the FCC simply adopted the extant ob-
scenity standard and excised the requirement that the material
appeal to the prurient interest.76
Two factors were crucial to the FCC's decision. First, the
FCC believed radio's unique characteristics, the pervasive and
intrusive nature of the medium, justified the Commission's in-
terference with indecent licensee expression." The other fac-
part and dissenting in part). The majority thought it sufficient that the language was
gratuitous and lacking in social value. IM pars. 7 at 410, para. 12 at 413. Note that the
interview was not performed live.
75. See 47 U.S.C. § 503 (b)(4) (1982). After receiving the Notice, the licensee can
pay the forfeiture or refuse to pay. A refusal "require[s] the FCC to seek to recover
[the forfeiture] in a trial de novo before a court." Illinois Citizens Comm. for Broad-
casting v. FCC, 515 F.2d 397, 401 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
76. 24 F.C.C.2d 408, para. 10 at 412. The standard was formulated in Memoirs v.
Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966). That case adjudicated the nonobscenity of John
Cleland's novel FANNY HILL: MEMOIRS OF A WoMAN OF PLEASURE. Under the
Memoirs test, for a finding of obscenity
three elements must coalesce: it must be established that (a) the dominant
theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to a prurient interest in sex;
(b) the material is patently offensive because it affronts contemporary com-
munity standards relating to the description or representation of sexual mat-
ters; and (c) the material is utterly without redeeming social value.
383 U.S. at 418.
The Memoirs test was modified in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973):
The basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a) whether "the average
person, applying contemporary community standards" would find that the
work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b) whether the
work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifi-
cally defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as
a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
I& at 24 (citations omitted).
For the argument that Miller effectively overruled WUHY-FM, see Illinois Citizens
Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 515 F.2d 397, 418 & n.48 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (Bazelon,
C.J., statement as to why he would grant rehearing en bane); Note, Filthy Words The
FCC and the First Amendmen Regulating Broadcast Obscenity, 61 VA. L. REv. 579,
604-05 (1975) [hereinafter Note, Filthy Words]; cf. United States v. Simpson, 561 F.2d
53, 55 n.2 (7th Cir. 1977) (reversing a section 1464 conviction for indecent broadcasting
on the basis of a jury instruction approximating the WUHY-FM standard). The Com-
mission modified and reaffirmed the WUHY-FM standard of "indecency" in PacVfica
(1975), 56 F.C.C.2d 94, pars. 16 at 100.
One commentator has argued persuasively that prurient appeal as measured by the
average person is meaningless and self-contradictory. Ratner, The Social Importance
Of Prurient Interest - Obscenity Regulation v. Thought Privacy, 42 S. CAL. I- REV.
587, 588 (1969).
77. 24 F.C.C.2d 408, para. 8 at 411. See also Pacifica (1975), 56 F.C.C.2d 94, paras.
11-13 at 98-99 (indecent language on intrusive medium akin to a public nuisance); cf
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tor was the Commission's fear that if WUHY emerged
unscathed after disseminating indecent expression, other sta-
tions might follow suit. The FCC opinion conjured a vision of
millions of American listeners approaching their radios with
trepidation-if they dared approach at all. Thus, it was neces-
sary to punish the licensee to stem the flood of filth on the
airways and keep radio useful to the public. The Commission
was acting to defend the public interest by abating a public nui-
sance.78 The Commission emphasized, however, that it could
only act in clear-cut, flagrant cases."
That flagrant case arose only three years later. In
Sonderling Broadcasting Corp.,s the licensee aired Femme Fo-
rum, a mid-day call-in talk show which often focused on sexual
topics. After two particularly egregious episodes,"' the FCC is-
sued a Notice of Apparent Liability for broadcasting obscene
and indecent material in violation of 18 U.S.C. section 1464. A
local citizens group sought reconsideration and the Commis-
sion narrowed the basis of liability to obscenity.82
Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082, 1100 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (broadcast cigarette advertise-
ments may be considered a public nuisance), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969).
78. 24 F.C.C.2d 408, paras. 7-8 at 410-11; see also Riggs, Regulation of Indecency
on Cable Television, 59 FLA. B.J. 9, 10 (1985). For an earlier version of this argument,
see Palmetto Broadcasting Co., 33 F.C.C. 250, para. 21 at 256 (1962), reconsideration
denied, 34 F.C.C. 101 (1963), qffd sub nom. Robinson v. FCC, 334 F.2d 534 (D.C. Cir.
1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 843 (1964). In Illinois Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v.
FCC, 515 F.2d 397 (D.C. Cir. 1975), Chief Judge Bazelon, the author of Banzhof sug-
gested that the Supreme Court's opinion in Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't
397 U.S. 728 (1970), invalidated the nuisance theory as a basis for government interfer-
ence with broadcast expression and thus undermined WUHY-FM. 515 F.2d at 418-19
n.48 (Bazelon, C.J., statement as to why he would grant rehearing en banc). However,
the Supreme Court upheld the nuisance theory in FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S.
726 (1978). See infra notes 240-55 and accompanying text. In doing so the Court signifi-
cantly altered the meaning of Rowan. See infra notes 314-19 and accompanying text.
79. 24 F.C.C.2d 408, par. 13 at 413. There were two strongly worded dissents.
Commissioner Cox (partially dissenting) disagreed with the "flood-of-filth" argument.
Id. at 417, 421. To the contrary, he was concerned with the chilling effect the decision
would have on experimental programming. I& at 417; accord id, at 423-24 (Johnson,
Comm'r, dissenting). Commissioners Cox and Johnson also found the definition of
indecency unconstitutionally vague. Id at 419-21 (Cox), 422 (Johnson). Commissioner
Johnson also argued that the majority was guilty of ethnocentrism in prohibiting the
language of a significant subculture and imposing the Commissioners' moral stan-
dards upon the nation. ISd at 423.
80. 41 F.C.C.2d 919, affd on reconsideration, 41 F.C.C.2d 777 (1973), affd sub
nom. Illinois Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 515 F.2d 397 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
81. The programs of February 21 and 23, 1973 discussed techniques of oral sex. See
515 F.2d at 401 & n.4.
82. 41 F.C.C.2d 777. The licensee chose to pay the $2000 forfeiture rather than
incur "the tremendous financial burden" of challenging the action. Id. para. 9 at 779.
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The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed.83
The court held that a daytime broadcast containing explicit
discussion of ultimate sexual acts in a titillating context could
be found statutorily obscene." Due to the narrowed FCC hold-
ing, the court did not reach the question of whether "indecent"
and "obscene" were synonymous within section 1464. s5 The
FCC's construction of the statute announced in WUHY-FM
thus remained unreviewed, but not for long. Shortly after-
wards, the Commission decided Citizen's Complaint Against
Station WBAI Paciftca Foundation (Pacifia (19 75))."e
Direct action against licensee programming is rarely under-
taken, mostly because it is more burdensome" than other regu-
latory techniques. The rare instance of direct action is
attributable to the indirect and informal effect it has on the
broadcasting industry, the public, and the Congress."
C. Indirect Regulation of Program Content
The more common method of regulating licensee program-
ming is use of the 'Commission's broad power to license (or re-
83. Illinois Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 515 F.2d 397 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
84. I& at 406.
85. Id. An important point the court did decide was a standing question. In Office
of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir.
1966), the court granted standing to representatives of the licensee's listening audi-
ence to challenge the licensee's renewal application with a petition to deny. ICE at
1001-03. The further question posed in Illinois Citizens was whether a citizens' group
had standing to challenge a forfeiture imposed upon a licensee when that licensee
had admitted liability by paying the fine. The court held in the affirmative, necessar-
ily implying that the public interest may also need protection from the FCC. 515 F.2d
at 406. See generally Longley, Krasnow & Terry, The Courts in Broadcast Regulatory
Policy-Making, 4 COMM/ENT L.J. 377 (1982).
86. 56 F.C.C.2d 94 (1975), rev'd, 556 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cr. 1977), rev'd, 438 U.S. 726
(1978), discussed inifra notes 211-359 and accompanying text.
87. To deny renewal of a station license the FCC need only find, as a matter of
fact, that the applicant has failed to prove that renewal would serve the public inter-
est. 47 U.S.C. §§ 307(c), 309(e) (1982). In forfeiture and revocation proceedings the
FCC has the burden of proof. See Robinson, Observations, supra note 60, at 118-19;
Comment, Drug Lyrics, supra note 27, at 337. See generally B. COLE & M. OErrINGFR
supra note 69, at 204-05.
88. See the further discussion of Sonderling Broadcasting Corp., 41 F.C.C.2d 919
(1973), infra notes 146-59 and accompanying text. Direct action against a licensee is
highly visible to the general public. A forfeiture proceeding is therefore the most ef-
fective way to quiet public and congressional clamor for action against a particular
programming practice. WUHY-FM, Sonderling, and Pacif ca (1975) 56 F.C.C.2d 94
(1975) were all decided against a backdrop of congressional and public dismay over
broadcast content. See infm note 106 and accompanying text.
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fuse to license) in the public interest." On receipt of an
application for renewal from a licensee whose programming
has generated complaints, the Commission can either grant re-
newal or order a hearing to determine whether renewal would
be consistent with the public interest.9° A renewal application
may be challenged with a petition to deny9' or a competing ap-
plication.92 The latter requires a hearing; the former mandates
a hearing only if it raises a substantial and material question of
fact.93 Ultimately, the Commission can renew the license, deny
renewal or grant a short term renewal, which is tantamount to
probation.94
A related method of controlling licensee programming is the
Commission's power to make rules and issue statements of
89. 47 U.S.C. §§ 307(a), (c), 309(a) (1982). See Comment, Drug Lyrics, supra note
27, at 337 & n.48. See generally Abel, Clift & Weiss, supra note 68; Stanley, supra note
68; Weiss, Ostroff & CMt, supra note 68. Consider the compelling statement of Pro-
fessor Meiklejohnr "[The first] amendment[] ... we may take it for granted, does not
forbid the abridging of speech. But, at the same time, it does forbid the abridging "of
freedom of speech." A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM 21 (1965) (emphasis in
original). In the broadcasting context, this logic would compel the conclusion that
the Constitution is far less offended by the Commission's power to punish indecent or
obscene speech than by the very existence of its power to deny licenses in the public
interest. The former deals directly with speech; the latter is manifestly a curtail-
ment of the freedom.
90. 47 U.S.C. § § 309(a), (e) (1982). The renewal rate has been estimated at 99%.
Fowler & Brenner, supra note 53, at 209 n.10. Former Chairman Fowler and Profes-
sor Brenner consider this a contributing factor in licensees' failure to challenge the
FCC's regulatory authority. Id at 209. Professor Kalven, writing prior to the 1970s
tidal wave of FCC content regulatory activity, observed that "[w]hat broadcasting has
needed is its own Zenger case. The greatest obstacle to the development of a vigorous
tradition of freedom of speech in broadcasting may well have been the placidity and
the decency of the FCC." Kalven, Broadcasting, supra note 59, at 18.
91. 47 U.S.C. § 309 (d) (1982). See Lamar Life Broadcasting Co., 38 F.C.C. 1143
(1965) (granting short term renewal), rev'd and remanded sub nom. Office of Com-
munication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966), on
remand, 14 F.C.C.2d 431 (1968) (granting short term renewal), rev'd and remanded,
425 F.2d 543 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
92. See 47 U.S.C. § 307 (b) (1982); 47 C.F.R. §§ 1.591, 1.593 (1982); WHDH, Inc., 16
F.C.C.2d 1, reconsideration denied, 17 F.C.C.2d 856 (1969), qffd, 444 F.2d 841 (D.C.
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971); Goldin, "Spare the Golden Goose"- The
Afermath of WHDH in FCC License Renewal Policy, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1014 (1970);
Pennybacker, Comparative Renewal Hearings: Another Dialogue Between Commis-
sion and Court, 24 J. BROADCASTING 527 (1980); Robinson, Observationsj supra note
60, at 115-18.
93. 47 U.S.C. § 309 (d) (1982). See WGBH Educ. Found., 69 F.C.C.2d 1250, para. 4 at
1252 (1978).
94. 47 U.S.C. § 307(c) (1982). See Shelby, Short-Term License Renewals. 1960-
1972,18 J. BROADCASTING 277 (1974).
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policy.9 5 Because of its power to deny renewal in the public in-
terest, the Commission's advice to licensees as to what pro-
gramming it feels serves the public interest is taken very
seriously. In fact, the Commission's most valuable regulatory
resource is the implicit threat generated by any indication from
the Commission that a particular programming practice is
outside the public interest."
Denial of renewal is drastic action but it was validated early
on to stem the broadcast of bogus medical advice and defama-
tion."8 Other practices found to disserve the public interest
include misrepresentations to the Commission," fairness doc-
95. 47 U.S.C. § 303 (1982).
96. See infra notes 136-210 and accompanyingtext. See also Robinson, Observa-
tions, supra note 60, at 118-21 (in terrorem effect of triennial renewal hearings is the
FCC's primary tool to enforce continuing compliance with FCC requirements).
97. KFKB Broadcasting Ass'n v. FRC, 47 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1931). The court up-
held the Federal Radio Commission's (predecessor of the FCC) decision to take the
notorious Doctor Brinkley off the air. On his popular show "Medical Question Box"
the Doctor diagnosed listeners' ills based on written descriptions of their symptoms.
His own pharmaceutical "tonics" were invariably just what the doctor ordered. The
FRC found that such practices were inimical to the public interest. In affirming, the
court held that the Commission could examine the licensee's programming in its re-
newal decisions without violating the statutory duty to refrain from censorship. The
Commission was "merely exercis[ing] its undoubted right to take note of... past
conduct, which is not censorship." Id at 672. See generally Albert, Constitutional Reg-
ulation Of Televised Violence, 64 VA. L. REv. 1299, 1324-25 (1978). Professor Robin-
son believes the decision was proper but the opinion "atrocious" and the foregoing
language "sweeping and foolish." Robinson, Observations, supra note 60, at 98,104-05.
However, note that Professor Robinson also mistakenly believed that the court de-
cided the action was constitutional. In fact, no first amendment issue was decided.
Note also that the Supreme Court continues to approve the reasoning of the case. See
infra note 231 and accompanying text. For a forceful criticism of the Court's narrow
conception of censorship, see Note, Morality And The Broadcast Media: A Constitu-
tional Analysis of FCC Regulatory Standards, 84 HARV. .. REV. 664, 696 n.144 (1971)
[hereinafter Note, Morality And The Broadcast Media]; see also E. SMEAD, supra note
60, at 110.
98. Trinity Methodist Church, South v. FRC, 62 F.2d 850 (D.C. Cir. 1932), cert
denied, 288 U.S. 599 (1933). See generally Orbison, "Fighting Bob" Shuler: Early Ra-
dio Crusader, 21 J. BROADCASTING 459 (1977). The Reverend Doctor Shuler was
found to have used his station for defamation, anti-semitic exhortations, and black-
mail, among other transgressions. Not surprisingly, the FRC found such practices to
be inconsistent with the public interest and the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals af-
firmed. The court specifically held that the Commission's review of past program-
ming did not offend the first amendment. Trinity Methodist Church, 62 F.2d at 851.
See generally Albert, supra note 97, at 1324-25.
99. Brandywine Main-Line Radio, Inc., 24 F.C.C.2d 18 (1970) (misrepresentation
of programming plans; renewal denied), offd, 473 F.2d 16 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert de-
nied, 412 U.S. 922 (1973); Palmetto. Broadcasting Co., 33 F.C.C. 250 (1962) (misrepre-
sentation of knowledge of listener complaints concerning objectionable broadcasts;
renewal denied), reconsideration denied, 34 F.C.C. 101 (1963), qffd sub nom. Robin-
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trine violations,100 failure to follow the station's own screening
policies, 01 and the broadcast of bawdy stories, 0 2 vulgar
songs,'os offensive announcer banter and sound effects104
The public interest renewal hearing is less burdensome for
the Commission than the prosecution of forfeiture or revoca-
tion proceedings, but it is also more widely condemned. The
Commission has been criticized for promoting "dreary bland-
ness" and discouraging experimentation in programming
through an overly conservative definition of the public inter-
est.0 5 Generally, the Commission's conception of the public
son v. FCC, 334 F.2d 534 (D.C. Cir. 1964), cert denied, 379 U.S. 843 (1964). See gener-
ally Murchison, Misrepresentation and the FCC, 37 FED. CoMM. L.J. 403 (1985).
100. Brandywine Main-Line Radio, Inc., 24 F.C.C.2d 18 (1970).
101. Jack Straw Memorial Found., 21 F.C.C.2d 833 (1970) (granting short term re-
newal), hearing ordered on reconsideration sub nom. Renewal of the License of Sta-
tion KRAB-FM, 24 F.C.C.2d 266 (1970), license renewed sub nom. Jack- Straw
Memorial Found., 29 F.C.C.2d 334 (1971), discussed infra notes 107-14 and accompa-
nying text.
102. Palmetto, 33 F.C.C. 250, par. 2 at 250 (stories with "vulgar, suggestive mate-
rial susceptible of double meanings with indecent connotations"), o ffd on other
grounds sub nom Robinson v. FCC, 334 F.2d 534 (D.C. Cir.1964). See generally Smith,
The Charlie Walker Case, 23 J. BROADCASTING 137 (1979); Note, Regulation Qf Pro-
gram Content By the FCC, supra note 51, at 712-14 (discussing the FCC decision);
Note, Morality And The Broadcast Media, supra note 97, at 665-66 (discussing both
the FCC and D.C. Circuit decisions).
103. WREC Broadcasting Service, 19 F.C.C. 1082 (1955). In a comparative hearing
on a renewal application the Commission found that applicant WMPS had broadcast
six songs containing language "[which] clearly conveys a double meaning in its sugges-
tive content while other such language is vulgar." Id. para. 49 at 1106. WMPS de-
fended on the ground that it broadcast the songs only in the late evening and did so to
accommodate local minority tastes. Id, para. 65 at 1113. The Commission held for
challenger WREC, citing, inter alia, WMPS' "negative attitude" concerning the songs.
Id. para. 69 at 1115. See also Tampa Times Co., 19 F.C.C. 257, para. 139b at 296, paras.
18-19 at 309 (1955) (smutty song of questionable taste); H. WARNER, supra note 63, at
337 & n.12 (broadcast of suggestive Spanish songs led to congressional investigation of
the FCC and the broadcast industry in 1936); infra note 413 (describing recent Com-
mission action against a licensee for the broadcast of a sexually explicit rock song).
104. Mile High Stations, Inc., 28 F.C.C. 795 (1960) (revocation proceeding;, Commis-
sion issued cease and desist order and associated findings with the station's license file
for use in renewal consideration). See also infra note 413 (describing recent Commis-
ion action against a licensee for the broadcast banter of controversial disc jockey How-
ard Stern).
105. "The history of the FCC is... replete with examples ... of the controversial
viewpoint being screened out in favor of the dreary blandness of a more acceptable
opinion." Brandywine Main-Line Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 473 F.2d 16, 78 (D.C. Cir. 1972)
(Bazelon, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (footnote omitted), cert de-
nied, 412 U.S. 922 (1973). Q. Note, Morality And The Broadcast Media, supra note 97,
at 685 ("[Tihe achievement of quality and social importance in programming may
necessarily bring with it expression that morally offends some persons by challenging
lifestyles and accepted concepts of value and taste" (footnote omitted)). See also
Powe, American Voodoo. If Television Doesn't Show It Maybe It Won't Exist, 59 TEX.
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interest has been quite narrow, especially when Congress has
pressured it to "do something" about specific types of pro-
gramming.
1 0 6
A case in point is that of KRAB-FM.1° The FCC received
complaints about the broadcast of objectionable language after
a segment of an innovative audio autobiography that con-
tained indecent language slipped by the station's screening
committee. 08 The FCC granted the station only a short term
renewal because it had failed to adhere to its own screening
policies.10 9 The industry regarded KRAB as a scapegoat to
then-FCC Chairman Burch's anti-smut campaign, sacrificed to
ease congressional pressure on the FCC to clean up radio." 0
L REV. 879, 906 (1981) [hereinafter Powe, American Voodoo] (stakes too high for
licensee to risk "an excess of nonconformity").
106. See, e.g., Writers Guild of Am., West, Inc. v. FCC, 423 F. Supp. 1064 (C.D. Cal.
1976), discussed infra notes 160-85 and accompanying text. Professor Robinson cites
the events that occasioned the Writers Guild litigation as an example of effective
congressional oversight. Robinson, The Federal Communications Commission An
Essay On Regulatory Watchdogs, 64 VA. L. REV. 169, 182 n.32 (1978) [hereinafter
Robinson, Watchdogs]. For an overview of the pressures that led to the Sonderling,
Writers Guild, and Pacifica (1975) actions, see Krattenmaker & Powe, Televised Vio.
lence: First Amendment Principles And Social Science Theory, 64 VA. L. REv. 1123,
1214-15 (1978). See also Note, Broadcasting Obscene Language: The Federal Commu-
nications Commission and Section 1464 Violations, 1974 AIZ. ST. L.J. 457, 457-65
[hereinafter Note, Broadcasting Obscene Language].
107. Jack Straw Memorial Found., 21 F.C.C.2d 833 (1970).
108. The autobiography was by one Reverend Sawyer, a controversial area figure,
and was 30 hours long. The screening committee had randomly selected snatches of
the program for screening purposes and found nothing objectionable. The tape in fact
contained indecent language and was pulled off the air as soon as it came to the sta-
tion's attention.
109. 21 F.C.C.2d 833, paras. 68-70 at 833-34.
110. See KRAB definitely gets three year renewal, BROADCASTING, May 24, 1971, at
49; A big victory for little KRAB, BROADCASTING, Mar. 29, 1971, at 68. Indeed, the
Commission was rather disingenuous in its opinion granting the petition for reconsid-
eration. "We have acted here, on this issue of licensee responsibility, based on the
particular facts of the case and in order to make clear the importance qf licensee
responsiblity to the industry generally." Renewal of the License of Radio Station
KRAB-FM, 24 F.C.C.2d 266, para. 1 at 266 (emphasis added). Yet the Commission
disclaimed any intent to chill licensee expression. Id. Compare infta note 154 and
accompanying text.
The clean-up campaign was multi-faceted. It included a crackdown on underground
radio; see WUHY-FM Eastern Educ. Radio, 24 F.C.C.2d 408 (1970); Jack Straw, 21
F.C.C.2d 833. See generally FCC prodded on free form radio edict, BROADCASTING,
Aug. 30, 1971, at 45; Another scare thrown into underground radio, BROADCASTING,
Aug. 23, 1971, at 42-43. It also targeted drug-related lyrics, see infra notes 186-208 and
accompanying text, sexually-orented talk shows, see infra notes 146-59 and accompa-
nying text, and indecent language in general, see Pac(fca (1975), 56 F.C.C.2d 94;
WUHY-FM, 24 F.C.C.2d 408. See generally-Krattenmaker & Powe, supra note 106, at
1214-15; Note, Broadcasting Obscene Language, eupra note 106, at 457.
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The action backfired, however, as strongly worded dissents...
and public opinionn1 forced a rehearing.113 On reconsideration,
the Commission admitted that KRAB's overall programming
was outstanding and meritorious, and the Commission granted
a full term renewal
1 4
But the FCC has occasionally given an enlightened construc-
tion to the public interest standard. In Paciic Foundation
(Paciftca (1964)),115 listener complaints of offensive program-
ming led to a hearing on the licensee's renewal application.
The complaints centered on broadcasts of literature read-
ings,116 a recording of the Edward Albee play, The Zoo Story,
and a group discussion on homosexuality. The Commission
found that the programs "pose no bar to a grant of renewal.' 1 7
Three of the broadcasts were "programming judgments rea-
sonably related to the public interest,"1 " while two others
were simply "isolated errors"' 1 9 which the licensee admitted
were inappropriate for broadcast. Since the programs did not
evidence a pattern of programming outside the public interest,
the grounds asserted for denial were deemed insufficient.12
The Commission recognized that
provocative programming... may offend some listeners. But
this does not mean that those offended have the right, through
the Commission's licensing power, to rule such programming
off the airwaves. Were this the case, only the wholly inoffen-
sive, the bland, could gain access to the radio microphone or
TV camera.U1
The Commission further stressed its "underlying policy-that
the licensee's judgment in this freedom-of-speech area is enti-
111. 21 F.C.C.2d 833 (1970) (Cox, Comm'r, dissenting); id. at 841 (Johnson,
Comm'r, dissenting).
112. See KRAB definitely gets three year renewal, supra note 110; A big victoryfor
little KRAB, supra note 110.
113. Renewal of the License of KRAB-FM, 24 F.C.C.2d 266 (1970).
114. 29 F.C.C.2d 334, par. 1 at 351 (1971).
115. 36 F.C.C. 147 (1964). The decision was hailed as "a historical document of con-
siderable pride and significance." The "Pacfica "Decision: Broadcasting and Free Ex-
pression, 9 J. BROADCASTING 177, 177 (1965).
116. Readings by Lawrence Ferlinghetti, Edward Pomerantz and Robert Creeley
of their own works.
117. 36 F.C.C. 147, pars. 8 at 150.
118. I& pars. 5 at 149.
119. Id. para. 7 at 150.
120. Id. paras. 3 at 148, 7 at 150. See also Pacifica Found., 95 F.C.C.2d 750 (1983);
WGBH Educ. Found., 69 F.C.C.2d 1250, para. 3 at 1251 (1978) (requiring a pattern of
objectionable programming to justify a hearing on a petition to deny renewal).
121. 36 F.C.C. 147, para. 5 at 149.
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tled to very great weight...."1
Pacfc (1964) is not an isolated example.m Most notable is
Anti-Defamation League of B'Nai B'ith.'" The petitioner
sought denial of the licensee's application based on an anti-
semitic broadcast. Since the station had complied with the fair-
ness doctrine by offering the petitioner free air time for reply,
the Commission determined that a hearing was unnecessary.
To interfere with the licensee's programming decisions would
raise serious first amendment questions.n5 The Commission
noted that the first amendment extended to controversial
ideas and concepts, and even to material that some would find
understandably offensive. 1'
But generally speaking, the Commission's use of its authority
to regulate content through formal action, direct or indirect,
has been predominantly overreaching and disrespectful of the
first amendment rights of both broadcasters and listeners. The
scarcity justification erected in NBC' 7 is now a talismanic in-
cantation of governmental power to intrude on licensee discre-
tion. This power has been treated as a license to design the
122. Id. para. 8 at 150. 'But see Note, Morality And The Broadcast Media, supra
note 97, at 667-69, 683 n.93 (describing the Commission's failure to apply its enlight-
ened rhetoric and high first amendment ideals when individual Pacifica stations sub-
sequently filed for renewal); accord Note, Offensive Speech and the FC, supra note
61, at 1360. See also Kalven, Broadcasting, supra note 59, at 45 & n.96 (FCC's careful
scrutiny of the programming itseUf constituted censorship).
123. See, e.g., United Federation of Teachers, 17 F.C.C.2d 204 (1969). Yet another
Pacifica Foundation station was the subject of a petition to deny on the basis of some
vehement anti-semitic material broadcast during a teacher's strike laden with racial
tensions. The Commission held that since the licensee had complied with the fairness
doctrine and the speech was protected under the first amendment, the Commission
was precluded from setting the application for hearing. See A question of responsib-
lity, BROADCASTING, Feb. 19, 1969, at 88; WEAl asks its critics to help air programs,
BROADCASTING, Feb. 10, 1969, at 55; Another point of view draws public ire, BROAD-
CASTING, Feb. 3,1969, at 58. For additional examples, see Video 44, 103 F.C.C.2d 1204
(1986); Kaye-Smith Enterprises, 98 F.C.C.2d 670 (1984); Pacifica Found., 95 F.C.C.2d
750 (1983).
124. 6 F.C.C.2d 385 (1967), affd, 403 F.2d 169 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cer denied, 394 U.S.
930 (1969).
125. 6 F.C.C.2d 385, para. 44 at 387.
126. Id, para. 3 at 385. In Writers Guild of Am., West, Inc. v. FCC, 423 F. Supp.
1064, 1148 (C.D. Cal. 1976), discussed in'fra notes 160-85 and accompanying text, the
court described the D.C. Circuit's decision affirming the Commission as a ruling "that
the Commission has no power under the public interest standard to use the relicens-
ing process as a vehicle to rid the airwaves of offensive material."
127. National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943). See supra
notes 57-60 and accompanying text.
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programming of licensees' s and enforce moral standards con-
cerning the form and content of broadcast expression.'
Notwithstanding the questionable vitality of the spectrum
scarcity theory"' and the dubious validity of nuisance ratio-
nales,13 1 the FCC and the federal judiciary too often read "re-
duced protection" overbroadly. Reasonably read, the term
signifies simply that a less than compelling governmental inter-
est is required to sustain content regulation, and that a looser
means-end fit will be tolerated.132 The reduced protection con-
cept should not entitle the FCC to the administrative deference
128. E.g., FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION PUBUC SERVICE RESPONSIBILITY
OF BROADCAST IAcENSEES (1946); En banc Programming Inquiry, 44 F.C.C. 2303
(1960).
129. E.g., Sonderling Broadcasting Corp., 41 F.C.C.2d 777 (1973); WUHY-FM East-
ern Educ. Radio, 24 F.C.C.2d 408 (1970); Jack Straw Memorial Found., 21 F.C.C.2d 833
(1970); Palmetto Broadcasting Co., 33 F.C.C. 250 (1962); Mile High Stations, Inc., 28
F.C.C. 795 (1960); WREC Broadcasting Service, 19 F.C.C. 1082 (1955).
130. See Lovejoy v. FCC, 707 F.2d 1443, 1458-59 (D.C. Cir. 1983). Commentators
have continually questioned the proposition that spectrum space remains scarce.
They argue that technology has advanced to the point that the only restriction on
access to the spectrum is financial. Because access to the print media is similarly re-
stricted, the constitutional distinction between the fully protected print media and the
electronic media is no longer viable. See, e.g., T. EMERSON, supra note 60, at 662-71;
Bazelon, supra note 61; Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J.L &
ECON. 1 (1959); Fein, supra note 56; Fowler & Brenner, supra note 53; Powe, Or of the
[Broadcast] Press, 55 TEX. L. REV. 39 (1976); Robinson, Observations, supra note 60,
Spitzer, Controlling The Content Of Print And Broadcast, 58 S. CAL L REV. 1351
(1985); Van Alstyne, The Mobius Strip of the First Amendment Perspectives on Red
Lion, 29 S.C.L. REV. 539 (1978); Note, The Future of Content Regulation in Broadcast-
ing, supra note 53. The Commission itself has recently taken this view; see Deregula-
tion f Radio, 73 F.C.C.2d paras. 121-29 at 497-500 but, the judiciary has not yet
acquiesced. See FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 377 n.11 (1984).
131. The nuisance rationale for reduced protection in the broadcast media was en-
dorsed by the Supreme Court in FCC v. Paciflca Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978), discussed
infra notes 211-358 and accompanying text. The rationale has been criticized. See, eg.,
Krattenmaker & Powe, supra note 106, at 1228-37; The Supreme Cour4 1977 Term, 92
HARV. L. REV. 57, 159-63 (1978); Note, Filthy Words, supra note 76, at 612-17.
132. This interpretation was recently adopted by a tenuous majority in FCC v.
League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984). However, even this intermediate stan-
dard of scrutiny may not be applicable to offensive or indecent expression. See 468
U.S. at 380 n.13. Modern first amendment jurisprudence grants less protection to of-
fensive expression, rendering the speech most in need of protection the easiest to re-
strict. This is because society has a lesser interest in protecting expression of lesser
worth. See infra note 256. Note also that this intermediate standard was adopted in
the context of a challenge to a congressional amendment to the Communications Act.
Thus it is far from clear that this standard will be applied to the review of FOC con-
tent regulatory action. Logic would dictate that an unelected agency would carry a
greater burden of justification than the Congress in this area-but FCC programming
decisions are accorded substantial deference. See FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450
U.S. 582, 595-98 (1981).
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common in non-constitutional contexts."s Nor should constitu-
tional principles of overbreadth and vagueness be forsaken in
review of regulations and decisions affecting broadcast expres-
sion.134 The licensing power, and the resulting regulatory rela-
tionship, makes the broadcasting context one peculiarly suited
to overbreadth principles and renders deferential review pecu-
liarly inappropriate.
If one accepts NBC as a regulatory scepter, then there is little
room for complaint. But if one accepts the primacy of the first
amendment as a bulwark against governmental intrusion into
free expression, then, regardless of radio's uniqueness, one can
admit of no regulatory carte blanche. The Commission's failure
to proceed with caution in the use of its formal regulatory ma-
chinery bespeaks a disturbing lack of institutional respect for a
fundamental freedom.'w
D. Informal Regulation of Program Content-Regulation by
Lifted Eyebrow
The most objectionable methods of FCC content regulation
are those that are legally invisible - not directly traceable to
any formal FCC action and therefore not subjected to mean-
ingful judicial scrutiny. The achievement of regulatory goals
through informal processes has been aptly denominated "regu-
lation by lifted eyebrow." '' 1 Raised eyebrow regulation is best
understood simply as action short of formal proceedings against
the licensee or toward the industry which is calculated to re-
mind the licensee of the tenuous grip it has on its license.13 7
133. See infra note 144 and accompanying text; cf Quadres, supra note 46, at 470
(criticizing the general deferential tendencies of modern first amendment jurispru-
dence); id. at 489 (urging "a truly searching degree of judicial scrutiny to regulations
affecting free speech").
134. See Kalven, Broadcasting, supra note 59, at 37; infra note 211 and accompany-
ing text. See also Illinois Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 515 F.2d 397, 422-23
n.59 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (Baszelon, CJ., statement as to why he would grant rehearing en
banc): "On the basis of (the first amendment overbreadth] doctrine, it seems mani-
festly proper to discern the true meaning of a particular FCC policy as the persons to
whom the policy is directed perceive it, and to resolve legal questions on the basis of
that meaning."
135. Former FCC Chairman Mark S. Fowler believes that any interference with
licensee programming discretion is a spiritual violation of the first amendment. See
Fowler, The Public's Interes4 supra note 60, at 215.
136. Miami Broadcasting Co. (WQAM), 14 Rad. Reg. (P & F) 125,128 (1956) (Doer-
fer, Comm'r, dissenting).
137. Of. Note, Morality And The Broadcast Media, supra note 97, at 666 (the licen-
see is "reminded that his license is rather fragile property held by temporary
[Vol. 9:423
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The raised eyebrow power stems from a combination of
human nature, economic reality, congressional largesse, and ju-
dicial laxity.138 Because the Commission has the authority to
deny renewal of a valuable license on the basis of its vague and
discretionary interpretation of the public interest, licensees
tend to zealously accomodate perceived Commission prefer-
encesla9 at the expense of not only their own expressive
rights1' 4 but also those of their listeners.141 The power is fur-
ther aggrandized by the federal judiciary's failure to scrutinize
informal FCC action clearly designed to influence licensees' ex-
pressive behavior.1 The raised eyebrow power therefore corn-
grant..."). The technique is a focal point for academic criticism. E.g., Krasnow, Cole
& Kennard, supra note 60, at 774-77; Robinson, Observation4 supra note 60, at 118-27;
Note, Writers Guild of America We, Inc. v. FC. A First Amendment Blow to FCC
Jawboning, 20 ARIZ. L. REV. 315,334-37 (1978) [hereinafter Note, A First Amendment
Blow to F"C Jawboning].
138. The root of the power is the uncertainty of the relicensing process and the
vagueness of the standards which govern it." Writers Guild of Am., West, Inc. v. FCC,
423 F. Supp. 1064, 1146 (C.D. Cal. 1976).
139. See Loevinger, Free Speech, Fairness, and Fiduciary Duty in Broadcasting, 34
LAW & CONTEMP. PRoBs. 278,291 (1969) ("Mn general, people will bend to the will of
those who wield power over them, and the independence of individuals and enter-
prises will be inversely proportional to the power government thus exerts."); Powe,
American Voodoo, supra note 105, at 906:
Too much is at stake for a broadcaster to attempt an excess of nonconformity.
Thus the FCC may simply sit back and let the threat of capital punishment at
license renewal time do the rest. With only an occasional display of its All-
Star talents, the FCC can transform the normal "chilling effect" into a Blue
Norther.
See also Robinson, Observations supra note 60, at 119 (Commission's public interest
licensing power is "in a very real sense a 'Sword of Damocles' over the broadcaster's
head. If the sword does not often fall, neither is it ever lifted and the in terrorem
effect of the sword's presence enables the Commission to exercise far-reaching pow-
ers of control over the licensee's operations."); Yale Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 478 F.2d
594,605 n.22 (D.C. Cir.) (Bazelon, C.J. statement as to why he would grant rehearing
en banc, sua sponte) ("The main value of the sword of Damocles is that it hangs not
that it drops") (quoting Clay T. Whitehead, Nixon administration Director of Tele-
communications Policy), cerL denied, 414 U.S. 914 (1973).
140. See Kalven, "Uninhibited, Robust and Wide Open"--A Note on Free Speech
and the Warren Court, 67 MIcH. I- REv. 289, 297 (1968): "A regulation of communi-
cation may run afoul of the Constitution not because it is aimed directly at free speech
but because in operation it may trigger a set of behavioral consequences which
amount in effect to people censoring themselves in order to avoid trouble with the
law." See also E. SMEAD, supra note 60, at 110; Krasnow, Cole & Kennard, upra
note 60, at 775-77; Walden, supra note 36, at 314-15.
141. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969). Audiences have a
first amendment right to receive information. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,
448 U.S. 555, 575, 576 (1980); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 408-09 (1974); Klein-
dienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762-65 (1972).
142. See Writers Guild of Am., West, Inc. v. American Broadcasting Co., 609 F.2d
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bines the regulatory virtues of convenience, effectiveness,
efficiency, and insulation from judicial reversal, but sacrifices
the broadcaster's and the public's right to be free from govern-
mental interference in the expression and receipt of
information.
The existence of an expansive power to informally interfere
with broadcast expression compromises first amendment val-
ues. Ultimately, the blame must lie with the judiciary. Con-
trary to the constitutional principle that governmental
intrusions on fundamental freedoms are subject to heightened
scrutiny,1'8 courts have held the Commission only to the basic
administrative standards of review.'" This anomalous depar-
355, 33-65, (9th Cir. 1979) discussed irfra notes 160-85 and accompanying text. See
also Kalven, Broadcuting, supra note 59, at 23:
[An FCC raised eyebrow tactic] serves to extend the appearance of control
far beyond what rulemaking or formal decisions would suggest, and it does so
by a process which is really not public and which is awkward to challenge. [It
also] serves to create psychologically an atmosphere of surveillance which is
destructive of the morale of a free press.
The lack of meaningful review is not due to any problem in identfying informal
regulatory action. See Bazelon, supra note 61, at 216:
The methods of communicating these pressures are by now familiar to FCC
practitioners: the prominent speech by a Commissioner, the issuance of a
notice of inquiry, an official statement of licensee responsibility couched in
general terms but directed against specific programming, setting the licensee
down for a hearing on "misrepresentations," forwarding listener complaints
with requests for a formal response to the FCC, calling network executives to
"meetings" in the office of the Chairman of the FCC or of some other Execu-
tive Branch officials, compelled disclosure of future programming on forms
with already delineated categories and imposing specific regulatory actions
on a particularly visible offender against this background .... Recently,
there have been indications that the threat of antitrust or Internal Revenue
Service actions has served to buttress certain "raised eyebrow" suggestions.
See also Black Citizens for a Fair Media v. FCC, 719 F.2d 407, 416 (D.C. Cir. 1983),
cert denied, 467 U.S. 1255 (1984); H. WARNER, supra note 63, at 338; Kalven, Broad-
casting, supra note 59, at 19-23; Note, Regulation of Program Content By the FCt
supra note 51, at 703.
143. E.g., FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984) (broadcasting, first
amendment); Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530 (1980);
First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (first amendment); Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973) (substantive due process); Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383
U.S. 663 (1966); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1964) (equal protection).
144. See Note, Morality And The Broadcast Media, supra note 97, at 696. The stat-
utory administrative review provisions are codified at 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1982). Commis-
sion action is accorded substantial deference on review under administrative law
principles. See Beth Israel Hospital v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483 (1978); Citizens To Preserve
Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971); cf National Broadcasting Co. v. United
States, 319 U.S. 190, 224 (1943). See generally E. GELLHORN & B. BOYER, ADMImSTRA-
TIVE LAW AND PROCESS 58-62 (2d ed. 1981). Though questions of law are theoretically
to be decided de novo on review, as a practical matter courts confer a presumption of
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ture from the court's customarily zealous role in safeguarding
first amendment interests is especially troubling in light of the
important informational role played by today's electronic me-
dia.145 The result is that the licensing authority, with its inci-
dental coercive capacity, is a very powerful regulatory tool
presenting an insidious potential for encroachment on vital ex-
pressive interests. This is best illustrated by a few notorious
regularity (procedural) and correctness (interpretation) upon agency legal conclu-
sions. E. GELLHORN & B. BOYER, supra, at 58-59. One would expect the courts to
forego such deference in the review of programming decisions because they bear
directly on first amendment interests, see National Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 516 F.2d
1101, 1122 (D.C. Cir. 1974), but this is not the case. In fact, the Supreme Court has
expressly commanded that deference be accorded even in this sensitive area. See
CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 382 (1981); FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S.
582, 595-98 (1981); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726,760 (1978) (Powell, J., concur-
ring); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 381 (1969). Thus the already
reduced first amendment protection afforded broadcasters and the listening public is
further reduced by the deferential nature of review. Consider Chief Judge Bazelon's
remarks in Yale Broadcasting Co. v. FCC:
In reviewing the Commission's actions in technical areas... we must accord
great deference to its decisions. But no such deference is due in cases involv-
ing the Commission's "public interest" regulation of program content...
Courts have a special responsibility to protect First Amendment rights and a
special expertise for doing so.
478 F.2d 594, 604 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Bazelon, C.J., statement as to why he would grant
rehearing en bane, sua sponte). See also Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC 768 F.2d 1434,
1459,1462 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert denied, 106 S. Ct. 2889 (1986); Comment, Drug Lyric
supra note 27, at 345-46 ("critical to our system of jurisprudence is the maxim that
courts alone possess the competency to adjudge the nature of speech as to its constitu-
tional status"); ef Note, Morality And The Broadcast Media, supra note 97, at 696
(raised eyebrow tactics and public interest determinations "tend to preclude judicial
consideration of the applicability of first amendment protections to the controversial
programming at stake... [therefore] programming is deterred by a process operating
outside the scope of constitutional adjudication").
It should be noted that there is a longstanding, rabid debate over the degree of
deference Commission action deserves generally. Some accuse the D.C. Circuit Court
of Appeals of usurping FCC authority. Others believe that the judiciary has acted well
within its jurisdiction. See generally Garay, The FCC and the U.S Court of Appeal
Telecommunications Policy by Judicial Decree?, 23 J. BROADCASTING 301 (1979); Pa-
per, Judicial Scrutiny of the FC.: The Illusion of Usurpation, 52 B.U.L. REV. 659
(1972); Pennybacker, "Activism" v. "Restraint." The DC Circuit, the FCC and the
Supreme Court, 28 J. BROADCASTING 149 (1984); Note, The Judicial Role in the Ftt
Decisionmaking Process: A Perspective on the Court.Agency Partnership in the En-
tertainment Format Cases, 21 B.C.L REv. 1067 (1980); Comment, To Defer or Not To
Defer: The Question For the D.C. Circuit in Reviewing FCC Decisions, 36 FED. COMM.
L.J. 293 (1984). For a general discussion of judicial review of Commission action, see
Longley, Krasnow & Terry, supra note 85; Note, The FCC and Reciprocity: An Exam-
ination Of The "Public Interest" Standard, 62 TEX. L. REV. 319, 319-30 (1983).
145. See Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94,
195 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Fein, aupra note 56, at 424 & n.7; Kalven, Broad-
costing, supra note 59, at 15-16.
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examples of the use of the raised eyebrow in response to per-
ceived problems in industry programming.
1. Toples Radio
Perhaps the most telling aspect of the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia's review of the FCC's raised eyebrow
campaign against sexually explicit speech, or sex talk, on the
airwaves is that a realistic description of the campaign appears
only in Chief Judge Bazelon's extra-panel protest to the denial
of a rehearing en banc.14 The panel opinion paid little atten-
tion to the challenge to the informal Commission activities. It
thus stands as a silent and unintended tribute to the judiciary's
toothless oversight of informal Commission regulatory action.
In early 1973, the Commission was catalyzed by listener com-
plaints and congressional pressure to censor the "topless radio"
formats which had achieved phenomenal popularity in some
major markets. On the eve of the National Association of
Broadcasters (NAB) convention, the Sonderling Notice of Ap-
parent Liability 147 for violation of section 1464 was prepared.
That same day, the FCC announced a nonpublic factfinding in-
quiry into other possible violations of section 1464.1" The
NAB reacted immediately-the same day its governing board
passed a resolution that "unequivocally and vigorously de-
plored and condemned tasteless and vulgar program content,
whether explicit or by sexually oriented innuendo. '149 The
next day FCC Chairman Burch addressed the convention, viru-
lently condemning the format as "electronic voyeurism" and
"prurient trash." He made it clear that licensee self-restraint
was necessary, and would be preferable to government
intervention. 150
Licensee reaction was swift. The leading "topless" show, the
syndicated "Bill Ballance Feminine Forum," became the "Bill
Ballance Show" with a cleaner format within days. Manage-
ment personnel of the implicated stations reformatted or can-
146. Illinois Citizens Comm. For Broadcasting v. FCC, 515 F.2d 397, 407 (D.C. Cir.
1975) (Bazelon, C.J., statement as to why he would grant rehearing en banc).
147. 41 F.C.C.2d 919 (1973).
148. 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1982), set out supra note 49.
149. Government and the NAB close in on sex programs, BROADCASTING, Apr. 2,
1973, at 27.
150. Id.; Ainois Citizens, 515 F.2d at 408; Note, Broadcasting Obscene Language,
supra note 106, at 464-65. See generally Carlin, The Rise and Fall Qf Topless Radio, 26
J. CowL 31 (Winter 1976).
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celled the shows, citing their unwillingness to incur the wrath
of the FCC. Sonderling itself "banned all sexual discussion"
from its talk shows upon learning of the closed inquiry-al-
most two weeks before the Notice of Apparent Liability was
issued.151
In their Sonderling reconsideration petition, in addition to li-
ability, the Illinois Citizens Committee for Broadcasting chal-
lenged the constitutional and statutory propriety of the dosed
inquiry and the Chairman's speech. It alleged that the FCC ac-
tions in toto had deprived area listeners of popular radio for-
mats and programs, constituting a violation of the listeners'
first amendment rights as well as censorship in violation of 47
U.S.C. section 326.
The Commission rejected these claims. It held that Chair-
man Burch's remarks were unreviewable as they were his per-
sonal views rather than Commission action.15 The purpose of
the forfeiture was to punish the violation of section 1464 and
the purpose of the inquiry was to determine whether other vio-
lations had occurred. "We are emphatically not saying that sex
per se is a forbidden subject on the broadcast medium."153 In
response to the crucial allegation that the Commission's action
was intended to and did have a chilling effect on licensee pro-
gramming, the Commission stated:
Licensees make programming decisions every day... and the
Commission will not second-guess them as long as these deci-
sions are "reasonably responsive to the needs and interests of
the public...." Our policy has long been that the day-to-day
operation of broadcast stations is primarily the responsibility
of the licensees, and that "the licensee must find his own path
[of programming] with the guidance of those whom his signal
is to serve ......
This commission has consistently adhered to the policy that
it will not-indeed cannot-insist that licensees abandon pro-
gram material because it is offensive to some or even a substan-
tial number of listeners.... However, the Supreme Court has
indicated that the Commission can insist that its licensees be
151. Government and the NAB close in on sex prmanu, supra note 149, at 27. Q.
Illinois Citizens, 515 F.2d at 408-09.
152. Sonderling Broadcasting Corp., 41 F.C.C.2d 777, par. 2 at 778 (1973).
153. ItE para. 25 at 784 (emphasis in original). For an example of topless radio gone
haywire, see Trustees of the University of Pennsylvania (WXPN-FM), 69 F.C.C.2d
1394 (1978), 57 F.C.C.2d 782 (1975).
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"law abiding.". .. One of the laws specifically applicable to
broadcast material is 18 U.S.C. 1464.
If the licensee goes beyond the requirements of the law and
drops sexual material altogether,... that is an act of licensee
judgment.... That decision was Sonderling's and we insist that
it was not mandated by anything we said in our Notice of Ap-
parent Liabiityd.
On appeal 15 the United States Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia's analysis of the informal component of the
FCC campaign was cursory, superficial, and deferential, to the
extent it was analyzed at all.TM
Chief Judge Bazelon was sufficiently outraged to memorial-
ize his concerns in a relatively rare form of dissent.' 57 He
lamented the panel's "failure to see the whole of the Commis-
sion's policy instead of focusing only on the Sonderling forfei-
ture.'1' M He examined the Commission's calculated censorship
efforts and found that "the closed nature of the inquiry both
,accentuated the chilling effect and, indeed, should have been
foreseen as having that effect.'
159
154. 41 F.C.C.2d 777, paras. 22-24 at 783-84 (citations omitted) (alteration in origi-
nal). This statement exemplifies the FCC's modus operandi concerning its raised eye-
brow powers. After taking informal action (perhaps, as here, underscored by a
parallel formal proceeding) that causes broadcasters to protect their licenses with
knee-jerk self-censorship, the Commission disclaims any intention to chill expression.
When confronted with evidence of the actual chilling effect, it disclaims responsibil-
ity for licensee programming decisions. (. Licensee Responsibility to Review
Records Before Their Broadcast, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 31 F.C.C.2d 377
(1971), discussed infra notes 186-208 and accompanying text; Renewal of the License
of Station KRAB-FM, 24 F.C.C.2d 266, para. 1 at 266 (1970), discussed supra notes
107-14 and accompanying text; Krasnow, Cole & Kennard, supra note 60, at 762, 776.
155. Illinois Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 515 F.2d 397 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
156. In a supplemental opinion, Judge Leventhal warned that "the Commission
must pay careful attention to ensure that the freedom of substantial numbers of the
listening public is not curtailed because of possible offensiveness to particularly sensi-
tive listeners who retain the option of switching off the offending broadcasts." 515
F.2d at 406. Compare Judge Leventhal's dissenting opinion in Pacifica Found. v. FCC,
556 F.2d 9, 30 (D.C. Cir. 1977), discussed infnz note 228 and accompanying text.
157. 515 F.2d at 407. The Chief Judge was not a member of the deciding panel, but
issued a dissent to the Circuit's decision to deny rehearing en banc.
158. 515 F.2d at 421. See also i& at 425: "[The task of the courts must be to vigi-
lantly oversee FCC administration of the regulatory scheme to eliminate the various
'chilling effects' of that scheme, no matter how difficult the role of overseer may be."
159. Id at 408 n.2. See also Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l
Comm., 412 U.S. 94,163-64 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring) (criticizing the non-public
inquiry). For other examples of myopic review on the D.C. Circuit, see Judge
Leventhal's dissenting opinion in Pacifica Found. v. FCC, 556 F.2d 9, 30 (D.C. Cir.
1977) and Judge Wilkey's opinion in Yale Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 478 F.2d 594 (D.C.
Cir. 1973). In the former, Judge Leventhal sua sponte limited his review to the facts
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Unfortunately, only Chief Judge Bazelon has been willing
to promote substance over form and subject informal FCC ac-
tion to substantial review under section 326 and the first
amendment.
2. The Family Viewing Hour
For a short while it appeared that the Chief Judge's battle
against the raised eyebrow would take hold in a distant forum.
In Writer's Guild of America, Wes; Inc. v. FCC1e° a suit was
brought in the United States District Court for the Central Dis-
trict of California against the television networks, the NAB,
the FCC, and the individual commissioners. The gravamen of
the complaint was that the networks and the NAB had jointly
agreed, as a result of informal FCC pressure, to effectively con-
stitute the NAB's Television Code Review Board, a national
television censor for the initial hour of daily prime time view-
ing. The plaintiffs alleged, inter alia, violations of section 326,
the first amendment, and the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA).161
The district court found it had jurisdiction because the Com-
mission had acted informally. Since the FCC denied taking any
action, the exclusive review provisions of the Communications
Act were not triggered.6 2 It further found that the doctrines of
exhaustion of administrative remedies and primary jurisdiction
were not a bar, as requiring the plaintiffs to seek an FCC adju-
dication of its own liability would be an exercise in futility."e
On the merits, the court found that FCC Chairman Wiley
had, on behalf of the FCC and in response to congressional
of the FCC Order despite the Commission's concession that it was stating industry-
wide policy and despite the fact that the Order was part of a larger campaign to clean
up the broadcast media which included the topless radio and family viewing hour
crusades. See Krattenmaker & Powe, supra note 106, at 1217; infra notes 283-84 and
accompanying text. The other example of juristic tunnelvision, the Yale Broadcasting
opinion, is discussed ifvfra notes 186-208.
160. 423 F. Supp. 1064 (C.D. Cal. 1976), vacated and remanded sub nor. Writers
Guild of Am. West, Inc. v. American Broadcasting Cos., 609 F.2d 355 (9th Cir. 1979),
cert denied, 449 U.S. 824, dismissed on remand sub nom. NAB TV Code, 95 F.C.C.2d
700 (1983).
161. 5 U.S.C. § § 551-706 (1982). Plaintiffs alleged that the Commission had fash-
ioned policy without a rulemaking proceeding in violation of the Act's procedural
requirements. 423 F. Supp. at 1072. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1982) (notice and comment
.procedural requirements).
162. See 423 F. Supp. at 1076 n.12. The Jurisdiction statute is 47 U.S.C. § 402(a)
(1982).
163. 423 F. Supp. at 1081-82.
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pressure, mounted an offensive against inappropriate program-
ming aired in the early evening.1' 4 The campaign consisted of
an informal regulatory technique known as "jawboning." The
Chairman's weapons were identified as an FCC report to Con-
gress,16a a series of phone calls, speeches and meetings "timed
and orchestrated to generate press coverage and pressure,"' 66
and personal lobbying efforts. The dominant theme of his ef-
forts was that if the industry did not regulate itself, the Com-
mission would be forced to, even though the first amendment
and section 326 posed problems.16 7 The court held that the
FCC's coercion violated the first amendment and the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act.' e6
It is difficult to overstate the significance of the decision. The
emergence of an alternative forum willing to scrutinize the in-
formal regulatory initiatives of the FCC represented a sweep-
ing victory for first amendment values. Indeed, the court's
language was categorical in its denunciation of the FCC's
method of avoiding the constitutional limitations on its
authority.
6 9
But the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
disagreed.170 Finding the subject matter of the action to be of
great concern to the FCC and within its special competence, the
court ruled that primary jurisdiction lay with the Commission
and reversed the declaratory judgment with instructions to re-
mand the cause to the FCC.' 7 ' In wide-ranging dicta, the court
164. Id. at 1094.
165. Report on the Broadcast of Violent, Indecent and Obscene Material, 51
F.C.C.2d 418 (1975). One commentator has aptly described the Report as "the FCC's
own proud description of how it browbeat the networks into adopting the 'Family
Viewing' period." Case Note, 56 N.C.L. REV. 584, 584 n.3 (1978).
166. 423 F. Supp. at 1121.
167. See generally id. at 1094-1121.
168. Id, at 1149-53. The court determined that Wiley's pressure tactics were "a cru-
cial, necessary and indispensable cause" of the agreement. Id. at 1094. Section 553 of
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) had been violated by the failure to provide
notice of rulemaking and opportunity for comment before instituting new program-
ming policy. Id. at 1151-52. Or Note, A First Amendment Blow to FM Jawboning,
supra note 137, at 337-38 (jawboning implements policy without conforming to APA
procedural requirements). Compare Action For Children's Television v. FCC, 564
F.2d 458, 474 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (Commission "jawboning" substantially complied with
APA).
169. The Commission "may not use the licensing process to prevent programming
which it regards as offensive." 423 F. Supp. at 1155.
170. Writers Guild of Am. West, Inc. v. American Broadcasting Co., 609 F.2d 355
(9th Cir. 1979).
171. Id. at 362-63.
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questioned the district court's "bedrock principle" that it was
the licensee's right and duty to make independent decisions
concerning its programming.1 7 2 The court stated that the pub-
lic trusteeship inherent in the license subjects broadcasters to
reasonable regulation on behalf of the paramount first amend-
ment interests of the public.173 Since there was a delicate bal-
ance of competing interests to be struck, the FCC's choice of
method was entitled to deference. 74 While jawboning raised
serious questions, it was an effective method of negotiating "the
regulatory tightrope" between the government and the licen-
sees.' The court acknowledged "that informal procedures
permit the FCC to exercise 'wide-ranging and largely uncon-
trolled administrative discretion in the review of telecommuni-
cations programming' which can be used to apply, 'sub silentio
pressure' on broadcast licensees."'17 But it also recognized that
the technique was "commonplace in the administrative con-
text." The determination of the permissibility vel non of its use
was therefore within the FCC's primary jurisdiction.'7
The Ninth Circuit's decision to let the guards guard them-
selves is regrettable. Yet it must be recognized that the district
court opinion was revolutionary doctrine and that the issue
raised serious implications for Commission operation. The ap-
pellate court likely felt that if such changes were to be made it
was for the D.C. Circuit or Supreme Court to so order. But in
view of the first amendment issues raised, the justification that
"jawboning is commonplace in the administrative context" is
troubling. 7 " No matter what the adjudicative context, due
weight should be accorded first amendment interests by rigor-
ously scrutinizing intrusions on protected speech.
On remand, the FCC refused to disclaim its power to regulate
via raised eyebrow or active jaw.'79 This may have been par-
tially motivated by institutional respect for a preceding Com-
mission. Nevertheless, the Commission's refusal to part with
172. Id. at 364.
173. Id. at 362-63.
174. Id at 365-66. C. supra notes 133, 144 and accompanying text.
175. 1& at 362-65.
176. Id at 365 (quoting Bazelon, upra note 61, at 215).
177. Id. at 363. For a general discussion of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, see
E. GELLHoRN & B. BOYER, upra note 144, at 297-300.
178. 609 F.2d at 365. Here again, the issue is treated as one of administrative law
despite its serious first amendment implications. See upra notes 133, 144, and accom-
panying text, infra notes 295-98 and accompanying text.
179. NAB TV Code, 95 F.C.C.2d 700 (1983).
1987]
COMM/ENT L. J.
its most potent weapon, in the midst of a large-scale deregu-
latory movement, is noteworthy. The Commission relied on
Chairman Wiley's calculated naysaying, especially his equivocal
statements that FCC regulation might raise some first amend-
ment or section 326 problems-to find that the networks could
not have been reasonably motivated by fear of FCC action.'8s
Also influential was the finding that the Chairman's efforts
were "a personal initiative."'' The Commission concluded:
"[W]e do not believe that there is anything inherently improper
about 'jawboning.' "1"8 It added in a footnote:
We do not disagree with Judge Bazelon's observation that
more care should be taken in "regulation by informal means
where first amendment values are at stake rather than purely
economic interests." Consolidated Edison Co. v. FPC, 512 F.2d
1332, 1341 n.54 (1975)[sic]. However, it should be kept in mind
that the use of informal techniques such as jawboning... is
one method by which the difficult balance among the various
first amendment interests involved in the broadcast media has
been made.'83
It seems that even the Fowler Commission was capable of
first amendment myopia.'" The balance involved in jawboning
is not among first amendment interests, but against them. It is
the broadcaster's and the public's interest in freedom from
governmental interference balanced against the FCC's interest
in proceeding in an informal and effectively unreviewable man-
ner to realize its regulatory goals. Regardless of the specific
governmental interest being furthered by the FCC, it is hard to
imagine any greater intrusion on first amendment interests
than regulatory action that is placed beyond the reach of judi-
cial review. The Commission agrees with the quoted state-
ment in the abstract, but in application it is far from the first
amendment ideal described. As the Commission itself stated,
"[t]he problem, of course, is necessarily a matter of degree."'
5
The district court had attempted to draw the line on FCC
coercion. The FCC could suggest and encourage, it reasoned,
180. Id. at 704, 705.
181. Id. at 708 n.27. Compare Sonderling Broadcasting Corp., 41 F.C.C.2d 777, para.
2 at 778 (1973) (FCC Chairman's exhortatory speech not FCC action). But see 95
F.C.C.2d 700 at 710 (Chairman's efforts were "plainly government action").
182. 95 F.C.C.2d 700 at 710.
183. Id. at 711 n.35.
184. Or infra notes 401-16 and accompanying text.
185. 95 F.C.C.2d 700 at 710-11 (quoting Action for Children's Television v. FCC,
564 F.2d 458, 473 n.27 (D.C. Cir. 1977)).
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but not threaten or pressure. It was of course a vague standard,
but it was a standard nonetheless. In the final analysis, the
Writers Guild litigation merely bolstered the questionable sta-
tus quo in FCC content regulation.
3. Drug Lyrics and "Licensee Responsibility"
In 1971, in response to increasing pressure from the Nixon
administration ls 6 and agitation from within the Commission by
Robert E. Lee,' the FCC promulgated Public Notice 71-205,"s
which reminded broadcasters of their responsibility to know
the content of the songs they broadcast.
Whether a particular record depicts the dangers of drug
abuse, or, to the contrary, promotes such illegal drug usage is a
question for the judgment of the licensee. The thrust of this
Notice is simply that the licensee must make that judgment
and cannot properly follow a policy of playing such records
without someone in a responsible position... knowing the con-
tent of the lyrics.189
As the FCC later explained in its clarifying Memorandum
Opinion and Order,190 the Notice did not expressly bar stations
from playing records promotive of drug use.'9 ' However, the
Commission pointed out that "the broadcaster could jeopardize
his license by failing to exercise responsibility in this are."192
186. For an account of the Nixon administration's concerted efforts to quiet the
politically troublesome youth culture, see J. ORMAN, supra note 1, at 6-11. For a de-
scription of its abuse of the licensing power, see Bazelon, upra note 61, at 214-17 &
nn.5-12. See also Whiteside, Annals of Television, NEw YORKER, Mar. 17, 1975, at 41
(describing President Nixon's comprehensive efforts to subdue the media). A former
speechwriter for Vice President Agnew credits his anti-drug lyric diatribes as a ma-
jor factor in the defeat of several liberal Democratic Senators. Safire, Sex on a Plat-
ter, supra note 4.
187. See No dope, BROADCAsTING, Mar. 1, 1971, at 7.
188. Licensee Responsibility to Review Records Before Their Broadcast, Public
Notice 71-205, 28 F.C.C. 2d 409 (1971) [hereinafter Notice], reprinted in Comment,
Drug Lyrics supra note 27, at 331 n.2l.
189. Notice, 28 F.C.C.2d 409, para. 2 at 409.
190. Licensee Responsibility to Review Records Before Their Broadcast, Memo-
randum Opinion and Order 71-428, 31 F.C.C.2d 377 (1971) [hereinafter Responsibility
Order or Order]. Shortly after the Notice was released petitions for reconsideration
and clarification were filed by, among others, Pacifica Foundation. See Did the R.Cgo
too far on drug lyrics?, BROADCASTING, Apr. 12, 1971, at 32-33. The resultant clarify-
ing Responsibility Order was construed by one writer as a pastiche designed to ob-
scure instead of clarify the Commission's position to cover "the commission's
embarrassment at being caught ... so close to the off-limits area of censorship."
Zeidenberg, What'8 it all about, FCC'?, BROADCASTING, Apr. 26, 1971, at 42.
191. Responsibility Order, 31 F.C.C.2d 377, para. 4 at 378.
192. Ild. pars. 7 at 379. The leading industry journal, BROADcASmI , opined that
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Regardless of what the Commission meant, the public, the
press, and the industry construed the Notice as an FCC attempt
to ban song lyrics "tending to promote or glorify the use of ille-
gal drugs.' 193 Warnings couched in terms of "licensee responsi-
bility," "public interest," and "jeopardize" served to alert
licensees to the potential consequences. The Commission art-
fully refrained from making any overt threats, but its failure to
explain the consequences of playing such records with knowl-
edge of their content rendered licensee self-censorship a rea-
sonably foreseeable and certainly not unwelcome probability.'19
The concurring opinions of Commissioners Robert E. Lee and
Thomas Houser reinforced the inference that such was the
FCC's intent. 95 Commissioner Johnson in dissent drew that
the ambiguity of the Notice lay in its juxtaposition of the familiarity requirement
with the assertion that numerous complaints about the broadcast of drug lyrics had
been received. Did the FCC go too far on drug lyrics?, supra note 190, at 32. For an
industry interpretation of the Responsibility Order, see Drug lyrics ruling is back in
court, BROADCASTiNG, Apr. 26, 1971, at 42-43. For a somewhat skewed view of this
episode see Albert, supra note 97, at 1333-34.
193. See Yale Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 478 F.2d 594, 603-06 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Baze-
Ion, C.J., statement as to why he would grant rehearing en banc, sua sponte); Com-
ment, Drug Lyrics, supra note 27, at 347-49, 355-57, 363-67. See also Coast to coast flap
over drug lyrics, BROADCASTING, Mar. 22, 1971, at 73; Powe, American Voodoo, supra
note 105, at 905; Walden, supra note 36, at 314. BROADCASTING's initial editorial reac-
tion was that the Notice meant the FCC was to hold Broadcasters accountable for
airing the music. Bad Trip, BROADCASTING, Mar. 15, 1971, at 78. One reason for the
reactions may have been the connotations attached to "licensee responsibility." Con-
sider former Commissioner Loevinger's description: "Talk of 'responsibility' of a
broacaster ... is simply a euphemism for self-censorship. It is an attempt to shift the
onus of action against speech from the Commission to the broadcaster, but it seeks
the same result--suppression of certain views and arguments." Anti-Defamation
League of B'Nai Brith, 6 F.C.C.2d 385, 398 (1967) (Loevinger, Comm'r, concurring).
Indeed, the Notice has been recognized as the classic example of raised eyebrow regu-
lation. Powe, American Voodoo, supra note 105, at 905; Walden, supra note 36, at 293
n.184; Cable seen leading to pay TV, BROADCASTiNG, Apr. 5, 1971, at 44-45 (quoting
then NAB President Vincent T. Wasilewski).
194. See irfra text accompanying note 208. One commentator noted that the lib-
eral citation to the "public interest" made the implication obvious. Comment, Drug
Lyrics, supra note 27, at 331. Accord Note, The Regulation Of Televised Violence, 26
STAN. L. REv. 1291, 1316 n.115 (1974). FCC Chairman Dean Burch later testified
before Congress that the FCC had not banned the playing of drug-related music, but
when asked what action he would take against a licensee who broadcast the music
with knowledge of its content he replied, "I probably would vote to take the license
away." Yale Broadcasting, 478 F.2d at 604 (Bazelon, C.J., statement as to why he
would grant rehearing en banc, sua sponte) (quoting from Hearings on the Effect of
the Promotion and Advertising of Over-the-Counter Drugs on Competition, Small
Business, and Health and Welfare f the Publi, Before the Subcommittee on Monop-
oly f the Senate Select Committee on Small Business, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., pt.2 at 734-
36 (1971)). See also Powe, American Voodoo, supra note 105, at 905.
195. "I sincerely hope that the action of the Commission... will discourage, if not
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inference in unequivocal terms: "[The Commission sends] a
loud and clear message: get those drug lyrics off the air... or
you may have trouble at license renewal time."'"
Five weeks after the Notice was released, the Commission
leaked to the press a list of twenty-two songs which were con-
sidered by the Department of the Army--and presumably the
federal government-to be drug-oriented.
1 7
The industry reaction was immediate and severe. Disc jock-
eys and program directors were fired for playing questionable
songs. Blacklists of songs and artists were circulated and sta-
tions removed records, and even artists' entire catalogs, from
their libraries.198
Two years later, the Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia ruled on a challenge to the Order in Yale Broadcasting
Co. v. FCC.1 The court initially noted that the Order super-
seded the Notice and that much of the industry confusion was
eliminate the playing of records which tend to promote and/or glorify the use of ille-
gal drugs .... [Obviously,] the licensee will exercise appropriate judgment in deter-
mining whether the broadcasting of such records is in the public interest." Notice, 28
F.C.C.2d 409, paras. 3-5 at 410 (Robert E. Lee, Comm'r, concurring). See also id. at
411 (Houser, Comm'r, concurring).
196. 28 F.C.C.2d 409, para. 2 at 412 (Johnson, Comm'r, dissenting). See also Com-
ment, Drug Lyrics, supra note 27, at 346 ("the broadcaster receives fair warning- your
license is at stake").
197. See Yale Broadcasting, 478 F.2d at 603 n.7; J. ORMAN, supra note 1, at 7; Powe,
American Voodoo, supra note 105, at 905. See also Comment, Musical Expression and
First Amendment Considerations, supra note 69, at 146 n.20; Ups and downs of drug
lyrics, BROADCASTING, Apr. 19, 1971, at 28 (listing the songs). Commission officials
assured that the list had no official standing. But the bell had been rung, so to speak;
the Pavlovian licensee reaction had been triggered. Cf Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sulli-
van, 372 U.S. 58 (1963) (invalidating similar tactics by State Obscenity Commission to
curb dissemination of nonobscene materials by booksellers); Playboy Enters., Inc. v.
Meese, 639 F. Supp. 581 (D.D.C. 1986) (granting temporary injunction to publisher
against letters and other informal action of the Attorney General's Commission on
Pornography designed to discourage distributors from selling nonobscene
publications).
198. See Yale Broadcasting, 478 F.2d at 603; Comment, Musical Expression and
First Amendment Considerations, supra note 69, at 147; Comment, Drug Lyrics,
supra note 27, at 347-49, 355-57, 363-67; Comment, 19 N.Y.L.F. 902, 905-06 (1974). A
1973 report to Congress, "The Record Industry And The Drug Epidemic," remarked
that "[a]pproving references to drugs have virtually disappeared from popular
songs." 119 CONG. REc. 37,849, 37,851 (1973) (statement of Sen. Buckley). Accord
Comment, Musical Expression and First Amendment Considerations, supra note 69,
at 144 n.11.
199. 478 F.2d 594 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 914 (1973). A Connecticut
licensee alleged that the FCC Notice and Responsibility Order violated the first
amendment and the APA and were unconstitutionally vague, and that the Commis-
sion's refusal to rule on the validity of the station's policy was an abuse of discretion.
Id at 595. See Comment, supra note 198, at 907 n.28 (quoting Brief for Petitioner at 4).
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traceable to the differences in the two documents. Viewing the
Order in isolation, its thrust was clear: the FCC was not
prohibiting the playing of any records and no reprisals would
be taken against stations that played drug records. However, it
was necessary for a management employee to know the con-
tent of the records broadcast and to make the judgment of
whether such broadcast was consistent with the public inter-
est. The Order merely "remind[s] broadcasters that they may
not remain indifferent to this severe problem and must con-
sider the impact that drug oriented music may have on the au-
dience." ° Since the Order did not prohibit the broadcast of
drug records, it did not violate the first amendment.
The court did not consider the first amendment implications
of the Commission's conspicuously elevated eyebrow. Instead
it focused on the tangential, tenuous overbreadth claim, casu-
ally distinguishing the licensee's authority20l The remaining
200. Yale Broadcasting, 478 F.2d at 596. Professor Powe has described the court
here as "willing" and the decision as a "loss of vision." Powe, American Voodoo,
supra note 105, at 905-07.
201. 478 F.2d at 597-99. See Comment, Musical Epression and First Amendment
Considerations, supra note 69, at 150. The licensee relied on Smith v. California, 361
U.S. 147 (1959). In Smith, the Supreme Court reversed the conviction of a bookseller
for sale and possession of obscene materials on the ground that the statutory imputa-
tion of knowledge of the contents of the seller's entire stock was overly burdensome.
The statute would necessarily restrict a law-abiding bookseller to trafficking only in
those books that she had read, inevitably suppressing protected speech. It was there-
fore fatally overbroad. The D.C. Circuit distinguished Smith on the ground that the
statute imposed a criminal penalty. Also, the knowledge imputed was of a signifi-
cantly greater magnitude in Smith and the "finite" quantity of disseminated music
playable by a licensee was easier to know than the bookseller's stock. Furthermore,
the court found that the purpose of the statute in Smith was to punish criminal con-
duct and to halt dissemination of obscene materials. In contrast, the FCC was merely
acting to promote the public interest by assuring informed licensee programming.
Viewed pragmatically, the cases cannot be distinguished without resort to super-
technicalities. The FCC's civil penalty may actually be harsher than many criminal
penalties. A criminal fine or suspended sentence pales in comparison to the loss of a
valuable station license. See Krattenmaker & Powe, supra note 106, at 1230 n.639;
Note, Broadcasting Offensive Programming Under A New Communications Act, 15
COLum. J.L. & Soc. PRos. 427, 433 (1980). Cf Pacifica Found. v. FCC, 556 F.2d 9, 20
n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (Bazelon, C.J., concurring) (fine preferable to chilling effect of
"associating" an order noting apparent liability for violation of section 1464 with the
offending station's license file); Note, Morality And The Broadcast Media, supra note
97, at 696 (comparing threatened loss of license to threatened criminal proceedings).
But cf. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 747 n.25 (1978) (plurality opinion) ("Even
the strongest civil penalty at the Commission's command does not include criminal
prosecution"). Moreover, the real purpose behind the regulations was identical: to
halt dissemination of matter considered objectionable by the respective governments
and to impose a liability on the offender. Finally, the extent-of-the- burden argument
is merely a hollow nicety. One is simply more impossible than the other.
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challenges were also easily deflected. Since the Order was
merely a reminder, APA rulemaking requirements were not
applicable.m Because "this court has no difficulty understand-
ing what the Commission expects of its licensees," and because
the Commission provided illustrative methods of compliance
with the Order, the vagueness claim was meritless zm Finally,
the Commission was well within its discretion in refusing to is-
sue a declaratory opinion as to the compliance vel non of the
station's policy. ° '
The decision is the epitome of judicial deference to FCC in-
formal action. The court's failure to reach, or even acknowl-
edge, the de facto censorship issue was duly noted by Chief
Judge Bazelon in yet another statement dissenting from the de-
nial of a rehearing en banc.m As in Illinois Citizens, he argued
202. 478 F.2d at 599-800. Compare Note, A First Amendment Blow to FCC Jawbon-
ing, supra note 137, at 337-38 (raised eyebrow tactics enable the FCC to circumvent
the requirements of both the APA and the Communications Act); supra notes 163-8
and accompanying text.
203. 478 F.2d at 601. Contra Comment, Drug Lyrics, supra note 27, at 362 (Notice
patently vague); Coast to coast flap over drug lyrics, supra note 193, at 73 (licensee
consensus that Notice was vague).
The court's vagueness analysis was questionable. It noted the prevailing standard.
"MTihe government may not draw a line between permissible and impermissible
speech in such an unclear and imprecise manner that 'men of common intelligence
must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.' " 478 F.2d at 601
(quoting Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926)). Aside from the
inherent nebulosity of the concept of "licensee responsibility," the reaction of the
press and the industry directly controverts the finding that the meaning of the Re-
sponsibility Order was clear. The record clearly showed confusion on the part of
those affected. See Comment, Musical Expression and First Amendment Considera-
tions, supra note 69, at 151-52. Even the Commissioners differed as to the meaning
and application of the directives. Moreover, the terse statement that the court had no
difficulty in understanding the meaning and application of the directives is not proba-
tive. Judges are generally not men of merely "common intelligence." Moreover, the
court's statement that part of the thrust of the Responsibility Order was that "no
reprisals would be taken against stations that played 'drug oriented music,' "calls into
question the court's understanding of the Responsibility Order because that state-
ment is clearly unsupported by the Responsibility Order's contents. 478 F.2d at 596.
Finally, the interpretation of the licensee's vagueness claim was also unduly narrow.
Yale's primary concern was clearly the uncertainty of the consequences for the licen-
see who, with knowledge of the content, decided that the public interest would best be
served by refusing to censor artists who described, expressed, or even advocated un-
popular Ideas. The court opted for simplistic resolutions on all these issues and
avoided the most serious constitutional claims.
204. 478 F.2d at 602.
205. Id. at 605. Chief Judge Bazelon suggested that the panel may have considered
the challenge premature. But he noted that the panel did not invoke the ripeness
doctrine and that mere alteration of programming due to the Notice was sufficient to
defeat a ripeness defense. Id at 605-06. For a discussion of ripeness doctrine, see
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that the Notice was indirect censorship and that ascertainment
of its real meaning required examination of the FCC's entire
course of conduct." Citing the concurring statement of Com-
missioners Lee and Houser, the distribution of the song list,
the interpretation of the Notice by the press, and the reaction
of the licensees, Chief Judge Bazelon concluded that the effect
of the Notice was censorship and that the court had abdicated
its responsibility by not confronting the issue.207
Though the Chief Judge was certainly insistent and pointed
in his criticism, he stopped short of explicitly finding an intent
to censor in the Notice. Justice Douglas, dissenting from the
denial of Yale Broadcasting's petition for certiorari, was not so
restrained. "It seems cear... that the Commission majority
intended to coerce broadcasters into refusing to play songs that
in the Commission's judgment were somehow drug related."2 m
Ultimately, the Yale Broadcasting decision is disturbing. It
strongly reinforces the conclusion that the court is willing to
abide the Commission's informal curtailment of free expres-
sion without substantial review. The Commission is thus
endowed with enormous power to shape this crucial communi-
cations industry and is largely unfettered in its discretion. It is
distressing that the FCC, guardian of the public interest and a
powerful arm of the federal government, participated in a cen-
sorial witch hunt designed to subvert constitutional protections
and cleanse the nation's airwaves of unpopular ideas - and was
generally E. GELLHORN & B. BOYER, supra note 144, at 318-21. See also Toilet Goods
Ass'n v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 158 (1967); Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136
(1967). Special considerations apply to block the application of the doctrine where
first amendment rights are implicated. See Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S.
307, 344-45 (1967) (Brennan, J., dissenting); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 432, 438
(1963). See generally Note, The Chilling Effect In Constitutional Law, 69 COLUM. L.
REV. 808 (1969); Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REV.
844 (1970); Note, The Void-For-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA.
L. REV. 67 (1960). For an illuminating discussion of the related substantive aspects of
the chilling effect doctrine, see Schauer, Fear, Risk And The First AmendmenL Un-
raveling The "Chilling Effect", 58 B.U.L. REV. 685 (1978).
206. 478 F.2d at 603. Compare Illinois Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 515
F.2d 397, 407 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (Bazelon, C.J., statement as to why he would grant re-
hearing en banc).
207. 478 F.2d at 603. See also Notice, 28 F.C.C.2d 409, at 415-16 (Johnson, Comm'r,
dissenting) (mere announcement of concern effects a censoring of speech); .
Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082, 1095-96 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (particularized Commission
rulings on contours of public interest must be closely scrutinized), cert denied, 396
U.S. 842 (1969).
208. 414 U.S. 914, 915 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting), denying cert to Yale Broad-
casting Co. v. FCC, 478 F.2d 594 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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not censured by a reviewing court. Yale Broadcasting stands as
a dark augury for those concerned with the constitutional fra-
gility of controversial rock speech.
In the final analysis, the reasons for the potency of the raised
eyebrow are apparent: the magnitude of the license's value;
the breadth of discretion conferred by the vague public interest
standard in the Communications Act; and the failure of the ju-
diciary to place meaningful limits on the FCC's exercise of that
discretion. Generally, this last and most important factor can
be attributed to the fact that the court, in practical effect,
treats the FCC like any other agency. FCC action is reviewed
by administrative law standards; deference is given to pre-
sumed agency expertise and the court exhibits a reluctance to
find an abuse of discretion that can only be ascribed to comity.
This course is proper and desirable in the fields of common car-
rier and technical broadcast regulation, but the courts should
not forsake constitutional standards when examining FCC con-
tent regulation. The relaxation of scrutiny is both inappropri-
ate and indefensible if the first amendment is to maintain its
vitality.
A possible explanation for the inadequacy of review in pro-
gramming cases is that the courts are applying an overly broad
reading of "reduced protection." Perhaps the combination of
the administrative setting and the unique nature of the me-
dium is thought to synergistically diminish first amendment
protection.
But if this explains, it does not satisfy. Reduced protection
does not call for laxity in review or deference to the very crea-
ture the first amendment exists to limit. Reduced protection
should merely find the court satisfied by a governmental inter-
est slightly less compelling and a restriction slightly less pre-
cisely drawn in furtherance thereof. Protective concepts such
as the chilling effect doctrine should be diligently applied. Re-
viewing courts should still rigorously scrutinize the proffered
justification and its invasive effects. At most, the usual pre-
sumption in favor of noninterference210 should be diminished.
209. This possibility is particularly troubling when the speech is indecent or offen-
sive and therefore less protected. The combination of less-protected speech, a lesser
protected setting such as broadcasting, and deferential review of Commission deci-
sions would amount to exceedingly scant protection.
210. See Quincy Cable TV v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434, 1462-63 (D.C. Cir. 1985) cert de-
nied 106 S. Ct. 288 (1986); see also L TRIBE, supra note 36, § 12-2, at 581. Ely, Flag
Desecration- A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First
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But to defer to political agencies in sensitive first amendment
areas seems wholly at war with fundamental constitutional
principles. It seems anomalous that reviewing courts should be
so gracious to the decisions of a Commission without expertise,
independence, or accountability. The sounder view would hold
that courts should cast an especially skeptical eye towards FCC
content regulation, both formal and informal, despite the na-
ture of the medium, because of the nature of the Commission,
the magnitude of the issues, and the judiciary's special obliga-
tion to vindicate fundamental freedoms. 11
Taken as a whole, the pre-Paciftca content regulation cases
demonstrate that the sui generis nature of broadcasting per-
mits broad, formal intrusions on licensee expression. Most im-
portantly, they indicate that wholesale subjugation of broadcast
speech is obtainable by the simple expedient of acting
informally.
IV
The Impact of Pacifica
A. Pacifica
On October 30, 1973, Pacifica Foundation's noncommercial
New York radio station, WBAI-FM, broadcast a program dis-
Amendment Analysis, 88 H.ARv. L. REv. 1482, 1492 n.39 (1975); Redish, supra note 46,
at 1182.
211. On the federal judiciary's special obligation to enforce expressive rights, see
Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974).
The recognition and application of the chilling effect doctrine seems especially ap-
propriate in reviewing FCC content regulatory activity. See supra text accompanying
notes 127-35 and 143-45. That doctrine extends beyond the procedural protections of
overbreadth and vagueness analysis. See Schauer, supra note 205, at 688: "[U]nder
[some] circumstances the inevitable chilling effect becomes great enough... to justify
the creation of substantive rules that recognize and account for the invidious chill."
Id. at 701. The broadcasting context, with that medium's crucial role in informing the
public and the substantial and potentially invidious government involvement through
the licensing process, is such a circumstance. See Kalven, Broadcasting, supra note
59, at 16, 37. This is evident when one considers that the staple of FCC content regula-
tion-the raised eyebrow-is designed to inhibit protected expressive activity. Yet the
judiciary has gone the other way, limiting the substantive protection accorded broad-
cast speech by refusing to meaningfully scrutinize governmental activities which re-
tard broadcast expression. This anomaly cannot be explained by the quid pro quo
justification, see Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). The argu-
ment that broadcasters are granted a privilege and therefore can be compelled to
surrender a portion of their freedom in return, besides being intrinsically questiona-
ble when used to limit expression, fails to account for the burden on the first amend-
ment rights of willing listeners. See supra note 130; infra notes 261, 351.
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cussing society's attitude toward language. During the broad-
cast, and with prior warning, the station played a George Carlin
monologue entitled "Filthy Words" '12 which lampooned socie-
tal taboos against certain vulgar expressions. Carlin used these
offensive expressions repeatedly in the broadcast recording.1 '
The Commission received a single complaint.214
Acting under the authority of section 1464 and its public in-
terest power,21 5 the FCC held the broadcast to be indecent.
2 1 6 It
defined "indecent" as "language that describes, in terms pa-
tently offensive as measured by contemporary community stan-
dards for the broadcast medium, sexual or excretory activities
and organs, at times of day when there is a reasonable risk that
children may be in the audience. '217 Essentially, the decision
took WUHY-FM1 8 one significant step further by eliminating
the requirement that the broadcast lack serious literary, artis-
tic, political, or scientific value before it could be proscribed.
Apparently, the Commission believed such an extension was
justified as it was not seeking to proscribe the material en-
tirely; rather it was "channeling" the "nuisance" to the late
evening when children were unlikely to be in the audience.219
212. The monologue can be found on the LP "George Carlin, Occupation: Foole"
(Little David Records, LD 1005, 1973). It was recorded before a live audience. The
transcript appears in the appendix to the FCC,'D.C. Circuit and Supreme Court opin-
ions. See 56 F.C.C.2d 94, para 2 at 100 (1975); 556 F.2d 9, 37 (D.C. Cir. 1977), and 438
U.S. 726, 751 (1978).
213. The expressions were "fuck," "shit," .piss," "motherfucker," "cocksucker,"
"cunt," and "tit." The repetitive use of these words was significant to both the FCC
and Supreme Court majorities. See Paciftea (1975), 56 F.C.C.2d 94, para. 14 at 99; FCC
v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 750 (1978) (plurality opinion); see also id. at 757
(Powell, J., concurring) (words were "repeated over and over as a sort of verbal
shock treatment.").
Carlin described the vulgarities as the seven words you cannot say on the radio. The
Commission action can be viewed as an instance of life imitating art. See Pac(fica, 438
U.S. at 777 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (decision confirms Carlin's prescience as a social
commentator).
214. Basic to the decision was the magnified privacy interest enjoyed in the home
and society's interest in protecting unsupervised children. It is therefore ironic that
the single complainant audited the broadcast in his car in the presence of his 15 year-
old son. See The Supreme Court- 1977 Term, supra note 131, at 149.
215. 47 U.S.C. § 303(g) (1982) in pertinent part provides broadly that the Commis-
sion shall "generally encourage the larger and more effective use of radio in the pub-
lic interest."
216. Pacic (1975), 56 F.C.C.2d 94, para. 14 at 99.
217. I para. 11 at 98. Compare Tallman v. United States, 465 F.2d 282,286 (7th Cir.
.1972) (similar statutory definition of "profane").
218. WUHY-FM Eastern Educ. Radio, 24 F.C.C.2d 408 (1970), discussed supra notes
71-79 and accompanying text.
219. 56 F.C.C.2d 94, paras. 11-12 at 98. See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying
1987]
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Since the intrusion on expression was qualitatively less severe,
more expression could be reached. Additionally, if the patently
offensive material was broadcast late at night, the Commission
might then exonerate the broadcaster if the material contained
the requisite degree of redeeming value. In sum, the new FCC
scheme was a bifurcated indecency standard: when children
were likely to be in the audience, broadcasts could be prohib-
ited if they were simply patently offensive, regardless of their
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value, or their lack of
prurient appeal. ° In the late evening, the WUHY-FM stan-
dard (modified) 221 might be applied, and a broadcast could be
proscribed if it was patently offensive and lacked the requisite
value, regardless of its failure to appeal to the prurient inter-
est.m The Commission made it quite clear that its paramount
concern was the protection of children from offensive language,
and it shaped its standards accordingly. The Commission held
that Pacifica was liable but did not impose a forfeiture. Instead
it "associated" the notice with the station's license file for con-
sideration with future renewal applications.23
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed
text. The theory views indecent broadcast expression as an abatable public nuisance
because of (1) the inability of prior warnings to protect the tranquility of the uncon-
senting adult dial scanner in the home, where he enjoys a magnified privacy interest,
and (2) the potential presence of a substantial number of unsupervised children in the
liestening audience when the material is aired during the daytime or early evening
hours. Id. paras. 8, 9, 11 at 96-98; id at 107-08 & n. 9 (Robinson, Comm'r, concurring);
see also WUHY-FM, 24 F.C.C.2d 408, para. 8 at 410-12. Commissioner Robinson,
joined by Commissioner Hooks, expressed some doubt: "I acknowledge that the logic
of this 'nuisance' test ... could carry us much further into the realm of censorship
than would be proper." 56 F.C.C.2d 94, at 108 (Robinson, Comm'r, concurring).
220. 56 F.C.C.2d 94, para. 11 at 98.
221. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), at minimum, altered the WUHY-FM
test by requiring that the redemptive literary, artistic, political or scientific value be
"serious." See 56 F.C.C.2d 94, para. 12 at 98; supra note 76.
222. 56 F.C.C.2d 94, para. 12 at 98. But see Note, Morality and Broadcasting: FCC
Control of "Indecent" Material Following Pacifica, 31 FED. CoMM. L.J. 145, 160, 162
(1978) (hereinafter Note, Morality and Broadcasting] (interpreting the WUHY-FM
and Pac(fic tests as parallel and consistent).
223. Commissioners Reid and Quello, concurring in separate statements, both fa-
vored complete proscription of patently offensive broadcast language. 56 F.C.C.2d 94,
para 3 at 102 (Reid, Comm'r, concurring); id para. 1 at 103 (Quello, Comm'r, concur-
ring) ("Garbage is garbage."). Commissioner Robinson, joined by Commissioner
Hooks, expressed some reservations as to the rationale, see supra note 219, but con-
curred nevertheless on the particular facts. 56 F.C.C.2d at 107. It was a version of
this more limited theory of the case that was ultimately adopted successfully before
the Supreme Court. See Krattenmaker & Powe, supra note 106, at 1217-18; injfra note
228.
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two to one.' Judge Tamm opined that the FCC action was
censorship in violation of 47 U.S.C. section 326,m and there-
fore did not authoritatively consider whether the first amend-
ment prohibited the FCC from regulating the broadcast of
nonobscene speech.m Chief Judge Bazelon agreed that the
FCC had violated the statute but went a step further and found
the first amendment violated as well.' Judge Leventhal dis-
224. Pacifica Found. v. FCC, 556 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
225. Nothing in this chapter shall be understood or construed to give the
Commission the power of censorship over.., radio communications ... and
no regulation or condition shall be promulgated or fixed by the Commission
which shall interfere with the right of free speech by means of radio
communication.
47 U.S.C. § 326 (1982). Meeting the Commission's claim that "channeling" could not
be considered censorship, the Judge stated- "In fact, the Order is censorship, regard-
less of what the Commission chooses to call it. The intent... is clear." 556 F.2d at 13.
See Note, Regulating Indecent Speech. A New Attack On 7he First Amendment, 41 U.
PrrT. L. REV. 321, 336 (1980) [hereinafter Note, Regulating Indecent Speech] (channel-
ing is a form of prohibition because It prevents a speaker from reaching the intended
audience). Censorship was defined as "[a]ny examination of thought or expression in
order to prevent publication of objectionable material." 556 F.2d at 14 (citing Anti-
Defamation League of B'Nai B'rith v. FCC, 403 F.2d 169, 169 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert
denied, 394 U.S. 930 (1969)). In reversing, the Supreme Court cited the same case for
the opposite conclusion, 438 U.S. 726, 737 (1978) (plurality opinion), ignoring the fact
that the definition culled from the case by Judge Tamm was originally formulated by
the Supreme Court in Farmers Union v. WDAY, 360 U.S. 525, 527 (1959).
For criticism of Judge Tamm's opinion, see Recent Decisions, 11 GA. L. REv. 951,
957-58 (1977); Case Note, 46 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 324, 335-37 (1978); Recent Decisions,
61 MARQ. . REv. 534, 538-40 (1978).
226. Judge Tamm additionally determined that the Order was equivalent to a rule.
556 F.2d at 15. So considered, the rule was overbroad in its sweeping prohibition of
broadcasts of certain words without regard to their context or redeeming value. IcS at
16-17. It was also vague in its failure to define "children" or distinguish in any way
between age groups. Id. at 17.
227. Id. at 18-30 (Bazelon, C.J., concurring). The Chief Judge theorized that 47
U.S.C. § 326, the anti-censorship provision, was necessarily limited by 18 U.S.C. § 1464
to the extent the latter was constitutional. He noted that in Illinois Citizens Comm.
for Broadcasting v. FCC, 515 F.2d 397 (D.C. Cir. 1974), where both section 326 and first
amendment claims were raised, the court had affirmed the Commission after examin-
ing only the constitutional claim This raised the "clear implication" that section 326
provided no greater protection than the first amendment. Since it could not provide
less the two standards must be coextensive. 556 F.2d at 18-20.
According to one commentator this conclusion was obvious. 'That the statute does
not (provide more protection than the first amendment] should be clear from its
wording alone." Recent Decisions, 11 GA. L REv. 951, 958 (1977). If this is so then
some impressive jurisprudential minds have been remarkably unconscious. Other
commentators have been more analytical. See, e.g., Comment, Drug Lyrics, aupra note
27, at 345-46 (theorizing that "interfere" is a more stringent prohibition than
"abridge"). For an early view that section 326 was meant to provide greater protec-
tion than the first amendment, see H. WARNER, upra note 63, at 453, 461 n.26.
The Chief Judge concluded that the speech would be constitutionally protected in
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sented, finding the Commission's action, on these facts, justi-
fied by the compelling governmental interest in assisting
parents in the protection of their children and in maintaining
residential privacy and the quality of community life.2as
The United States Supreme Court reversed five to four.2 9'
Justice Stevens, writing for a plurality, began by limiting the
scope of review to the Commission's holding that the broadcast
of Carlin's monologue at a time when children were likely to be
in the audience was indecent. Because the FCC Order was an
adjudication "issued in a specific factual context," any further
review would be tantamount to an advisory opinion. 2
The Court next decided that section 326 had not been vio-
lated by the Order." The Court adopted a narrow view of cen-
sorship, essentially construing the statute to disallow only
classical prior restraints. Reviewing the content of past broad-
casts was within the FCC's public interest authority and "[sec-
tion] 326 does not limit the Commission's authority to impose
sanctions on licensees who engage in obscene, indecent, or pro-
the print media, and that the unique characteristics of the broadcast media could not
justify the expanded reach of government control. 556 F.2d at 30.
228. Id. at 30-37 (Leventhal, J., dissenting). Judge Leventhal limited his inquiry to
the FCC's conclusion that the language as broadcast was indecent within the meaning
of section 1464 and unprotected. According to Professors Krattenmaker and Powe,
Judge Leventhal's theory of the case was manufactured out of whole cloth, appearing
in neither the briefs nor the argument of the Commission. Krattenmaker & Powe,
supra note 106, at 1217-18, 1266 n.843. The Commission then adopted the theory for
the first time in its brief to the Supreme Court. Id. Thus viewed, Judge Leventhal's
theory apparently finds its roots in the reluctant concurrence of Commissioners
Robinson and Hooks, see supra note 223; inftra note 230 and accompanying text.
229. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978). Justice Stevens wrote for a plural-
ity which included Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist. Justice Powell,
joined by Justice Blackmun, concurred separately. Justice Stewart, joined by Justices
Brennan, White and Marshall, dissented on statutory grounds, Justice Brennan,
joined by Justice Marshall, filed a separate opinion dissenting from the Court's con-
stitutional analysis.
230. 438 U.S. at 734-35. This was similar to the argument fashioned by Judge
Leventhal in dissent below and adopted by the Commission before the Court. See
supra note 228.
231. 438 U.S. at 735-38, 736 n.10. The Court quoted at length from KFKB Broad-
casting Ass'n v. FRC, 47 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1931), and Trinity Methodist Church,
South v. FRC, 62 F.2d 850 (D.C. Cir. 1932), cert denied, 288 U.S. 599 (1933), both dis-
cussed supra notes 97-98. It is interesting that the Court chose to exhume 45 year old
precedents in affirming, essentially, the reasoning of Commissioner Robinson. In his
seminal 1967 study of Commission regulation, then Professor Robinson had reasoned
that KFKB was of doubtful validity since Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931), and
that the court of appeals language (quoted favorably by the Pac(ftca plurality) was
"foolish." See Robinson, Observation, supra note 60, at 104-05; supra note 97.
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fane broadcasting. ' 2 2
The Court then turned to the definition of statutory inde-
cency promulgated by the FCC. The plain language of the stat-
ute was said to mandate bifurcated definitions of indecency and
obscenity. First, the statute was written in the disjunctive.tm
Second, the normal definition of "indecent" merely refers to
"nonconformance with accepted standards of morality."2 Fi-
nally, the Court rejected Pacifica's contention that the synon-
ymy of "indecent" and "obscene" in a related mail statutem as
recently construedm required a similar definition of those
232. 438 U.S. at 738. For critical discussion of the Court's statutory analysis, see The
Supreme Court; 1977 Term, supra note 131, at 153 n.47; Note, Regulating Indecent
Speech, supra note 225, at 328-32.
233. 438 U.S. at 740. This was also noted in the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals'
thoughtful analysis in United States v. Simpson, 561 F.2d 53, 60 (7th Cir. 1977). That
court reached the opposite conclusion, however. See also 438 U.S. at 779 n.5 (Stewart,
J., dissenting) (endorsing the 7th Circuit's analysis).
234. 438 U.S. at 740 & n.14 (citing WEBSTER'S THmD NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTION-
ARY (1966)). This is a perplexing point. Many commentators read this definition to
supersede or supplement the FCC definition. E.g., Krattenmaker & Esterow, Censor-
ing Indecent Cable Programs: 7e New Morality Meets The New Media, 51 FORDHAM
L. REv. 606, 619-21, 625 (1983); Riggs, supra note 78, at 11; Note, Indecent Program-
ming On Cable Television And The First Amendment, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 254,258
(1983). Some cannot make up their minds. Compare Krattenimaker & Powe, supra
note 106, at 1218 (the Court adopted the FCC definition) with id at 1286-87 (the
Court relied on the dictionary definition); Glasser & Jassem, Indecent Broadcasts and
the Listener's Right of Privacy, 24 J. BROADCASTING 285, 290 (1980) (the Court
adopted the dictionary definition) with id at 291 (both the FCC and the Court de-
clined to specify standards for defining indecent language). According to one com-
mentator, "the Court provided no guidance on what material will be considered to be
'indecent,' and expressly refused to review the [FCC definition]." Note, Morality and
Broadcasting, supra note 222, at 145; accord Note, Regulating Indecent Speech, supra
note 225, at 324-25. Contra The Supreme Court; 1977 Ter, supra note 131, at 157 (the
Court accepted the FCC definition). Note that the FCC, at least for the time being,
has stuck to its own definition. See WGBH Educ. Found., 69 F.C.C.2d 1250, para. 10 at
1254 n.5 (1978). But see Kenneth L. Gilbert, 92 F.C.C.2d 130, para. 6 at 138 (adminis-
trative law judge applied the Supreme Court's dictionary definition in revoking an
Amateur Radio Service Station (ham radio) license for, inter alia, use of indecent
language), affd on other grounds, 92 F.C.C.2d 126 (1982)).
Neither definition can be satisfactorily squared with the minority-protecting func-
tion of the first amendment, though certainly the narrower FCC definition is more
acceptable. See Ratner, supra note 76, at 589:
Patent offensiveness. . . frankly rests on a majority attitude .... [I]t permits
the majority to withhold from a minority communications that do not con-
form to majoritarian esthetic-sexual preferences. Such a standard contra-
dicts first amendment exchange-of-ideas and privacy-of-thought values that
preclude restraints on unpopular communications just because they are
unpopular.
235. 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1982).
236. See Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974).
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terms in section 1464.2 It based this holding on the Commis-
sion's long-standing bifurcated construction2 and the differ-
ent characteristics of the print and broadcast media. The
pervasiveness of the broadcast media warranted the inference
that Congress intended to apply more stringent regulatory
;standards.2 9 The Court concluded that "neither our prior deci-
sions nor the language or history of [section] 1464 supports the
conclusion that prurient appeal is an essential component of in-
decent language." Therefore, the language as broadcast was
statutorily indecent despite the absence of prurient appeal.' 1
The Court then affirmed the Commission's constitutional
analysis. It noted that 'roadcasting... has received the most
limited First Amendment protection .... [A] broadcaster may
be deprived of his license and his forum if the Commission de-
cides that such an action would serve 'the public interest, con-
venience, and necessity.' '' m Reduced protection in the
broadcast context was warranted because "the broadcast media
have established a uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of
all Americans" and because broadcasts are "uniquely acces-
sible to children."2" The Court cited Rowan v. United States
Post Office Departmentm for the proposition that "indecent
material presented over the airwaves confronts the citizen, not
only in public, but also in the privacy of the home, where the
237. 438 U.S. at 740-41.
238. Id. at 741 & n.16. See supra notes 133-34, 144, and accompanying text for a
criticism of deferential review in the first amendment context.
239. I& at 741-42 & n.17. But ci Krattenmaker & Powe, supra note 106, at 1232-33;
The Supreme Court 1977 Term, supra note 131, at 161 (print media is at least as
pervasive as broadcast media). The print media may in fact be more accessible to
minors because their presence is less fleeting. It takes affirmative action (turning on
a tape recorder) to capture the broadcast. In contrast, printed matter requires the
affirmative action of a toss into the trash to remove it once obtained.
240. 438 U.S. at 741.
241. Id,
242. Id. at 748 (quoting in part 47 U.S.C. §§ 309(a), 312(a)(2)).
243. 438 U.S. at 748.
244. Id at 749.
245. 397 U.S. 728 (1970). The Court upheld a statute which allowed an individual to
petition the government to require a mailer of objectionable material to remove the
individual's name from its mailing list. The individual's privacy interest in the home
was found to outweigh the right of the mailer to communicate with him. As Justice
Brennan noted in his concurring opinion, the basis of the decision was that the indi-
vidual and not the government was to make the decision as to what materials were to
be prohibited; and the decision of the individual in no way interfered with the right of
willing addressees to receive the material, or the right of the mailer to send its mate-
rial to others. 397 U.S. at 741 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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individual's right to be left alone plainly outweighs the First
Amendment rights of an intruder."2 Residential dial scanners
could not be completely protected by prior warnings.2 47 The
Court then dismissed the idea that the invasion of these sub-
stantial privacy interests could occur in a "tolerable"
manner:
248
246. 438 U.S. at 748.
247. Id.
248. The concepts of offensive speech, levels of privacy rights, and tolerable and
intolerable invasions were expounded and defined in Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15
(1971), and Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
Cohen was arrested for wearing a jacket adorned with an offensive expression
("Fuck the Draft") in a courthouse corridor, a breach of the peace. The Court held
that the offensive, nonobscene expression was protected under the first amendment
because it did not invade "substantial privacy interests... in an essentially intolerable
manner." 403 U.S. at 21. Those exposed to the message "could effectively avoid fur-
ther bombardment of their sensibilities simply by averting their eyes." Id. In the pub-
lic theatre, privacy interests are less substantial and the ability to escape the message
renders the invasion a tolerable one. Thus the right to speak in that setting outweighs
the right to insulate one's self from the offensive speech. The Court made clear that
the privacy interest in the home is more substantial and may command a different
result Id. at 21-22.
In Erznoznik, the Court invalidated an ordinance which deemed a nuisance any
projection of nudity onto an outdoor screen visible from a public street. The Court
rejected, inter alia, the City's proffered interest in protecting the sensibilities of un-
willing passers-by because, like the onlookers in Cohen, they were not captive viewers
- they could "avert their eyes." 422 U.S. at 212. The invasion was therefore a tolera-
ble one. Id. at 211-12.
The Court attempted to reconcile these cases with the Order. The surprised dial
scanner is subjected to an intolerable invasion of her privacy, and that invasion was
likely to occur inside the home, where those interests are substantial. See 438 U.S. at
748-49. Cohen and Erznoznik, in contrast, stood for the proposition that "[o]utside the
home, the balance between the offensive speaker and the unwilling audience may
sometimes tip in favor of the speaker, requiring the offended listener to turn away."
438 U.S. at 749 n.27. For criticism of this analysis, see iiifra notes 299-319 and accompa-
nying text. The Court also contrasted Cohen by noting the political nature of Cohen's
statement and the criminal nature of Cohen's penalty. 438 U.S. at 747 n.25. Or Bethel
School District No. 403 v. Fraser, 106 S. Ct. 3159, 3164 (1986) (distinguishing Cohen's
political statement from a lewd nominating speech in a student election). These ratio-
nales are criticized infn note 364 and accompanying text (political) and supra note
201 (criminal). Most important to the Court, no one in Cohen appeared to be offended,
whereas the FCC had responded to an actual complaint. 438 U.S. at 747 n.25. See Far-
ber, supra note 43, at 294 n.72. Even assuming this is a reasonable distinction, it is not
entirely correct The officer who arrested Cohen was clearly offended by his message.
See id. at 286. Professor Farber has argued that Cohen is irrelevant to broadcasting
because it focused entirely on content. Pacdftca, in contrast, was based largely on con-
text. See id at 294. He therefore disagrees with those who read Cohen as a statement
regarding the balance of speech rights and privacy rights. Id. at 291-93.
This seems an overly technical argument. It is true that what Cohen stands for and
what Cohen held may be two different things, but that should not diminish the im-
portance of what Cohen has come to mean or the enduring majesty of Justice
Harlan's prose. The Cohen tolerability and substantiality standards have come to be
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To say that one may avoid further offense by turning off the
radio when he hears indecent language is like saying that the
remedy for an assault is to run away after the first blow. One
may hang up on an indecent phone call, but that option does
not give the caller a constitutional immunity or avoid a harm
that has already taken place.2 9
The Court next affirmed the FCC's theory that the radio's
unique accessibility to unsupervised children justified advanced
FCC power to regulate for their protection.' The Court cited
Ginsberg v. New York 251 to establish the government's interest
in assuring the "well-being of its youth" and in supporting
parents' household autonomy.= The Court deflected the con-
tention that solicitude for children's sensibilities would imper-
missibly reduce adults to hearing only what is fit for children~m
by pointing out that adults had other methods of receiving Car-
the law-regardless of their original status as dictum. Subsequent cases invariably
quote Cohen in preparation for their balancing analysis. In sum, whether Harlan's
thoughts on the balance between.privacy and speech rights were dictum is moot-
subsequent jurisprudence has transformed and elevated the standard to prominence
and precedent.
The Court has departed from Cohen's original contours, however. It has found pri-
vacy interests in public to outweigh expressive interests when the invasion is an intol-
erable one (i.e., the audience is a captive one), see Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights,
418 U.S. 298 (1974), and has found the expressive interests of a public utility to out-
weigh privacy interests in the home when the invasion is a tolerable one, Consolidated
Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530 (1980). .Rowan v. United States
Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728 (1970) (addressee must receive the unwanted commu-
nication before invoking the statute).
249. 438 U.S. at 748-49. For a criticism of Justice Stevens analogies, see Maltz &
Hogue, On Keeping Pigs Out Of The Parlor: Speech As Public Nuisance After FCC v.
Pacifica Foundation, 31 S.C.L. REv. 377, 387 (1980).
250. 438 U.S. at 749-50.
251. 390 U.S. 629 (1968). The Court adopted a theory of variable obscenity, uphold-
ing a conviction for knowingly selling material to a minor that was obscene as to mi-
nors--even though it was not obscene as to adults. Neither adult nor minor first
amendment rights were prejudiced since the material remained available to adults
and was not constitutionally protected in the hands of minors. I& at 634-35. The stat-
ute "simply adjusts the definition of obscenity to social realities by permitting the
appeal of this type of material to be assessed in terms of the sexual interests'... of
such minors." I& at 638 (quoting in part Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502, 509
(1966)). The Court reasoned that the state had a strong interest in supporting par-
ents' "claim to authority in their own household" and a strong independent interest
in assuring the well-being of children. 390 U.S. at 638-40.
252. 438 U.S. at 749.
253. IdS at 750 n.28. The argument was based on Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380
(1957). There, the Court overturned a Michigan statute which prohibited the dissemi-
nation of material to the general reading public which would tend to corrupt the
morals of a minor. The Act was void because it would allow the entire population to
receive only material that was fit for children. This was akin to "burn[ing] the house
to roast the pig." 352 U.S. at 383. In Ginsberg the Court expressly held that Butler was
ROCK LYRICS
lin's message.2 4 In light of broadcasting's unique accessibility
to children, the interests asserted "amply justify special treat-
ment of indecent broadcasting."'
The majority diverged on other constitutional principles. The
plurality conceded that the Commission's Order might lead to
self-censorship by broadcasters, but believed that it would only
deter "patently offensive references to excretory and sexual
organs and activities. While some of these references may be
protected, they surely lie at the periphery of First Amendment
concern.' '2 5 In an accompanying footnote, the plurality stated
not offended because adult access to the nonobscene material was unrestricted. 390
U.S. at 634-35.
254. The plurality believed Butler was unoffended because adults could purchase
Carlin's records or see him perform the monologue in a nightclub. They also noted
that the FCC had not yet spoken as to whether the monologue could be aired late at
night. 438 U.S. at 750 n.28. The concurring Justices were not so convinced, recognizing
that the "argument is not without force." Id at 760. However, they chose to defer to
the Commission's decision because the point "is not sufficiently strong to leave the
Commission powerless to act in circumstances such as those in this case." Id For the
argument that such deference is inappropriate, see supra notes 133-34, 144, and ac-
companying text; infra notes 295-98 and accompanying text.
Justice Brennan thought the principle of Butler was "violate[d] in spades." 438 U.S.
at 768. See infra note 274 and accompanying text.
255. 438 U.S. at 750.
256. Id. at 743. See also infa note 260 and accompanying text.
In traditional first amendment analysis of regulations directed at expression there
are two general tiers, or levels, of speech: a protected, upper level which is presump-
tively off-limits to government regulation, and a lower, unprotected level consisting of
certain well-defined categories of expression which are subject to reasonable regula-
tion. See, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982) (child pornography); Miller v.
California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (obscenity). See generally Chaplinsky v. New Hamp-
shire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942); L. TRIBE, supra note 36, § 12-8 at 602-08; Ely, supra
note 210; Kalven, The Metaphysics Of The Law Of Obscenity, 1960 Sup. CT. REv. 1
[hereinafter Kalven, Metaphysics].
Modern analysis recognizes that within the upper tier there are certain categories of
speech which are less worthy of constitutional protection and therefore less than fully
protected. The state can regulate these according to special rules, and the presump-
tion of protection can be defeated more easily--a less than compelling governmental
interest will suffice to justify the restriction. Examples of these categories are com-
mercial speech, Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S.
557, 561-66 (1980); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770-73 (1976), and defamatory speech, Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345-48 (1974); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
265-66 (1964). Broadcast speech is also subject to this reduced protection, not for any
lack of general value, but rather on the basis of its pervasiveness and the scarcity of
spectrum space. See FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 374-78 (1984);
FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726,744-50 (1978); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,
395 U.S. 367, 396-400 (1969); National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190,
225-27 (1943). The emerging worthier speech doctrine renders offensive nonpolitical
speech less protected because, like defamatory and commercial speech, it is intrinsi-
cally less constitutionally valuable. See Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427
19871
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that the primary effect would be "on the form, rather than the
U.S. 50, 70 (1976) (plurality opinion). The crucial difference is that commercial and
defamatory speech are objectively identifiable categories of speech whereas the offen-
sive nature of a particular expression is necessarily a subjective, ad hoc value judg-
ment. Nevertheless, under the value-based theory the reviewing judge subjectively
determines the worth of the particular expression and gives it proportionate weight
(or protection) in the balance of competing interests.
This is a sharp break with traditional first amendment doctrine which severely lim-
ited the state's ability to regulate with reference to content. That analysis supposedly
conferred equal weight upon all protected expression with any reduction in protec-
tion accomplished on a categorical rather than an ad hoc basis, thereby reducing the
subjectivity of the analysis. Subjectivity inevitably sneaks in through the back door
when weight is accorded to the governmental interest. See Ely, supra note 210, at
1493 n.44. But see Goldman, supra note 41, at 300 (treating subjectivity as a new prob-
lem presented by the worthier-speech theory). But the value-based theory offers far
more opportunity for manipulation or unconscious prejudice because both sides of
the scale are available to the arbiter's thumbs, thereby providing greater flexibility
in justifying the desired result. See Goldman, supra note 41, at 300-01.
The doctrine of worthier speech has been called a new two-level theory because it is
an extrapolation of the famous dictum in Chaplinsky. This, however, is misleading.
It does find its doctrinal base in that dictum, but it turns the two-level theory on its
head. The Chaplinsky dictum called for the denial of protection to "certain well-de-
fined and narrowly limited classes of speech" which are "no essential part of any
exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any
benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in
order and morality." 315 U.S. at 571-72.
In the Young and Paciftca plurality opinions, Justice Stevens adopted the expan-
sive aspects of the dictum and discarded the important limiting principle. See
Goldman, supra note 41, at 300. See also L. TRIBE, supra note 36, § 12-8 at 607 (the
theory takes Chaplinsky to a dangerous extreme). He has also effectively narrowed
the idea of "truth" to its political sense, rejecting, at least partially, the oft recognized
capacity of free expression to better define our individual identities, see supra note 46.
See generally L. TRIBE, supra note 36, §§ 12-18, 12-19 at 672-82; id. at 65 & n.48 (Supp.
1979); Goldman, supra note 41; Krattenmaker & Powe, supra note 106, at 1207-12;
The Supreme Court 1977 Term, supra note 131, at 154-57 & n.60; Note, Content Regu-
lation And The Dimensions Of Free Ex-pression, 96 HARv. L REV. 1854 (1983) (here-
inafter Note, Dimensions]; Note, The Emerging Constitutional Jurisprudence Qf
Justice Stevens, 46 U. Cm. L. REv. 155, 161-71 (1978). Additionally, in both Young
and Pacifica, the lesser value of the expression was cited as grounds for refusing to
apply overbreadth principles. 427 U.S. at 58-61; 438 U.S. at 743. See text accompany-
ing infra note 258.
Justice Brennan, in dissent, took comfort in the fact that Justice Stevens failed to
garner a majority for his "sliding scale of First Amendment protection calibrated to
this Court's perception of the worth of a communication's content." 438 U.S. at 763.
However, some commentators argue that the theory was implicitly adopted by a ma-
jority of the Court in New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982). See, e.g., Note, Dimen-
sions, supra, at 1856 & n.14. Contra The Supreme Court 1981 Term, 96 HARv. L. REV.
62, 146 n.37 (1982). This argument is off the mark. The Court in Ferber merely cre-
ated another category of unprotected speech - child pornography. Though the path
to this decision necessarily included a value judgment, it is a judgment concerning a
type of expression and is no material departure from the reasoning that shunted ob-
scene expression outside the protection of the first amendment, see Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S. 476, 481-85 (1957). See Ferber, 458 U.S. at 763-64:
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content, of serious communication. There are few, if any,
thoughts that cannot be expressed by the use of less offensive
language. ' ' 2 7 It concluded that invalidating the Order based on
conjectural overbreadth was "strong medicine" to be rarely in-
voked; the instant category of speech was undeserving of such
drastic action.2m Additionally, the plurality cited the limited
scope of its review as a sufficient reason to forego an over-
breadth analysis.2" Finally, the plurality expressly lowered
the level of first amendment protection for patently offensive
speech. Though "not entirely outside the protection of the First
Amendment," indecent speech is situated low in the "hierarchy
of First Amendment values." In some contexts it could be regu-
Recognizing and classifying child pornography as a category of material
outside the protection of the First Amendment is not incompatible with our
earlier decisions. "The question whether speech is, or is not protected by the
First Amendment often depends on the content of the speech." [citing the
plurality opinions in Young and Pact]ica] . .. [It] is not rare that a content-
based classification of speech has been accepted because it may be appropri-
ately generalized that within the confines of the given classification, the evil
to be restricted so overwhelmingly outweighs the expressive interests, if any,
at stake, that no process of case-by-case adjudication is required.
(citations omitted). On Ferber, see generally The Supreme Court, 1981 Term, supra, at
141-50.
A more compelling argument can be made that the theory was approved implicitly
in FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984), and Bethel School Dist. No.
403 v. Fraser, 106 S. Ct. 3159 (1986). In the former, Justice Brennan's majority opinion
repeatedly referred to editorials as core speech. See 468 U.S. at 380-82 & n.13. Since no
test was advanced to define editorials as a category of speech, it may be assumed that
such speech is to be subjectively identified on an ad hoc basis and given additional
weight when it appears. Also, in distinguishing Pac(fica, the Court expressly dis-
tanced core expression from indecent expression, though it in fact phrased this dis-
tinction in terms of the governmental interest in regulating the respective
communications rather than the societal interest in protecting them. See 468 U.S. at
380 n.13; id. at 412 & n.4 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
In Fraser, Chief Justice Burger spoke for the Court in finding a high school election
campaign nominating speech laced with sexual metaphors to be unprotected when
uttered in a high school gymnasium. The Court's balance of competing interests was
obviously and expressly affected by the nonpolitical, sexually explicit content of the
speech.
257. 438 U.S. at 743 n.18. See infra notes 333-36 and accompanying text for criti-
cism of this statement.
258. 438 U.S. at 743. See also Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50,61
(1976) (plurality opinion); cf. Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082,1101 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert
denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969) (overbreadth analysis not applied to commercial speech);
see supra note 256.
259. 438 U.S. at 742. This reasoning is rather circular. Justice Powell nevertheless
agreed, and additionally relied on his expectation that the Commission would "pro-
ceed cautiously" and not unduly chill the broadcasters' exercise of their rights. Id. at
761-62 n.4 (concurring opinion).
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lated.m Broadcasting, uniquely pervasive and accessible to
children, was such a context.261
In conclusion, the Court emphasized that its holding was ex-
tremely narrow. It had "not decided... that this broadcast
would justify a criminal prosecution." It had merely ap-
proved the FCC's nuisance theory in which context was "all
important."' It identified the contextual variables in the inde-
cency analysis as: time of day, program content, and the nature
of the specific medium. It concluded "[w]e simply hold that
when the Commission finds that a pig has entered the parlor,
the exercise of its regulatory power does not depend on proof
that the pig is obscene. ''
The concurring justices reached the same result in a differ-
ent manner. They refused to subscribe to the theory that some
speech was worthier than others. Value was "a judgment for
each person to make, not one for the judges to impose upon
him."2w The plurality had concluded that the broadcast was
260. 438 U.S. at 746. "It is a characteristic of speech such as this that both its capac-
ity to offend and its 'social value,'. . . vary with the circumstances. Words that are
commonplace in one setting are shocking in another. To paraphrase Mr. Justice
Harlan, one occasion's lyric is another's vulgarity." I& at 747 (citing Cohen v. Califor-
nia, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971)). But of Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948)
("Though we can see nothing of any possible value to society in these magazines,
they are as much entitled to the protection of free speech as the best of literature").
See supra note 256 and accompanying text.
281. 438 U.S. at 750. The Court did not rely on the spectrum scarcity rationale. As
Justice Brennan noted in his dissent, "although scarcity has justified increasing the
diversity of speakers and speech, it has never been held to justify censorship." 438 U.S.
at 770 n.4 (quoting Pacifica. Found. v. FCC, 556 F.2d 9, 29 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (Bazelon,
C.J., concurring) (emphasis Bazelon's)).
262. 438 U.S. at 750. One wonders then what was decided. Does indecent in section
1464 mean something different when invoked by the Justice Department rather than
the FCC? See i& at 780 n.8 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (criticizing the Court's apparently
disparate construction of section 1464 for criminal and civil contexts). Is the opinion
merely intended to add potency to the Commission eyebrow? Cf. Krattenmaker &
Powe, supra note 106, at 1262 n.825 (statement raises questions of justiciability).
263. 438 U.S. at 750.
264. I/
265. Id at 750-51. For a persuasive argument that a careful application of the
Court's reasoning would yield the opposite result, see L. TRIBE, supra note 36, at 64-65
(Supp. 1979). See also Brenner, Censoring the Airwaves" The Supreme Court's
Pacifica Decision, in FREE BUT REGULATED: CONFLICTING TRADITIONS IN MEDIA LAW
175, 178-79 (D. Brenner & W. Rivers eds. 1982).
266. 438 U.S. at 761 (Powell, J., concurring). In a footnote, the plurality forcefully
argued that this stand was inconsistent- that in fact a threshold value judgment was
implicit in the decision that the speech could be regulated. Id at 745 n.20. This seems
correct. Unlike his commercial speech opinions, which contain value language but ap-
ply to an objectively identifiable category of speech, e.g., Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar
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unprotected because any interest in disseminating this deval-
ued speech was outweighed by the government's interest in
regulating it, at least when a substantial number of children
were likely to be in the audience. Justices Powell and Black-
mun believed the government's interest outweighed the
speaker's interest in that context regardless of the value of the
speech 267
In addition to this disagreement, the concurring opinion was
noteworthy for its view of Commission-judiciary relations. Jus-
tice Powell stated that the Commission was embarking on a
"relatively new and difficult area of law," apparently recogniz-
ing that the obscenity odyssey may be repeated in this new cat-
egory of partially protected speech.2" The Commission's
judgment as to what speech may be banned from the airwaves
was "entitled to respect."2 9 He also noted that Pacifica's con-
tention that the Order was overly invasive of adult first
amendment rights "is not without force. The Commission cer-
tainly should consider it as it develops standards in this
area."2
70
The dissenting opinion of Justice Stewart challenged the ma-
jority's conclusion that "obscene" and "indecent" were not sy-
nonymous within section 1464.21
Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978), Justice Powell was willing to regulate on the ground
that the broadcast was offensive. Offensive speech is an inherently subjective cate-
gory and therefore necessarily contemplates ad hoc (rather than categorical) deter-
minations of a particular matter's value. See supra note 256. -
267. 438 U.S. at 757-58. This is essentially the reasoning that the Court embraced in
New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756-64 (1982), in holding that child pornography was
categorically unprotected speech. There the government's interest in protecting the
well-being of children was considered conclusively greater than any possible interest
in disseminating the material. Id. at 757. See supra note 256. Here the same govern-
ment interest was considered greater than the speaker's (and, presumably, the willing
listeners') interests in communication of any patently offensive material of any kind.
Justice Brennan found the concurring opinion to hold even greater potential for
abuse of first amendment values. As it would allow the FCC to regulate regardless of
the speech's value, no speech would be safe if it offends. See infra note 282.
268. 438 U.S. at 756. See The Supreme Cour14 1977 Term, supra note 131, at 156-57;
Note, Regulating Indecent Speech, supra note 225, at 332.
269. 438 U.S. at 760. But see Bazaar v. Fortune, 476 F.2d 570, 580 (5th Cir. 1973)
("[Where modes of expression are involved, the First Amendment casts a heavy bur-
den on any governmental body which seeks to censor on the grounds of 'public de-
cency' "). See also supra notes 133-34, 144, and accompanying text.
270. 438 U.S. at 760. See also id, at 761-62 n.4. Justice Powell agreed that Pacifica's
overbreadth claim was "meritless" in part because "the Commission may be expected
to proceed cautiously, as it has in the past.... I do not foresee an undue 'chilling'
effect on broadcasters' exercise of their rights." Id. at 762 n.4.
271. 438 U.S. at 777-80.
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Justice Brennan's dissent forcefully attacked the Court's
constitutional analysis.' 2 Justice Brennan disagreed with the
Court's application of Rowan,27 Butler, and Ginsberg,"' and
the Court's balancing analysis in general."5 The Justice also
took the majority to task for its "acute ethnocentric myopia"
and "depressing inability to appreciate that in our land of cul-
tural pluralism, there are many who think, act and talk differ-
ently from the Members of this Court, and who do not share
their fragile sensibifities."I 6 Justice Brennan concluded by hy-
pothesizing as to where the impact of the decision would be
felt, presciently describing the current plight of rock speakers
and listeners:
Today's decision will thus have its greatest impact on broad-
casters desiring to reach, and listening audiences composed of,
persons who do not share the Court's view as to which words
or expressions are acceptable and who, for a variety of reasons,
including a conscious desire to flout majoritarian conventions,
express themselves using words that may be regarded as offen-
sive by those from different socio-economic backgrounds.27
272. Justice Brennan set the tone of his dissent immediately: "I find the Court's
misapplication of fundamental First Amendment principles so patent, and its attempt
to'impose its notions of propriety on the whole of the American people so misguided,
that I am unable to remain silent." Id. at 762 (emphasis in original). Professor Bren-
ner remarked that the "acrimony directed from Brother Justice to Brother Justice
[was] unrivaled by any other opinion during the term." Brenner, supra note 265, at
178.
273. 438 U.S. at 766. See supra notes 245-47 and accompanying text. See infra notes
299-319 and accompanying text for criticism of the Court's application of Rowan.
274. 438 U.S. at 767-69. Justice Brennan protested the extension of Ginsberg to en-
compass indiscrete material which is not obscene as to minors, noting that the FCC
made "completely unavailable to adults material which may not constitutionally be
kept even from children." Id. at 768. The principle of Butler was thus "violate[d] in
spades." Id
275. 438 U.S. at 764-66. Justice Brennan felt that the privacy interests were less
substantial than the majority claimed because auditing the broadcast was a public ac-
tivity, even when undertaken in the home. Id. at 756-66. Moreover, the intrusion on
those interests was slight and therefore tolerable, because of the ease of escape from
the unwanted message. Id. at 756-66. Finally, he opined that the majority had failed to
adequately consider the rights of the "receptive, unoffended minority" of listeners
who welcomed the broadcast. Id. at 766. These arguments are explored in more detail
infra notes 299-319 and accompanying text.
276. 438 U.S. at 775. This myopia extended to the Court's conclusion that adults
retained alternative avenues of receiving Carlin's monologue-recordings and live
performances. See supra note 254 and accompanying text. Justice Brennan lamented
the Court's "insensitivity to the fact that these alternatives involve the expenditure of
money, time and effort that many of those wishing to hear Mr. Carlin's message may
not be able to afford." 438 U.S. at 774.
277. Id at 776. Compare WUHY-FM Eastern Educ. Radio, 24 F.C.C.2d 408, 422-23
(1970) (Johnson, Comm'r, dissenting) (accusing the Commission of ethnocentrism).
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B. Wrong Turns and Improper Accommodations
1. The Move Toward a Value-Based Theory of First
Amendment Protection
Paciica's constitutional analysis has justifiably drawn con-
siderable ire.28 Perhaps most objectionable was the Court's
retreat from the magnanimous protection Cohen and Erz-
noznik 9 mandated for offensive speech.' Justice Harlan's
eloquent discourse on toleration in the former seems a consid-
erable distance from Justice Stevens unabashed value judg-
ments. Those who had viewed Young v. American Mini
Theatres, Inc.2 l as a first amendment waif were disappointed
to find that, for the plurality at least, offensive speech was con-
stitutionally second-hand in more than just the land use
context.2
278. See, e.g., Fowler & Brenner, supra note 53, at 237: "Pacfica has little to com-
mend its constitutional analysis." See also L. TRIBE, supra note 36, at 61-67 (Supp.
1979); Krattenmaker & Esterow, upra note 234 at 621, 625; The Supreme Court 1977
Term, supra note 131, at 154-63; Note, Regulating Indecent Speech, supra note 225, at
332-39.
279. See supra note 248.
280. See L. TRIBE, supra -note 36, at 65-66 (Supp. 1979). Some may question the
desirability of protecting offensive speech, but, as Professors Krattenmaker and Powe
have noted, "[i]f there is no freedom to offend, there may well be no freedom." Krat-
tenmaker & Powe, supra note 106, at 1288. See Young v. American Mini Theatres,
Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 87 (1976) (Stewart, J., dissenting): "lilt is in those instances where
protected speech grates most unpleasantly against the sensibilities that judicial vigi-
lance must be at its height." See also Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15,25 (1971) ("[O]ne
man's vulgarity is another's lyric.").
281. 427 U.S. 50 (1976). Young concerned a Detroit "anti-skid row" zoning ordi-
nance requiring the dispersal of adult bookstores and moviehouses. The Court held
the ordinance was a valid regulation of the time, place and manner of expression de-
spite the fact that it operated with reference to the content of speech. The majority
grounded its decision on the government's substantial interest in combating the secon-
dary effects of such land use. Justice Stevens, leading a plurality of four justices, also
concluded that sexually explicit speech was of little value and therefore enjoyed less
constitutional protection. See supra note 256. See also City of Renton v. Playtime
Theatres, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 925 (1986) (upholding a similar zoning ordinance).
282. Young, 427 U.S. at 84-88 (Stewart, J., dissenting); L. TRIBE, supra note 36, § 12-
19, at 674; id at 65 n.48, 67-68 (Supp. 1979); Goldman, supra note 41, at 297. See supra
notes 256, 260 and accompanying text.
Theoretically more disturbing was Justice Powell's position. While rejecting Justice
Stevens value-based theory, he found that Carlin's monologue could be regulated re-
gardless. The necessary implication is that all broadcast speech is subject to commu-
nity caprice. For example, a fundamentalist community could rid the local airwaves of
broadcasts pertaining to evolution, or a staunchly conservative community could pre-
vent the airing of a discussion of the theories of Karl Marx, on the ground that the
community abhors these views. Or, closer to home, rock speech could be regulated if
the majority of the community found it patently offensive--or perhaps merely im-
moral--even if it addressed worthy themes. For a similar criticism of Justice Powell's
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2. The Move Toward Limited Review of FCC Content
Regulation
The Court's threshold decision to limit the scope of review
was particularly unfortunate." Generally speaking, adminis-
trative agencies enjoy discretion to formulate new policy
through ad hoc litigation rather than notice and comment
rulemaking.2" But the Court has frequently recognized the po-
tential for abuse in that process.m It is therefore odd that the
Court declined to review the "legislation" which emerged from
the Order.m The Commission candidly conceded that the pur-
pose of the Order was to inform licensees what language the
Commission would not tolerate on the air.28' Clearly the Com-
mission's predominant mission was to announce policy-not to
punish Pacifica.2m
When an agency chooses to make rules through the adjudica-
tive process it disserves the regulated entities, and perhaps the
public as well, to insulate the legislation from judicial scrutiny.
Limited review serves to fortify the FCC eyebrow by leaving
suspect directives in force to chill licensee conduct. A fortori it
pyrrhic rejection of the theory in Young, 427 U.S. at 73 n.1, see Goldman, supra note
41, at 305-06.
283. See supra note 230 and accompanying text.
284. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194,202-03 (1947) (rulemaking by adjudication
is within the agency's informed discretion); accord NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416
U.S. 267, 294 (1974).
285. See, e.g., Bell Aerospace, 416 U.S. at 294 (agency's decision to make rules
through ad hoc adjudication may be reversed for abuse of discretion); NLRB v. Wy-
man-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 764-66 (1969) (adjudicatory rulemaking upheld but
strongly criticized). See generally E. GELLHORN & B. BoYER, supra note 144, at 282-84.
Lower federal courts have found an abuse of discretion where the adjudication seeks
to establish rules of widespread application. See Ford Motor Co. v. FTC, 673 F.2d 1008,
1010 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 999 (1982); Patel v. Immigration & Naturali-
zation Serv., 638 F.2d 1199, 1204 (9th Cir. 1980).
286. (. Writers Guild of Am., West, Inc. v. FCC, 423 F. Supp. 1064, 1151-53 (C.D.
Cal. 1976) (FCC violated APA by proceeding through informal action rather than
notice and comment rulemaking), vacated and remanded sub nom. Writers Guild of
Am., West, Inc. v. American Broadcasting Cos., 609 F.2d 355 (9th Cir. 1979).
287. The Commission stated: "In this declaratory order we consider a citizen's com-
plaint ... [and we] review the applicable legal principles and clarify the standards
which will be utilized in considering the public's complaints about the broadcast of
'indecent' language." 56 F.C.C.2d 94, para. 2 at 94 (1975). See also id para. 10 at 97
("we are reformulating the concept of 'indecent' ").
288. This is evident in the Commission's choice of remedy. Rather than impose a
forfeiture, the Commission merely declared that Pacifica "could have been the subject
of administrative sanctions" and "associated" the Order with the station's license file
for possible consideration in subsequent renewal applications. 56 F.C.C.2d 94, para. 14
at 99.
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is anomalous that the Court abdicates its watchdog function in
an area so pregnant with first amendment issues. Indeed, the
limited scope of the Court's review betrays the unreality of first
amendment theory as currently applied to broadcasting. icen-
sees, as pervasively regulated creatures, order their primary ex-
pressive conduct not to conform with "holdings" but with
reference to whisperings, rumors, and innuendos.
Here again the complaint finds added volume when applied
to the analysis of Justice Powell.2" He appears willing to allow
the Commission carte blanche in regulating indecent program-
ming and setting constitutional standards. Specifically, he ex-
pressed abundant confidence in the Commission's ability to set
reasonable limits on its own power to regulate broadcast ex-
pression and to proceed with caution in maintaining decency on
the airwaves.' Thus far Justice Powell has been vindicated -
subsequent Commissioners have been restrained, opting for a
policy of deregulation.29 But that does not change the poten-
tial for abuse that inheres in his latitudinous investiture. The
fortuity of Commission restraint should not obscure the fact
that "[t]he principle... lies about like a loaded weapon ready
for the hand of any authority that can bring forward a plausi-
ble claim of an urgent need." 2m One must ask: (1) whether, at
the time, Justice Powell's confidence was reasonable in light of
the broad policy laid down in the Order and its extreme exten-
sion over WUHY-FM, which had never been validated by the
judiciary;293 (2) whether the foundation for his assumption
(that the Commission has proceeded cautiously in the past) is
historically accurate;2 (3) whether such an assumption can
ever be proper in the first amendment context, regardless of its
289. See supra notes 259, 268-70 and accompanying text.
290. See supra note 270 and accompanying text.
291. See irtfra notes 401-09 and accompanying text.
292. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 246 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
Cf. Fein, supra note 56, at 424, 427 n.8 (theories of reduced protection for broadcasting
are "loaded guns").
293. Commentators have noted that the early-to-mid 1970s was a time in which
Congress put heavy pressure on the Commission to clean up radio and television. See
supra note 106.
294. See Pacifica Found. v. FCC, 556 F.2d 9, 19 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (Bazelon, C.J.,
concurring) (citing examples of excessive Commission regulation). Justice Powell
also assumed implicitly that the Commission holds some constitutional expertise. This
is also questionable. See Illinois Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 515 F.2d 397;
418 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (Bazelon, C.J., statement as to why he would grant rehearing en
bane) ("[I]n applying section 1464... the FCC has demonstrated ... a total ignorance
of the constitutional definition of obscenity"); Fowler, The Public's Interest, supra
1987]
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reasonableness;' and (4) whether, considering the relation-
ship between the Commission and the licensees, the mere con-
ferral, or purported conferral of such discretion, is harmful in
and of itself. In other words, regardless of the Commission's
restraint, the chilling effect Justice Powell did not foresee
probably occurred merely because the discretion was actually
or apparently granted.2m While the majority did not expressly
adopt Justice Powell's theory of Commission semi-autonomy,
neither did the Court disclaim it.297 Only Justice Brennan
questioned the propriety of such deference. ,
3. Improper Accommodation of Privacy and Speech Rights
The Court's analysis of the proper balance between the com-
peting fundamental freedoms of privacy and speech was glar-
note 60; cf Robinson, Watchdogs, supra note 106, at 184 (Commissioners often have
doubtful qualifications).
295. "I am far less certain than my Brother Powell that such faith in the Commis-
sion is warranted, ... and even if I shared it, I could not so easily shirk the responsibil-
ity assumed by each Member of this Court jealously to guard against encroachments
on First Amendment freedoms." 438 U.S. at 769 (Brennan, J., dissenting). For a dis-
cussion of the propriety of granting deference to agency decisions on constitutional
matters, see supra notes 133-34, 144 and accompanying text.
296. Such a grant is akin to giving the Commission a machine gun to complement
the damoclesian sword. It is doubtful that licensees experienced in such Pavlovian
stimuli as proclamations of "licensee responsibility," see supra notes 186-208 and ac-
companying text, and exhortatory speeches, see supra text accompanying note 150,
share Justice Powell's confidence.
297. In fact, the Court's reliance on the Commission's longstanding interpretation
of section 1464 in affirming its reading of that statute implicitly supports Powell's
thesis. Powell merely expressly extended deference to the Commission's constitu-
tional conclusions. Section 1464's interrelationship with the first amendment puts the
plurality in the same camp sub silentio. See also FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450
U.S. 582, 596, 603 (1981) (holding that the FCC's conclusion that radio format deregu-
lation was in the public interest was "rational." FCC public interest determinations
are entitled to substantial deference). In WNWCV, the Court did not expressly include
constitutional questions, but the first amendment is implicated in every FCC pro-
gramming decision. Cf Kalven, Broadcasting, supra note 59, at 25 ("Since it is, in
effec4 the First Amendment which determines what [section 326] means, the argu-
ment must draw directly on the experience with the First Amendmene") (emphasis in
original).
298. See supra note 295. Commentators have also questioned it. See, e.g., Note, Mo-
rality and Broadcasting, supra note 222, at 171 (the FCC is "obviously... not the
ideal forum for a determination of constitutional rights"). Professors Krattenmaker
and Powe agree that Justice Powell probably viewed the case as one of administra-
tive law reviewable under an abuse of discretion standard. But, "[n]o more elemen-
tary proposition of law exists than that an administrative agency's opinion on issues
involving an individual's constitutional liberties is fully reviewable by federal courts
without the usual deference to administrative expertise." Krattenmaker & Powe,
supra note 106, at 1261 n.823.
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ingly superficial. The Court ignored the compelling argument,
pressed below by Judge Tamm2 and Chief Judge Bazelon s °
and by Justice Brennan, in dissent,s0l that the homeowner's
right of privacy is of a lesser magnitude when he tunes into a
public medium.
[A]n individual's actions in switching on and listening to com-
munications transmitted over the public airways and directed
to the public at large do not implicate fundamental privacy in-
terests, even when engaged in within the home. Instead, be-
cause the radio is undeniably a public medium, these actions
are more properly viewed as a decision to take part, if only as a
listener, in an ongoing public discourse.
0 2
The substantiality of the individual's privacy interest is there-
fore diminished. Moreover, the homeowner is not a "captive"
auditor because the radio can be turned offs 0s as easily as an
individual can turn away from a printed four-letter word em-
blazoned on a counter-cultural back in a courthouse corridor s "
or a nude picture flickering through the trees from a drive-in
theater screense5 The ability to escape the nuisance renders the
invasion a tolerable one and diminishes the substantiality of
the intrusion on individual privacy sm If the offending broad-
cast is a nuisance, it is one the complaining auditor has "come
to" and can easily escape from.s°" In sum, neither the magni-
tude of the privacy interest nor the extent of its infringement is
299. Pacifica Found. v. FCC, 556 F.2d 9, 17 (D.C. Cir 1977) (dicta).
300. Id. at 25-27 (Bazelon, C.J., concurring).
301. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 764-65 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
302. Id. (citing Note, Filthy Wor4s supra note 76, at 618). See Note, supra note 165,
at 599 ("Modern technology makes it possible to leave one's home without leaving the
house"); The Supreme Court 1977 Term, supra note 131, at 159.
303. 438 U.S. at 765 (quoting Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 302
(1974)). See also Packer Corp. v. Utah, 285 U.S. 105, 110 (1932); Pacifica Found. v.
FCC, 556 F.2d at 17 (dicta); id. at 26-27 & n.26 (Bazelon, C.J., concurring).
304. Cohen, 403 U.S. 15, 21. See 438 U.S. at 765 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting
556 F.2d at 26 (Bazelon, C.J., concurring)); 556 F.2d at 17 (dicta).
305. Erznoznik, 422 U.S. 205, 212. See 438 U.S. at 765 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(quoting 556 F.2d at 26 (Bazelon, C.J., concurring)).
306. 438 U.S. at 766 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See Haiman, Speech v. Privacy: Is
There A Right Not To Be Spoken To?, 67 Nw.U.L. REv. 153, 193 (1972).
307. "[I]f the radio is an 'intruder,' it is an intruder purchased... by the occupant
... and turned on by a volitional act." Krattenmaker & Powe, aupra note 106, at 1232.
One commentator compared the complainant in Pacifica to one who stands on a chair
and peers through a window with binoculars to read Cohen's Jacket. Note, supra note
165, at 599. Cf Sheinfeld, upra note 38, at 10 (PMRC is asking parents to listen to
rock stations for offensive material and to call the FCC with their complaints); Note,
Song Lyric Advisories, supra note 33, at 249 (advocating such action).
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great when the residential listener is confronted with an objec-
tionable broadcast.
The crucial point missed by the Paciftwa majority is that
broadcast technology allows-but does not compel-the indi-
vidual to tap into a national, or at least a communal, experi-
ence. It is a bizarre and intolerant twist of logic that reduces
the breadth of the experience of many on the basis of notions
of taste and morality which may be shared, or strongly held, by
but a few when the offended can easily withdraw.
In any case, the Court's balance seems specious. When the
express, preferred first amendment freedom of expression, en-
tailing both the right of the broadcaster to speak and the right
of the willing listener to hear," is weighed against the implied,
penumbral (though fundamental) privacy rightss°9 of the of-
fended dial scanner who can escape the intrusion with an expe-
ditious flick of the wrist, it seems that only a faulty scale or a
heavy thumb can resist the conclusion that privacy must be
subordinated.1l Moreover, it is the most valued and therefore
valuable of the rights that should be elevated. This would
clearly be speech rather than silence. Humans are social beings
who value the ability to communicate more than the ability to
shield themselves from communication. The social is generally
preferred to the antisocial. While speech may sometimes be an-
tisocial (when it intentionally or recklessly offends or injures),
privacy is, by definition, antisocial. This same reasoning re-
quires that the positive corollary of speech also be elevated
over the negative corollary; the right to receive ideas is more
valuable than the right to be free of them. Furthermore, both
ends of expression further the aims of the first amendment
(facilitating self-government and promoting self-realization) to
a greater extent than isolationism.' Professor Haiman's semi-
nal study of the competing interests yielded the conclusion
308. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969), held that the
rights of the listening public are paramount. A reasonable implication from this hold-
ing is that the rights of willing listeners take precedence over the rights of offended
dial scanners and non-listeners.
309. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483
(1965).
310. See T. EMERSON, supra note 60, at 3. Contra Z. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE
UNITED STATES 407 (1948); see also Kamin, Residential Picketing and the First
Amendment, 61 Nw. U.L. REv. 177,182 (1966) (privacy of the home is the higher prior-
ity). For a provocative discussion of the concepts of expression and privacy, see Note,
Dimensions, supra note 256, at 1861-67.
311. See Emerson, supra note 46 at 879-81; c. Note, Dimensions, supra note 256, at
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that the law should not attempt to insulate any persons in our
society, no matter how willing or unwilling an audience they
may be, from the initial impact of any kind of communica-
tion, but... the law should protect their right to escape from a
continued bombardment by that communication if they wish
to be free from it3Y2
It is evident that the fact that the radio may sit in the living
room does not justify the homogenization of its output. s1 The
Court gave the unwilling listener's privacy interests excessive
weight. Its reliance on Rowan 314 in this regard was thoroughly
misplaced.1 5 Rowan cannot support any government action
which broadly and subjectively limits indiscrete expression.316
The Rowan decision was expressly based on the purely
mechanical nature of the government's vindication of the indi-
vidual's privacy rights and the noninterference with the rights
of the mailer to send materials to non-complainants and the
right of willing or unperturbed addressees to receive the mate-
rial. In fact, the Court expressly noted that to refuse to allow
the addressee to stop the influx of unwanted, objectionable
mail "would tend to license a form of trespass and would make
hardly more sense than to say that a radio or television viewer
may not twist the dial to cut off an offensive or boring commu-
1865 ("It is through expression that people come to view themselves as a community
with a common identity and a shared conception of the good").
312. Haiman, supra note 306, at 193 (emphasis in original). Accord Baker, supra
note 43, at 1006 n.117.
313. See The Supreme Court; 1977 Term, supra note 131, at 159. Professor Emerson
long ago warned that privacy rights may be misused. "The chief danger is that the
right of privacy will be used as a screen ... to infringe upon legitimate expression.
This danger can be met if the courts actively insist upon a careful definition of a genu-
ine right to privacy and upon a fair accommodation of the two interests." Emerson,
supra note 46, at 928.
314. Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728 (1970). See supra note
245.
315. See 438 U.S. at 766 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Shinners, Offensive Personal
Product Advertising on the Broadcast Mediw" Can It Be Constitutionally Censored?,
34 FED. Comm. L.J. 49, 77 (1982). For a discussion of Justice Stevens' use of Rowan,
see supra notes 242-49 and accompanying text. Justice Powell cited Rowan for the
proposition that the home Is "the one place where people ordinarily have the right
not to be assaulted by unwanted and offensive sights and sounds." 438 U.S. at 759
(Powell, J., concurring).
316. What the Court upheld in Rowmn was the individual's power to censor his own
percipient intake, and to enlist the government to enforce his decision. In contrast,
Pacifica validated the power of the FCC to censor the public's intake on behalf of a
single complainant. But cf Hannegan v. Esquire, 327 U.S. 146,158 (1946) (Postmas-
ter General has no power to prescribe standards for material disseminated through
the malls).
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nication and thus bar its entering his home. 3 17 Thus the right
to be free of objectionable mail vindicated in Rowan was based
on the discrete nature of the medium, was equated with the
auditor's right to turn off the radio and was valid only because
the government was not acting on its own initiative, or making
its own determination as to what protected material was unac-
ceptable. Moreover, even in upholding the statute, the Court
required the addressee to absorb the first blow of the mate-
rial- even in her own home .31  This is no more than Paciftca
asked, and no more than Cohen and Erznoznik commanded.31 9
4. Improper Accommodation of Paternal State Interests
and Expressive Rights
Perhaps the most worrisome aspect of Pacfca is the Court's
extension of the Ginsberg doctrine320 to an indiscrete medium
in apparent contravention of the firmly established principle of
Butler.321 The linchpin of Ginsberg's variable obscenity theory
was the discrete nature of the material regulated.322 This al-
lowed the material to be kept from minors, in whose hands the
material was obscene and therefore unprotected, without
treading on the expressive rights of the purveyor and adult
readers, and thus did not run afoul of Butler's admonition that
adults not be reduced to reading only that which is fit for chil-
dren. The foundation of Ginsberg crumbles when it is applied
to materials not amenable to segregation of access, such as ra-
317. 397 U.S. at 737 (emphasis added).
318. See Pacifica Found. v. FCC, 556 F.2d at 27 (Bazelon, C.J., concurring).
319. A similarly distorted reading of Rowan was proferred by the FCC. Pacifica, 56
F.C.C.2d 94, pars. 13 at 99. This string of manifestly errant analyses indicates that the
error may be self-propagating. In other words, while the words of Rowan remain
constant, their meaning changes from opinion to opinion like the message in a chil-
dren's game of telephone. The handling of Rowan by the Commission and the Court
is nothing short of jurisprudential revisionism.
320. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968), discussed supra notes 250-55 and
accompanying text.
321. Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957), discussed upra notes 253-55 and ac-
companying text.
322. The "discreteness" issue is the problem of restricting the access of a particu-
lar group without restricting the access of others. Sexually explicit motion pictures
or magazines, for example, can be segmented to an adult-only audience by limiting
minors' ability to purchase access. Radio communications, on the other hand, are
indiscrete--access to youths cannot be restricted without compromising the interests
of adults. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 758-59 (Powell, J., concurring);
Kalven, Metaphysis, supra note 256, at 7. The FCC's channelling remedy was an
attempt to prevent the material from reaching children without unduly burdening the
right of willing adults to receive it.
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dio broadcasts. A logical, delicate balance between the govern-
ment's paternal interests and the first amendment was
therefore demolished in Pacifica. Freed from the constraints of
Butler's solicitude for the first amendment rights of adults and
the rapidly disappearing expressive rights of minors," 3 the
Ginsberg rationale is distressingly expansive.2 4
The extension of Ginsberg to protected expression is inher-
ently problematic because it takes the underlying interests to
an extreme which reveals their internal inconsistency. On one
hand, the state is asserting its own right to protect children; on
the other, it is asserting the paramountcy of parental choice in
decisions affecting the child's development. Apparently, only
those parents who agree with the state as to the best interests
of the child are so blessed. Those parents who wish to have the
monologue heard by their child, perhaps to defuse the taboo
attached to the words, are in fact subordinated to the state's
paternal judgment. This is a strange result when one considers
Wisconsin v. Yoder,32 wherein the Court held that the par-
ent's right to make fundamental child-rearing decisions out-
weighed the government's power to act in loco parentis.
326
Moreover, the necessity for protecting children from inde-
cent expression seems overstated. Consider Professor Haiman's
admonition:
[Tihere are all kinds of troubling sights and sounds .. . to
which children are exposed in public places. Children some-
how learn to deal with them. The sight of people with gro-
tesque physical disabilities . . . can be most disturbing to
children, who must be helped by adults to understand these
unpleasant realities. Our world does contain ugliness as well
as beauty, danger as well as safety, death as well as life. Chil-
323. See, e.g., Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 106 S. Ct. 3159, 3164 (1986)
(upholding a high school's authority to prohibit sexually explicit expression in
school). Only three years earlier the Court had stated: "Speech that is neither ob-
scene as to youths nor subject to some other legitimate proscription cannot be sup-
pressed solely to protect the young from ideas or images that a legislative body thinks
unsuitable for them." Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 213-14 (1975).
324. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 767 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Haiman,
eupra note 306, at 199 ("[W]e must be careful not to allow our natural sympathy for
tender psyches to beguile us into accepting serious erosions of the first amendment").
325. 406 U.S. 205, 213-14 (1972). See also Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166
(1944).
326. See 438 U.S. at 770 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Professor Tribe questions the
legitimacy of the state's in loco parentis authority to interfere with minors' expressive
rights as well as the Court's casual handling of it. L. TRIm, supra note 36, at 63 & n.38
(Supp. 1979).
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dren growing up in this world must relate to all of it. It is quite
possible that attempting to shield a child from any of the
world's realities can be more harmful than helpful to his
healthy development .... But if our concern is... to encourage
the growth of free and independent citizens, it would seem that
exposure to the realities of the world, rather than isolation
from them, would most effectively serve that goal.3"
The extension of Ginsberg to protected expression also weak-
ens the foundation of the state's paternal interest.328 In Gins-
berg, because the material was unprotected, there was no need
to examine the evidence that it was in fact harmful to youths.
Thus the legislation had only to meet the minimal demands of
substantive due process. But the harmful effects of indecent
material must meet a higher standard of proof and are, corre-
spondingly, even less apparent.3
In the absence of convincing evidence that offensive language
is actually harmful to minors, it is evident that any curb on of-
fensive speech visits its most prominent benefits on adult,
rather than youthful, psyches. It is adult notions of propriety
and not youthful sensibilities that arguably are endangered by
offensive language. 330 To imagine that children are offended or
327. Haiman, supra note 306, at 198-99. .Farber, supra note 43, at 302 ("Sup-
pressing [offensive] language violates a cardinal principle of a free society, that truths
are better confronted than suppressed").
328. See L. TRIBE, supra note 36, at 63 n.38 (Supp. 1979).
329. The negative effect on the young that results from exposure to; indecent or
offensive material remains merely intuitive speculation. See The Supreme Court 1977
Term, supra note 131, at 161 n.98; Comment, Regulating Rock Lyrim supra note 30,
at 606, 618; Note, Song Lyric Advisories, supra note 33, at 226 n.10; Note, Filthy
Words, supra note 76, at 620-21. In Pac(tca, the Commission itself felt compelled to
phrase its concern in terms, of the "possible negative effects on children." 56 F.C.C.2d
94, para. 9 at 97 n.4 (quoting QUAAL & MARTIN [sic], BROADCAsT MANAGEMENT 57-60
(1968)).
330. See Note, Song Lyric Advisories, supra note 33, at 257; Comment, Regulating
Rock Lyrics, supra note 30, at 605 (children do not understand sexual innuendo).
"(T]he most troublesome part of this problem has to do with the exposure of children
to language which most parents regard as inappropriate for them to hear." 56
F.C.C.2d 94, para. 11 at 98 (emphasis added). See also id at 109 (Robinson, Comm'r,
concurring) ("What we assert is a special power to protect the young-or, more pre-
cisely, people's views about what sort of material it is proper to expose to the
young"). Rather, on close inspection, the root interest in curbing indecency is one
that springs from the Supreme Court's definition of indecency - a concern with mo-
rality and the tone of public discourse. As Professor Tribe has noted, this is precisely
the asserted interest the Court found wanting in Cohen. L. TRIBE, supra note 36, at 66
n.51 (Supp. 1979). See also Farber, supra note 43, at 290 ("The crux of [Cohen] was
the legal status of deep-seated societal antipathy for certain four-letter words").
Professor Louis Henkin, in examining the bases of obscenity legislation, forcefully
questioned the state's authority to legislate on moral grounds. He concluded that "[a]
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scarred by words or pictures they do not understand is just
that-imagination. Offense is an acquired trait that the very
young do not possess. Nor can they be exceptionally confused
or disturbed by words apart from the connotations that parents
impart to them. Indeed, this was Carlin's point. As for older
children, they are far more likely to be titillated or amused
than injured or offended. Modern teenagers are more apt to be
nonplussed and tolerant; only their parents are likely to be of-
fended. It is thus apparent that it is adults and their notions of
decency being protected, in derogation of the first amendment
rights of other adults and the minors themselves. Finally, if
the concern is with a general decay of society through a long
term transformation in social mores, the authority to restrict
expression to preserve a moral status quo can claim no firmer
constitutional footing than one designed to cement the political
status quo. A monarchy of morality is as abhorrent as a mon-
archy of men. Indeed, it is difficult to conceive of a more ap-
propriate situation to apply the venerable principle of
counterspeech. 3
state may not legislate merely to preserve some traditional or prevailing view of pri-
vate morality" without violating individual rights of substantive due process. "Legis-
lation cannot be based on unfounded hypotheses and assumptions about character and
its corruption." Henkin, Morals and the Constitution.. The Sin of Obscenity, 63
COLUM. L. REv. 391, 402 (1963). His argument-that there exists a fundamental right
to be free from arbitrary moral legal standards-has much force, but little support.
A less drastic and more widely held position questions the state's power to legislate
majoritarian aesthetics and notions of decency. See Krattenmaker & Powe, supra note
106, at 1201:
The rationale of quality of life is inherently unlimited, allowing legislatures
to ban allegedly racist books, scary novels, sexist literature, outmoded fairy
tales, and depictions of violence. Indeed, it would justify banning any type of
speech the elimination of which a majority in a community might think
would result in an improvement in the quality of life. As such, it is out of
place in a society committed to the proposition that speech, even unwanted
speech, is presumptively protected from suppression.
See also Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 84-88 (1976) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting); Ratner, supra note 76, at 588-89. See generally Quadres, supra note 46.
The leading exponent of the theory that government has a duty to maintain civility
in public discourse was the late Professor Alexander Bickel. See A. BICKEL, THE Mo.
RALITY OF CONSENT 72-77 (1975). The Supreme Court relied on Bickel's view in Paris
Adult Theater v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 59 (1973). See also Pacifica Found. v. FCC, 556
F.2d 9, 37 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (Leventhal, J., dissenting). The Supreme Court continues
to recognize majoritarian notions of taste, morality and beauty as proper indices in
the exercise of governmental police powers. See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres,
Inc., 106 S. Ct. 925 (1986); City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984);
Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981).
331. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring):
"If there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the
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Ginsberg struck a proper accommodation of the interests of
protecting minors and maintaining open channels of protected
communication. The state may regulate only that offensive ex-
pression which is discrete and sufficiently likely to cause harm
to minors. m The regulation of the dissemination to children
can be prevented from trammeling the first amendment free-
doms of adults and minors only if Ginsburg is so limited.
5. The Move Toward a Form/Content Distinction
A most criticized and indefensible aspect of the Pac(flca deci-
sion is the distinction created by the plurality (and not dis-
claimed by Justices Powell and Blackmun) between form and
content. The plurality believed that the decision would affect
primarily the form rather than the content of protected speech.
"There are few, if any, thoughts that cannot be expressed by
the use of less offensive language. '"m The dissent took vehe-
ment exception, pointing out the patent inconsistency with Co-
hen. "A given word may have a unique capacity to capsule an
idea, evoke an emotion, or conjure up an image . . .. [A]
speaker's choice of words cannot be surgically separated from
the ideas he desires to express." 4 No better example comes to
mind than Cohen itselfss Cohen's forceful use of an expletive
to make his point moved Justice Harlan to eloquently state:
[W]ords are often chosen as much for their emotive as their
cognitive force. We cannot sanction the view that the Constitu-
tion, while solicitous of the cognitive content of individual
speech, has little or no regard for that emotive function which,
practically speaking, may often be the more important element
of the overall message sought to be communic .... [W]e
cannot indulge the facile assumption that one can forbid partic-
ular words without also running a substantial risk of sup-
evil by the process of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not en-
forced silence. Only an emergency can justify repression." But see A. BICKEL, supra
note 330, at 89 (some ideas are too horrible to allow into the marketplace of ideas).
332. See 438 U.S. at 768 n.3 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
333. Id. at 743 n.18.
334. Ld. at 773 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also Quadres, supra note 46, at 484
n.235; The Supreme Court 1981 Term, supra note 256, at 157 n.72 and authorities cited
therein.
335. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 25-26. See Krattenmaker & Esterow, supra note 234, at 616:
"To compel Cohen to choose a different expression would likely convey a different
idea; in a very real sense, Cohen did not say, or wish to be understood as saying, 'I
sincerely and vigorously urge abolition of the Selective Service System."' Note also




pressing ideas in the process. '
6. The Move Toward an Ethnocentric First Amendment
One group of commentators has asserted that the FCC's sub-
stantial authority to regulate broadcast content in the public
interest makes the FCC the "vice and morals squad" of the air-
waves.3 Justice Brennan's dissent in Paciftca properly de-
plored the idea that even the Supreme Court, the ultimate
article III tribunal, could be constituted an arbiter in such mat-
ters.33s It is difficult to see how decisions based on subjective
notions of an expression's worth, or majoritarian notions of
taste and morality, by either the FCC or the judiciary, can be
squared with the minority-protecting function of the Bill of
Rights.=
Apparently, the Pacifica majority would condition the enjoy-
ment of first amendment rights not only on the acceptability of
form and content, but also on one's financial and social status.
336. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 26. See also Kalven, Metaphysics, supra note 256, at 11
(noting the anomaly that "(t]here is to be freedom for the thought we hate, but not
for the candor we deplore"). Q. Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S.
684, 689 (1959) (first amendment "protects expression which is eloquent no less than
that which is unconvincing"). The form/content dichotomy is most dangerous to the
vitality of speech intended to impact emotionally. The effect will be to disadvantage
the less educated, less articulate speakers. Also disadvantaged will be many of the
most articulate speakers-the artists, such as poets, authors and musicians whose con-
cern is with how the idea is expressed as much, if not more, than the idea itself. See
Bazaar v. Fortune, 476 F.2d 570, 573 (5th Cir. 1973). For an early enlightened view
that the form of expression is peculiarly within the discretion of the artist, see United
States v. One Book "Ulysses", 5 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y.), offd, 72 F.2d 705 (2d Cir.
1934).
337. Krasnow, Cole & Kennard, supra note 60, at 762.
338. See 438 U.S. at 775-77 (dissenting opinion). See also Kingsley Int'l Pictures
Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684, 690 (1959) (Black, J., concurring); supra notes 276-77
and accompanying text. One commentator believes that ethnocentrism is an unavoid-
able byproduct of the value-based speech theory because worth is measured with ref-
erence to cultural experiences. The Supreme Court 1977 Terri, supra note 131, at 156.
Indeed, if one accepts the theory that pluralism and cultural diversity produce variant
perceptions of truth, see Baker, supra note 43, at 967, 974, 976, it necessarily follows
that a particular expression's "value as a step to truth," see Chaplinsky v. New Hamp-
shire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942), is a peculiarly unsuitable yardstick for allocating consti-
tutional protection.
339. See Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 86 (1976) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting):
[I]f the guarantees of the First Amendment were reserved for expression
that more than a 'few of us' would take up arms to defend, then the right of
free expression would be defined and circumscribed by current popular opin-
ion. The guarantees of the Bill of Rights were designed to protect against
precisely such majoritarian limitations on individual liberty.
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The first amendment rights of adults were not violated by the
Order because Carlin's monologue can be heard on records and
in nightclubs--even though the poor may have neither the
time nor the resources to hear Carlin on anything but a ra-
dio.m4 The Order will predominantly affect the form of ex-
pression-except for the uneducated, who have possibly fewer
alternatives as to their manner of expression.
With the increasing importance of the electronic soapbox, the
Constitution, a shrine to tolerance, is sure to be subjected to
increasingly rigorous tests of principle in this context. 41 The
Constitution is, fundamentally, a set of principles reflective of
the spirit that-settled the colonies and fought the revolution; it
is a document born in a rebellion against intolerance and
oppression. The first amendment must necessarily be read
against this backdrop. When the Court allows the suppression
of minority views or minoritarian forms of expression simply
because they offend majoritarian sensibilities, the spirit of the
first amendment is prima facie violated s4  That value judg-
ments have no place in first amendment analysis is rendered
distressingly evident by Pacifica, where five elderly, educated
and financially comfortable jurists decided that the language of
the young, the poor, the uneducated and other under-
represented groups is not as worthy as their own.
C. Net Effects-FCC Power to Regulate Program Content
After Pacifica
Ultimately, what Pacif/ca has wrought is a dramatic increase
340. See supra note 254. See also WUHY-FM Eastern Educ. Radio, 24 F.C.C.2d
408, 422-23 (Johnson, Comm'r, dissenting). But note that in some cases there may not
be an alternative even for those with resources. For example, there would be no al-
ternative avenue of access to Jerry Garcia's conversation in WUHY-FM, see supra
notes 71-76 and accompanying text, to the literature readings by the authors in
Pacifica (1964), 36 F.C.C. 147, see supra notes 115-22 and accompanying text, or Rev-
erend Sawyer's audio autobiography in Jack Straw, 21 F.C.C.2d 833, see supra notes
107-14 and accompanying text. A related argument is that the medium transforms the
message, and diverting the audience to other media therefore frustrates expressive
rights even if access remains unrestricted. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 774-75
(Brennan, J., dissenting). See Quadres, supra note 46, at 484-85. A fine example is
Carlin's monologue-the seven words you cannot say on the radio surely take on a
new meaning when heard on the radio. Indeed, the very broadcast of the monologue
was a completely independent statement by the programmer.
341. See Fein, supra note 56, at 424.
342. For the view that the Courts should give content to first amendment policies




in FCC power to regulate the content of. broadcast speech.3"
For the first time, it validated a regulatory voyage into the
realm of indecent but nonobscene broadcast speech. In so do-
ing, it effectively rewrote section 1464 to eliminate the concept
of obscenity. Since offensive broadcast speech can be pro-
scribed or channeled without regard to its prurient appeal,s "
the obscenity proscription is mere surplusage.-4 Thus, in the
broadcasting context, a significant constitutional safeguard ap-
pears to have been discarded.
Pacifica also substantially weakened some remaining first
amendment safeguards. The redemptive capacity of the mate-
rial's literary, artistic, or scientific value is now conditioned on
the time of broadcast 3 and the definitional scope of the patent
343. At bottom, patently offensive speech which is broadcast when children are
likely to be in the audience is unprotected. Offensive, inane (lacking serious redeem-
ing value) speech broadcast in the late evening is probably unprotected. The Court
has not ruled on this, but the WUHY-FM decision remains in force until the Court
decides otherwise.
The upper limits of Pac(Aca are harder to discern. If form is to be separated from
content; if protection is to depend on the subjective value judgments of the judiciary;
If a politically appointed Commission's decisions implicating or even defining constitu-
tional rights are to be accorded substantial deference; and if the majority's vision of
decency is to become a legal benchmark, then the limits may be unfathomable.
344. Note that the FCC's definition of indecent contemplates only offensive speech
describing sexual and excretory activities and organs. It would therefore not reach
other forms of speech that a large segment of the population may find offensive, such
as broadcast evangelism, see Fowler & Brenner, supra note 53, at 228; The Supreme
Court 1977 Term, supra note 131, at 160 n.90, pandering television shows and com-
mercials, see Community Television of Utah, Inc. v. Roy City, 555 F. Supp. 1164, 1166
n.16 (D. Utah 1982); Home Box Office, Inc. v. Wilkerson, 531 F. Supp. 987, 1001 (D.
Utah 1982), or television violence, see generally Albert, supra note 97; Krattenmaker
& Powe, supra note 106; Note, The Regulation of Televised Violence, supra note 194.
The Supreme Court's dictionary definition would include all of these if sufficiently
offensive to the community. The status of this definition is unclear. See supra note
234 and accompanying text. Under the plurality's theory, only speech of lesser value
could be constitutionally indecent. Justice Powell's theory would hold constitution-
ally valid the regulation of all speech fitting the statutory definition. See infra note
382 for a discussion of the issue with specific reference to rock speech.
345. One wonders whether Congress could have intended such a result. Compare
the Court's statutory analysis in Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 737-41. Note that the statute
makes no distinction between the two standards in regard to available penalties. See
47 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(D) (1982); 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1982).
346. Whether the patently offensive broadcast can be saved by its serious literary,
artistic or scientific value is now only material in the review of broadcasts occurring in
the late evening when children are unlikely to be in the audience. See WUHY-FM
Eastern Educ. Radio, 24 F.C.C.2d 408 (1970), discussed supra notes 71-79 and accompa-
nying text. Political value, an amorphous concept to say the least, may redeem a
broadcast even during the day. It is likely that both the plurality and dissenters in
Pac0fca would so hold, though Justices Powell and Blackmun would apparently disa-
gree. See The Supreme Cour, 1977 Term, supra note 131, at 157 n.72.
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offensiveness standard has been widened by tying it to the pre-
vailing moral standards of the community with respect to the
broadcast medium. 7 Thus, even as commentators questioned
the viability of the constitutional distinction between the print
and broadcast media,3" and as the importance of the electronic
media in informing the citizenry grew more pronounced, the
Supreme Court significantly broadened the gap in protection
and rendered broadcast speech even more amenable to regula-
tion." 9 It seems inconsistent with the spirit of the first amend-
ment to so strengthen the government's grip on the nation's
informative pulse.=
Perhaps even more troubling is the Court's method of justify-
ing the diminution of first amendment protections. Without in-
terring the anachronistic but venerable scarcity justification,m'
the Court installed successor rationales through a troubling
347. See 438 U.S. 726, 732 (1978); 56 F.C.C.2d 94, para. 11 at 98 (1975). This defini-
tion is broader than the parallel obscenity provision because tastes toward what is
acceptable on the broadcast medium are more conservative and more subject to ma-
nipulation. A well-organized media campaign can condition people to be offended by
what they and others are witnessing. Thus, one may not personally be offended by a
particular message, but he may be offended that others are publicly receiving it, or by
the fact that others are being offended by it. See Note, Morality and Broadcasting,
supra note 222, at 166. A high profile campaign like that of the PMRC can condition
the public to be offended. For example, it is likely that a substantial number of peo-
ple had heard some of the PMRC's target songs without being offended-until the
PMRC publicized and labeled those songs. See Comment, Regulating Rock Lyrics,
supra note 30, at 605.
348. See supra note 130.
349. See 556 F.2d 9,30 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (Bazelon, C. J., concurring); Fein, supra note
56, at 424.
350. "The more powerful the medium, the less we want it in the hands of the gov-
ernment." Fowler still stumping for deregulation, supra note 38, at 87 (quoting then-
FCC Chairman Mark S. Fowler). See also Kalven, Broadcasting, supra note 59, at 16.
351. As Justice Brennan noted, the Court "rightfully refrain[ed] from relying on
the notion of 'spectrum scarcity."' 438 U.S. at 770 n.4. See supra note 261. In FCC v.
League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984), Justice Brennan himself revived the
moribund theory. Acknowledging that the "prevailing rationale" had been the sub-
ject of "increasing criticism" by FCC Chairman Fowler, among others, the Court nev-
ertheless refused to bury it "without some signal from Congress or the FCC that
technological developments have advanced so far that some revision of the system of
broadcast regulation may be required." Id. at 377 n.11. Apparently, the Commission's
steady agitation for abolition of the trusteeship model and the scarcity rationale since
at least 1979, see Deregulation of Radio, 73 F.C.C.2d 457 (1979), was not signal enough
for the Court.
Former Chairman Fowler and Professor Brenner have argued that the rationales
behind the trusteeship model of broadcast regulation no longer constitute a compel-
ling government interest. Fowler & Brenner, supra note 53, at 230. The Supreme
Court had already met this contention in Pac(fca by sanctioning new justifications.
The Court subsequently buried this theory by explicitly holding that the Constitution
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perversion of logic and precedent.32 It thus not only expanded
FCC power over content but assured the perpetuation of that
power as well.
Despite the professed narrowness of the Court's holding, the
increase in Commission power is not limited to actions based
solely on section 1464. Due to the nature of the regulatory rela-
tionships implicated, any increase in the FCC's ability to
intrude directly into licensee programming effects a corre-
sponding increase in its ability to regulate indirectlyY'  The
equation is simple: the more that can be accomplished, the
more that can be threatened. Objectionable speech is now eas-
ier to chill. The judicial imprimatur on indecency prosecutions
also serves to move the shelter of safe programming further
toward the region of the bland and inoffensive. Thus, those
licensees who alter their programming in response to raised
eyebrow tactics will move toward a more drastically conserva-
tive haven. Moreover, an FCC determination that a station's
objectionable programming is contrary to the public interest is
placed even further from the reach of meaningful review. The
limited reach of the constitutional and statutory constraints on
FCC regulatory power may reasonably be read by the judiciary
to require an even less jaundiced eye than the courts have cast
in the past. Additionally, Justice Powell's willingness to allow
the FCC to develop constitutional standards for the emerging
field-standards which are, according to Powell, "entitled to re-
spect"-is destined to make the lower courts even more hesi-
tant to substitute their judgment for that of the
Commission --- despite the fact that the Constitution is an
area beyond the FCC's expertise.
Notwithstanding the Court's narrow holding, Pacifica, in
practical effect, can reasonably be regarded as a veritable li-
cense to regulate. The nuisance rationale for regulation is little
more than fodder for first amendment exceptions. Ignoring the
fact that elections and wars are won and lost in our living
is satisfied If broadcast regulations further a substantial government interest. League
of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 380.
352. See supra notes 299-332 and accompanying text.
353. By refusing to review the legislative aspects of the Order, the Court ensured
that licensees would take care to avoid violating them. See Krasnow, Cole & Kennard,
supra note 60, at 776: Pactfica "enhances the Commission's capacity to instill fear and
loathing."
354. While this dictum found expression only in the concurring opinion, the actual
holding, including the limited scope of review, indicates no less. See supra note 297.
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rooms,w the Court has erected a bright line between public
and private discourse which makes little sense and bears little
resemblance to the realities of modern expression. Ignoring
the fact that expressive rights cannot be subordinated to intui-
tive paternal and parental state interests, the Court has er-
ected a multi-purpose justification for state intrusion into the
content of our most influential medium. The FCC is now em-
powered to sanitize sociopolitical debate by paring its emotional
content, even though that may effectively tie the tongue of
those with the most compelling reason to raise their voices in
passions m and even though this may obscure the extent of disaf-
fection of the nation's youth and minorities. This is surely
anathematic to a vibrant first amendment and the "profound
national commitment to the principle that debate on public is-
sues shoud be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open. '' And it is
cause for concern as Justice Stevens' subjective first amend-
ment is given content in the future.=
V
The Potential Regulation of Rock Speech
A. The Potential-The Regulability of Rock Speech
1. Categorical Protection for Rock Speech-The
Commercial Speech Analogy
At the outset, it is fruitful to note that rock music is pro-
tected speechs 59 The issue has never come before the Supreme
Court, but there is no reason to expect the Court to disagree.
However, the Court may decide that musical expression de-
serves only limited categorical protection, even outside the
broadcasting contextY ° By analogy, the limited protection en-
355. "Communications are the life blood of representative democracy." Barrow,
Introductory Remarks, 1 CoMM/ENT L.J. (1977). See Note, Morality And The Broad-
cast Media, supra note 97, at 680; Note, supra note 165, at 601.
356. See Cox, supra note 46, at 40-42; Rutzick, Offensive Language and the Evolu-
tion of First Amendment Protection, 9 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 17 (1974).
357. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). See The Supreme
Cour, 1977 Term, supra note 131, at 162-63; Note, Regulating Indecent Speech, supra
note 225, at 341; cf Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412
U.S. 94, 162 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring).
358. See Goldman, supra note 41, at 297; see also id at 307: "[O]nce the idea is
loosed that 'unworthy' speech can be constitutionally regulated, it may be too late for
the Court to re-establish the 'firstness' of the first amendment."
359. See supra note 39.
360. See supra note 256.
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joyed by commercial speech may signal constitutional difficul-
ties for rock speech. The Court may decide that rock speech is
of lesser general value than pure political speech because it is
"no essential part of any exposition of ideas" and of "slight so-
cial value."3' x Therefore, to prevent dilution of first amend-
ment values, the court may confer only a "limited measure of
protection, commensurate with its subordinate position in the
scale of first amendment values."' For while some rock
speech may be valuable, there is much that is apolitical and
predominantly commercial in character.m Any attempt to sur-
gically separate the political from the rest would be fatally sub-
jective, inexact and burdensome. 36 Hierarchies of value in rock
361. Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726,746 (1978); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568,
572 (1942) (dictum).
362. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978) (commercial speech).
363. See generally supra notes 42-46 and accompanying text. Recall that value
refers to the material's social value, which determines Its weight of protection in the
ad hoc weighing and balancing of first amendment interests against the state interest
asserted. This is Justice Stevens' emerging value-based theory. See supra notes 256-60
and accompanying text. The highest social value is represented by political ideas. See
supra note 46. Considering Justice Stevens' view on form and content, it is doubtful
that a well-turned phrase carries much weight if the idea it expresses is not high in his
hierarchy. Presumably, only political rock speech would have high value for Justice
Stevens. His analysis would therefore favor activist groups like the Clash who release
albums with titles like "Sandinista" over artists like Lionel Richie whose artistic
function is based primarily on melody, romance and sentiment.
364. This is a problem that pervades the value-based theory and the extremist
political speech theory from which it derives. On the political speech theory, see gen-
erally BeVier, The First Amendment and Political Speech- An Inquiry Into the Sub-
stance and Limits of Principle, 30 STAN. L. REv. 299 (1978); see also Bork, supra note
46. The definition of political is inherently problematic. To many, personal politics
and sexual politics are just as important, if not more so, in their day-to-day lives, as
electoral or governmental politics. C. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citi-
zens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 763 (1976) ("[The] consumer's interest in the
free flow of commercial information... may be as keen, if not keener by far, than his
interest in the day's most urgent political debate"); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S.
476, 487 (1957) ("Sex... is one of the vital problems of human interest and public
concern"). In a time when annihilation stands at more than one set of fingertips,
many have come to the fatalistic conclusion that there is no sense in worrying about
politics. Instead, they focus their energies on the more constitutionally trivial matters
within their control such as what shampoo to buy or what radio station to listen to.
The weightier matters within their control, such as their interpersonal relationships,
take on an increased importance. There may be a substantial number of people whose
lives are touched more by Pat Benatar's powerful statement on human relationships
in "Sex as a Weapon" than by a presidential news conference. Yet it is questionable
whether the song would receive much weight in Justice Stevens' hierarchy. Indeed,
today a candidate's views on sexual politics, drugs and homosexual rights may be in-
fluential in a voter's decision. Should songs that take a position on those topics be
constitutionally subordinated to a campaign speech filled with amorphous platitudes
and meaningless political cliches and rhetoric? It is evident that both the political
COMM/ENT L. J.
speech would therefore be unworkable. The situation is analo-
gous to that of commercial speech, as some advertisements are
highly informative while many are of little or no value. The
Court resolved that problem by simply conferring a limited
categorical measure of protection.3 '
The commercial speech analogy fails in the final analysis. Re-
duced protection for commercial speech is justified by its unu-
sual durability and verifiability.3 Regulation is not likely to
chill such speech because it is propounded with commercial
motive. Presumably, a financial interest leads commercial
speakers to persevere where speakers with mere aesthetic,
communicative, or altruistic interests would fear to tread. Ad-
ditionally, the time lag between production and publication,
and the speech's objective nature, render it feasible for the
speaker to assure the veracity of his message.6 7 Rock speech is
commercial in nature but it performs a substantial, overt artis-
tic function as well. Though the production of the speech may
be inherently durable, the important aspect of form is readily
susceptible to outside pressure.' Moreover, though there is
also, normally, a lag between creation and publication, rock is
not "verifiable" because its truths are intuitive and philosophi-
cal. It is submitted that rock should not be subordinated in a
first amendment hierarchy in the same manner as commerical
speech. If rock speech is to be subordinated, another rationale
must appear.
2. The Ad Hoc Value of Rock Speech
Assuming categorical rock speech is fully protected, it is still
susceptible to an ad hoc diminution in value (and protection)
speech theory and Justice Stevens' variation of it manifestly slight an important com-
ponent of the first amendment-the self-realization value that stems from general
topical discourse and the mere ability to speak and receive ideas freely on any and all
topics of interest See Quadres, supra note 46, at 494 n.281.
365. Virginia State Bd., 425 U.S. 748, 771-72 n.24.
366. Id, ("Attributes such as... the greater objectivity and hardiness of commer-
cial speech, may make it less necessary to tolerate inaccurate statements for fear of
silencing the speaker").
367. 1d
368. While Justice Stevens' failure to recognize the peculiar importance of form to
content is lamentable and specious, it is especially fallacious with regard to artistic
expression. The form of expression is crucial when one seeks to convey emotion.
Emotion is essential when one is describing passion. Rock is nothing if not passionate
discourse. Yet if one's choice is to alter his message or forfeit the opportunity to reach
a large audience (and reap recognition and financial reward), alteration becomes very
seductive. Thus the art is likely to be sacrificed.
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under the doctrine of worthier speech.3 9 For example, spoken-
word comedy and social satire is categorically protected speech,
but Carlin's monologue was regulable because of its offensive
nature. Protection was reduced because the monologue was
less valuable than cleaner satire. Such a reduction in protec-
tion is a particularly likely prospect for sexually-oriented rock
expression because "there is surely a less vital interest in the
uninhibited exhibition of material that is on the border line
between pornography and artistic expression than in the free
dissemination of ideas of social and political significance."370
This substraction could, for example, occur in the context of a
nuisance or zoning ordinance 7' directed at indecent rock
speech in nightclubs and concert halls, 72 or in the regulation of
album distribution and/or display.7 3 A court may find individ-
ual risque songs or performances to be of little value and re-
quire a less substantial interest to justify a broader regulation.
3. The Regulation of Broadcast Rock Speech
The consequence of any reduction in protection for rock
speech, categorical, ad hoc, or both, would be especially dra-
369. See supra notes 256-60 and accompanying text.
370. Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 61 (1976) (plurality opin-
ion). As applied to rock speech, this benchmark would entail a real record rating.
Attempts to justify degrees of protection accorded to particular expression would bear
a perverse resemblance to American Bandstand. Instead of giving a particular broad-
cast song an 87 because of the beat, a Justice would rate it high because it decried war
or pleaded for nuclear disarmament, or low because it was merely an invitation to join
the singer in the backseat of his car. This carries Justice Stevens' theory to an absurd
extreme, but no judicial pronouncement has yet indicated a viable limit on its appli-
cation. Cy. Kalven, Metaphysics, supra note 256, at 44 (discussing "the comic aspects of
judicial review of obscenity").
371. See, e.g., City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 925 (1986); Schad
v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981); Young v. American Mini Theatres,
Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976); Erznoznick v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
372. Such an ordinance was recently enacted in San Antonio, Texas. See Goldberg,
Crackdown on 'obscene'shows, ROLLING STONE, Jan. 30, 1986, at 9; Texas Concert Law
to Be Challenged, N.Y. Times, Nov. 21, 1985, at C18, col. 4. The enactment of laws
restricting attendance at rock shows was a PMRC plank. See Cockburn, supra note 4.
For a complete list of the PMRC proposals, see Note, Song Lyric Advisories, suprcr
note 33, at 230-31.
373. This too is part of tfie PMRC platform. The organization is seeking a prohibi.
tion on display of graphic album covers and in-store play of "porn-rock." Note that
retailers are already being harrassed by lease covenants which forfeit rights if R-rated
or stickered albums are played or displayed. See Bonk, Where Does The Responaibil
ity Lie? B.LLOAI, Oct. 19, 1985, at 24; Schipper, Retailers Oppose Record Ratings,
Fearing Buyer, Landlord Backlash, Daily Variety, Oct. 9, 1985, at 118, col. 1; see also
Levin, supra note 2, at 44; McDougall, supra note 28; Krauthammer, supra note 4.
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matic in the broadcasting context where all speech enjoys less
protection.
It is not inconceivable 374 that the FCC will be forced to decide
the public interest status of broadcasts of offensive rock speech.
A reasonable scenario would find a consumer group filing a pe-
tition to deny the renewal of a license sought by a station which
plays the targeted music on the ground that its programming is
inconsistent with the public interest.75 A hearing on the li-
374. For purposes of this Note, the emphasis is on power available. As a political
body, the Commission is easily galvanized where the public interest is endangered in
the view of significant or powerful segments of the Congress or the public. See supra
note 106; infra note 396. See also infra note 413 (discussing recent Commission activ-
ity against indecent broadcast speech impelled by the combination of conservative
groups' criticism that the Commission is soft on broadcast filth and the pendency of
Commissioner confirmation hearings). Therefore, with enough prodding, even a de-
regulation-bent Commission may make use of any weapons it can find in the shed no
matter how rusty the trigger or pacific the finger. Or Korematsu v. United States,
323 U.S. 214, 246 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting) ("The principle... lies about like a
loaded weapon ready for the hand of any authority that can bring forward a plausible
claim of an urgent need"). Moreover, the issue of rock lyrics is one that has already
inflamed the public. See Many adult rockers favor warnings, S.F. Examiner, Jan. 16,
1986, at E-3, col. 4 (56% of American adults enjoy rock, but 51% believe it has a bad
effect on children; 37% had been offended by rock lyrics; 56% support warning la-
bels; 55% support ratings).
Indeed, commentators have predicted that broadcast rock music may test the con-
stitutional limits of section 1464. See Brenner, supra note 265, at 177; Comment, Regu-
lating Rock Lyrics, supra note 30, at 598 (noting the inherent difficulty in applying
the Miller obscenity standard to rock music); Note, Filthy Word4 supra note 76, at
633 ("Will courts view three hours of rock music as serious art? Could some of it be
deemed seriously political? And how seriously literary are the barely distinguishable
lyrics?"). The answers to these questions may be forthcoming, the recently enacted
San Antonio ordinance incorporates the Miller standard. See authorities cited supra
note 372; see also infra note 413 (recent Commission inquiry into the playing of an
offensive rock song on a Saturday evening at 10 p.m.).
375. 47 U.S.C. § 309(d) (1982) authorizes petitions to deny renewal. The listening
public has standing to challenge the licensee's renewal application by virtue of the
D.C. Circuit decisions in Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v.
FCC, 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966) and Illinois Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v.
FCC, 515 F.2d 397 (D.C. Cir. 1975), see supra note 85. It is quite possible that such a
petition will be filed by a concerned group. .Channel 20, Inc., 73 F.C.C.2d 648
(1979); California Television Stations, 68 F.C.C.2d 1074 (1978) (repeated challenges to
renewal of television station licenses for alleged failure to meet the needs of the
child audience led to Commission inquiry). One commentator has argued that the
Yale Broadcasting litigation, discussed supra notes 199-207 and accompanying text,
indicates that the Commission can deny renewal solely on the basis of the playing of
one objectionable record. See Note, Filthy Words, supra note 76, at 629. This is a
doubtful proposition. In light of Commission statements that a pattern of inappropri-
ate programming is required to warrant denial of renewal in the public interest, see
Pacifica Found., 95 F.C.C.2d 750, paras. 16-18 at 759-61 (1983); WGBH Educ. Found., 69
F.C.C.2d 1250, para. 3 at 1252 (1978); Pacic (1964), 36 F.C.C. 147, paras. 3 at 148, 7, 8
at 150-51 (1964), or to frustrate an incumbent's renewal expectancy in a comparative
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cense application would be granted if the Commission decided
that the petition raised a material and substantial issue of fact
as to whether renewal would serve the public interest. 376 Al-
ternatively, an applicant may raise the issue in a comparative
proceeding against a competitor.3'7
Other scenarios may transpire. The Commission, under
mounting public and political pressure, might issue a Notice of
Apparent Liablity to a station for airing music in violation of
proceeding, see Kaye-Smith Enterprises, 98 F.C.C.2d 670, pars. 3 at 671-72 (1984); cf.
Tampa Times Co., 19 F.C.C. 257, para 139b at 296, para. 19(c) at 309 (1955) (airing of
one "smutty" song insufficient to warrant negative performance evaluation in com-
parative proceeding), such action would probably constitute an abuse of discretion. It
is clear, however, that one record can support a section 1464 action. Perhaps an adjudi-
cation of liability under that statute can then be bootstrapped into a denial of renewal.
It is also possible that a citizens' group will drum up enough pressure and orches-
trate enough complaints to cause the Commission to set a hearing on the application
sua sponte. An avalanche of complaints against a licensee could cause the Commission
to question whether the licensee is serving the needs of its listening area. In this era of
deregulation, this remains a licensee obligation. See Deregulation of Radio, Second
Report and Order, 96 F.C.C.2d 930 (1984). Most likely of all, however, is that numer-
ous complaints--and Commission requests for explanation-will cause the licensee to
alter her programming in fear of losing the license. See infrar note 396. This process
has been labelled "regulation by dossier." Kalven, Broadcasting, supra note 59, at 21-
23. For an early example, see H. WARNER, supra note 63, at 338 n.14 (quoting a Janu-
ary 14, 1938 letter from the FCC to NBC regarding objectionable programming).
376. 47 U.S.C. § 309(d) (1982). See WGBH Educ. Found., 69 F.C.C.2d 1250, para. 4 at
1251-52 (1978). The hearing would place the burden of proving that renewal is in the
public interest upon the applicant. The statute allows the Commission to shift the
burden to the petitioner, but that is by no means compelled. 47 U.S.C. § 309(e) (1982).
377. See 47 C.F.R. §§ 1.591-1.593; Ashbacker Radio Corp. v. FCC, 326 U.S. 327
(1945). See Fowler & Brenner, supra note 53, at 217-18: "[I]f all other criteria are
equal, the Commission looks at the content of proposed programs." Moreover, if one
of the applicants has a track record, the Commission can and will scrutinize the qual-
ity of its past programming service. One notable example is WREC Broadcasting Ser-
vice, 19 F.C.C. 1082 (1955), where the applicant's past airing of six songs of "less than
good taste" was instrumental in a victory for its competitor. See supra note 103. Com-
pare, however, Tampa Times Co., 19 F.C.C. 257 (1955), where the playing of one
"smutty" song was insufficient to sustain a comparative challenge. Modern Commis-
sion practice accords the incumbent a renewal expectancy--a comparative prefer-
ence--so "that a licensee who has rendered meritorious service can be reasonably
confident at renewal." Kaye-Smith Enterprises, 98 F.C.C.2d 675, para. 17 at 683 (1984).
See generally Cowles Broadcasting, Inc., 86 F.C.C.2d 993 (1981), ,ffd sub norm. Central
Florida Enterprises, Inc. v. FCC, 683 F.2d 503 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert denied, 460 US.
1084 (1983). The renewal expectancy reduces licensee paranoia, but if it reduces the
Commission's informal power, the change is minimal. A Commission determination
that the broadcast of offensive rock music is not meritorious is almost as likely to
trigger drastic changes in broadcast expression as a determination that such program-
ming is not in the public interest. It may be a more attractive method for the Commis-
sion to acheive the same result.
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section 1464.11 Or the Commission could state policy on the
subject, 79 initiate a Rulemaking, or announce an official in-
quiry. ° Individual commissioners could make vitriolic public
speeches and statements condemning the broadcast of offensive
rock songs.-sl Any and all of these tactics might convince
broadcasters to sanitize their programming. History has proved
their efficacy.
The most effective regulatory route would be a prosecution
under section 1 46 4 .12 It would at once loudly warn licensees of
the Commission's policy, produce standards of required con-
duct without the burden of a rulemaking proceedingm and
clearly establish that offensive rock speech is outside the pub-
lic interest. This would lead to the desired result: drastic
378. See, e.g., Pactfica (1975), 56 F.C.C.2d 94 (1975); Sonderling Broadcasting Corp.,
41 F.C.C2d 919 (1973); WUHY-FM Eastern Educ.Radio, 24 F.C.C.2d 408 (1970).
379. See, for example, supra notes 186-98 and accompanying text. One commenta-
tor has advocated an FCC policy statement on the public interest status of offensive
rock music. Note, Song Lyric Advisories, supra note 33, at 242-43.
380. See, e.g., First Notice of Inquiry, Children's Television, 28 F.C.C.2d 368 (1971);
Report and Policy Statement, 50 F.C.C.2d 1 (1974), offd on reconsideration, 55
F.C.C.2d 691 (1975), affd subnom. Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 564 F.2d
458 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Sonderling, 41 F.C.C.2d 777.
381. See, e.g., Writers Guild of Am., West, Inc. v. FCC, 423 F. Supp. 1064 (C.D. Cal.
1976), discussed supra notes 160-85 and accompanying text; Sonderling, 41 F.C.C.2d
777, discussed supra notes 146-59 and accompanying text.
382. Note that Pactfica dealt only with material that is sexually and excretorily
indecent, as comprehended by the FCC definition. It appears that the other objection-
able rock themes, including the glorification of drugs, violence and satanism, cannot
be reached under the FCC standard. However, the dictionary definition invoked by
the Court would clearly encompass these themes. See supra note 344. Satanism is an
especially difficult question as it may involve elements of religious expression. For
spatial reasons, this Note expresses no opinion on the validity of section 1464 actions
against rock music dealing with nonsexual, nonexcretory themes. It is believed that
an informed opinion in this area is impossible until further judicial interpretation
resolves the definitional issue. See supra note 234 and accompanying text. It bears
noting that "profane" has yet to be definitively construed and may be made to con-
form with whatever definitional needs arise. Additionally, the FCC can reach this
music indirectly, through its public interest power to make rules and deny licenses.
Finally, the Commission has demonstrated a talent for transcending constitutional
barriers with what Professor Powe has termed "misdirection" plays-also known as
the raised eyebrow. Powe, American Voodoo, upra note 105, at 905. See Yale Broad-
casting Co. v. FCC, 478 F.2d 594, 603 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Bazelon, C.J., statement as to
why he would grant rehearing en banc sua sponte).
383. At least one commentator has advocated that the Commission conduct a
rulemaking to clarify the indecency standards in the wake of the Supreme Court's
perplexing opinion. Note, Morality and Broadcasting, supra note 222, at 172-73. From
a licensee perspective, this would be welcome. However, the statute is far more valu-
able to the Commission in its present opaque state.
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changes in the tone of licensee programming and a more decent
level of discourse on the airwaves.
A successful prosecution for the airing of offensive rock mu-
sic is well within the realm of possibility. Hypothetically, con-
sider "She Bop"" by Cyndi Lauper and "Sugar Walls"'
written by Prince and performed by Sheena Easton, two of the
subtler songs that raised the ire of the PMRC. Each received
extensive airplay and each contains language which has been
identified as descriptive of sexual activities or organs. Both
could be considered patently offensive as measured by contem-
porary community standards for the broadcast medium e and
were frequently played at hours when children were certainly
in the audience. Repetition is satisfied in two ways: on a
micro-level by internal repetition, as each contains offensive
descriptions in its refrain; and on a macro-level by their fre-
quent airplay on station playlists or rotations. The songs could
easily fit within the FCC definition of statutory indecency.
The additional contextual factors identified by the Pacfs
pluralitys 7 lend further support. Consideration of the content
384. This song has been described as in "a clear celebration of masturbation." Rec-
ord Labelling: Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and
Transportation, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) (printed appendix to statement of Susan
Baker and Tipper Gore, Parents' Music Resource Center, delivered on Sept. 19,1985).
See also Gergen, X.Rated Records, supra note 4, at 98 ("an ode to female auto-
eroticism").
385. The term "sugar walls" denotes a woman's vagina. One commentator has de-
scribed the song as an "ode to orgasm." Krauthammer, supra note 4, at A27, col 1. See
also Horn, supra note 16, at 1, col. 4 (a top 10 hit chronicling female sexual arousal).
386. The amount of attention received by the PMRC is a testament. Note, how-
ever, that these songs were in the forefront of PMRC presentations despite their com-
parative subtlety. This indicates that the more popular the offensive song, the less
blatancy is required to arouse indignation. This further indicates that the worst of-
fenders will be less affected, because they are less played and less popular. See also
ire note 399 and accompanying text. Additionally, these songs may become patently
offensive only when PMRC publicity unearths their meaning. The potential for ma-
nipulation is evident. See Comment, Regulating Rock Lyrics supra note 30, at 605. It
is difficult to gauge the effect of Justice Stevens' form/content distinction. See ifra
notes 388-91 and accompanying text. Most of the public ire was drawn not by the
specific explicit words used but by the thoughts and themes conveyed. Even Carlin's
ideas were protectible to the Pacifica Court. A regulation of thematically offensive
rock speech, in most cases, could not reasonably be seen as a regulation merely of
form because rock lyrics are typically oblique, metaphorical and slurred in delivery.
See Harmon, supra note 32. However, in Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 106 S.
Ct. 3159 (1986), the Court found a high school election nominating speech laced with
.sexual metaphors and double-entendres to fit within the rubric of "sexually explicit
speech." By their very definition, metaphor and double-entendre can only be implicit.
387. See FCC v. Pacifica Found. 438 U.S. 726, 750 (1978); supra text accompanying
note 265.
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of the program and the composition of the audience suggests
that contemporary hit radio and youth-oriented album-oriented
rock (AOR) stations proffering heavy metal would be particu-
larly vulnerable. Pac(fic established that the radio medium is
one particularly suitable for this type of regulation. Note that
rock videos may be even more amenable to regulation due to
their enhanced impact on audiences., It is also quite possible
that contemporary rock's bi-media presence may influence the
analysis. The lingering visual images produced by a rock video
may be relevant to a particular song's ability to offend on the
radio. It appears that the FCC can regulate offensive rock
speech under the authority of Paciftca.
But what of the clever lyricist who drafts metaphor to the
cause of outrage? Suppose a song which is less direct but no
less offensive than Carlin's monologue triggers FCC action. A
reviewing court may be persuaded that Pac(fica does not prop-
erly apply to a rock song which conveys its patently offensive
descriptions in a more subtle, artistic manner. For example,
the court could reasonably conclude that the form of Carlin's
expression was crucial to the result. Such a conclusion would
not end the inquiry. For even ignoring Pacfloa's stare decisis
force, its underpinnings may persuade the court that the regu-
lation is nevertheless permissible.
The starting point of the analysis is the principle that even
"core" broadcast speech demands only a regulation which is
impelled by a substantial governmental interest and operates
narrowly in its pursuit.3" The court could analogize the sub-
stantial state interest in the preservation of community deco-
388. See FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984). The Court expressly
announced an analytical standard for restrictions on broadcast speech. The standard
approximates the Court's constitutional test for commercial speech. See Central Hud-
son Gas Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 US. 557 (1980). Read together with Pac(fic,
the League qf Women Voters test appears to be that if speech is not indecent it will be
protected unless the government satisfies the Court that the restriction is narrowly
tailored to further a substantial government interest. See 468 U.S. at 380 & n.13. In a
footnote, the Court distinguished Pac(fca:
In this case, by contrast, we are faced not with indecent expression, but
rather with expression that is at the core of First Amendment protections,
and no claim is made by the government that the expression of editorial opin-
ion... will create a substantial 'nuisance' of the kind addressed in [PaccAJ].
Id See supra note 256. An interesting issue that has yet to be decided is whether
categorical reductions are cumulative. Is commercial broadcast speech less protected
than a public affairs broadcast?
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rum from visual assault via visual clutter s " to reason that a
similarly substantial interest is promoted by combatting the
verbal assault caused by the repeated broadcast of repetitive pa-
tently offensive descriptions of sexual trysts or organs. ° In
addition, the interests asserted in Pacfica-the protection of
children from indecent expression, the support of parental au-
tonomy, and the protection of the privacy of unreceptive dial
scanners-would seem to apply as well to the more artfully
phrased but equally thematically offensive broadcast, though
perhaps with lesser force. Yet, despite the more oblique phras-
ing, the song may still approximate the impact of the Carlin
monologue through the cumulative effect of sonic musical ur-
gency, an impassioned vocal repetition and publicity. As a mat-
ter of first impression, a court could conceivably determine that
the Commission has a substantial interest in regulating the
broadcast of patently offensive, though metaphorical, rock
speech.
The channelling remedy seems sufficiently narrowly drawn
to pass constitutional muster. The court could find Pdac 's
reasoning persuasive: the restriction operates only when the
asserted regulatory interest is at its height-when children are
likely to be in the audience-and ample alternative avenues of
access to the song exist in the form of records, tapes, and live
performances. Whether the song could be banned entirely is
more problematic. The Pac(fic court did not reach this issue.
The hypothetical court could resolve the question by deciding
that the interests in vindicating privacy rights and preserving a
suitable tone of public discourse, without more, constitute suffi-
cient warrant for the restriction. Alternatively, it could be ar-
gued that regard for the ill effects the song may visit on the
few children likely to remain in even the late evening audience
presents the additional justification required to validate the
prohibition.
The regulation is even easier to justify if the doctrine of wor-
thier speech is applied.9 1 A court subscribing to the position
that patently offensive descriptions of sexual organs or activi-
389. See City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984); Metromedia,
Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981).
390. See Pac(iAca, 438 U.S. at 757 (Powell, J., concurring) ("verbal shock treat-
ment"); id at 747 (plurality opinion) (broadcast was "shocking"). or Rosenfeld v.
New Jersey, 408 U.S. 901, 906, 909 (1972) (Powell, J., dissenting) (willful use of offen-
sive language is a verbal assault). Accord A. BIcKEL, aupra note 330, at 72-73.
391. See Comment, Reglatng Rock Lyrics, 8upra note 30, at 607.
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ties do little to advance first amendment values will perhaps be
more easily convinced that the governmental interests are of
sufficient moment or that the remedy is sufficiently circum-
scribed. In such a case it might be determined that the Com-
mission was justified in banning the song from the airwaves
entirely.
Finally, in one crucial way, the hypothetical situation may
present a more compelling case for regulation. The nature of
the market targeted by the broadcaster may serve to partially
obviate the discreteness concerns. Though rock constituencies
are generally growing older, the segmentation of the modern
radio market finds many stations tailored to the young.m If
the targeted station is aimed at youths,mss then the discreteness
problem embodied in Butler" is reduced, though certainly not
eliminated.39 5 The lesser danger of abrogating adult first
amendment rights, and the enhanced paternal and parental
governmental interests make regulation more justifiable.
It thus appears that even shorn of Pac fim's force as control-
ling precedent, regulation of patently offensive broadcast rock
speech may withstand constitutional attack.
The repercussions of regulation, in both the rock and radio
industries, may be severe. Format and programming changes'
392. Today's radio market actually caters more to adult "baby boomers" than to
teens, but popular contemporary hit radio and album oriented rock formats include a
significant number of stations tailored to the young. See Mahler, Radio: The Great
Survivor, CHANNELS 32 (1985 Field Guide); Zorn, Playing the Quick Change Game,
CHANNELS 30 (1986 Field Guide).
393. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968). See supra notes 250-55 and accom-
panying text. One student comment argues that rock is peculiarly suitable for a varia-
ble obscenity analysis because its "actual audience" is youth. Comment, Regulating
Rock Lyrics, supra note 30, at 599. On the concept of variable obscenity, see generally
Schauer, The Return of Variable Obscenity?, 28 HASTINGS LJ. 1275 (1977).
394. Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957). See supra notes 250-55 and accompany-
ing text; 320-24 and accompanying text.
395. It appears that Justice Brennan would remain unsatisfied. He defined the
outer limit of acceptable regulation as a narrowly tailored regulation of an indecent
broadcast "directed specifically at younger children." FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S.
726, 768 n.3 (1978) (emphasis added). It is extraordinarily unlikely that an indecent
radio broadcast would be aimed specifically at young children.
396. Radio stations are hardly intractable in their formats. See S. FRITH, supra
note 7, at 123; Zorn, supra note 392, at 30. In general, radio stations can be expected to
act quickly and decisively to quell public or governmental unease with their broad-
cast material. See S. FRrTH, supra note 7, at 117. Between the public and the FCC
there is high pressure indeed to conform to popular standards. Consider Pacfica
(1975), 56 F.C.C.2d 94 (1975) (one complaint; adjudicated liable and judgment associ-
ated with file); WUHY-FM Eastern Educ. Radio, 24 F.C.C.2d 408 (1970) (no com-
plaints; forfeiture imposed and producer fired); Jack Straw Memorial Found. 21
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occasioned by licensee fears would have a ripple effect on the
entire rock industry: artists, songwriters, managers, retailers,
promoters, and even the music itself.m Expression would be
oriented toward more acceptable standards under the threat of
possible loss of airplay. A significant loss of airplay could lead
to commercial death for numerous artists.' Ironically, the
most explicit bands would emerge relatively unscathed. The
worst offenders, literally, do not receive airplay.3g They sell
their albums to cult followings, created through diligent tour-
ing and promotional publicity such as that kindly supplied by
the PMRC. They now have a new marketing tool in the form
of record rating stickers sure to attract the vast market of
youthful rebellion." That portion of the rock community that
contributes valuable debate, ideas, and enduring art would
therefore be inhibited while the extremist element in rock
speech would be comparatively undisturbed, and perhaps even
made more commercially viable as an attractively grittier alter-
native to an artificially sanitized rock mainstream community.
F.C.C.2d 833 (1970) (one complaint; short-term renewal); Mile High Stations, Inc., 28
F.C.C. 795 (1960) (two complaints; announcer fired; station threatened with revoca-
tion; ultimately received a cease and desist order); WREC Broadcasting Service, 19
F.C.C. 1082 (1955) (no complaints; competitor raised tasteless proramming issue in
comparative hearing, renewal denied). See Sumrall, supra note 52, at 17, col. 1:
No one is more sensitive to [the porn-rock] issue than the radio stations, who
are concerned with maintaining their FCC licenses. They will be very con-
cerned with what they play if they think that listener complaints might be
filed with the FCC because they are playing certain x-rated records.
(quoting record executive Howard Klein). See also BROADCASTING, July 15, 1985, at
38 (lyric row causing ripple effect in broadcasting and recording industries).
397. Radio station paranoia will have a substantial impact on the music industry
because radio is the record industry's umbilical cord to the marketplace. See S. FRITH,
supra note 7, at 117; Comment, Regulating Rock Lyrics, supra note 30, at 614; Sumrall,
supra note 52, at 17. The labelling agreement between the PMRC and RIAA has al-
ready spawned censorship controversy. Record companies have begun to pressure art-
ists to alter the content of their records to avoid labels and the consequent retail
problems, see supra note 373. DeCurtis, Record Companies Finesse PMRC, ROLLING
STONE, May 18, 1986, at 16; Goldberg, CBS Sets Policy on Explicit Lyrics, ROLLUNG
STONE, Apr. 24, 1986, at 13.
398. See Hamlin, supra note 4, at 4, col. 1.
399. For this reason radio regulation can never be the complete, or even substan-
tial solution to the porn-rock problem. It can only be counter-productive. See infra
note 400 and accompanying text.
400. See Note, Song Lyric Advisories, supra note 33, at 246-47; Comment, Regulat-
ing Rock Lyrics, supra note 30, at 617; Cocks, Rock Is a Four-Letter Word, supra note
2, at 70;, Hentoff, The Disc Washers, supra note 4, at 31; Congress all shook up over
rock lyrics, supra note 36, at 29. O. Note, Song Lyric Advisories, supra note 33, at 247;
McDougall, supra note 28, at 33, col. 6 (controversy itself aids porn lyricists).
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B. The Likelihood-The FCC's Deregulatory Revolution
Ironically, the FCC, so vastly empowered by Pacif , has
cast itself as the principal defender of first amendment free-
dom of the airwaves. In the last decade, the Commission has
stepped back from the active role it played in shaping the con-
tent of broadcasting through most of the 1970s."' Though a de-
tailed analysis of the current deregulatory trend is beyond the
scope of this Note, it is important to note the prevailing regula-
tory philosophy.
Under the stewardship of Chairman Mark S. Fowler, the
FCC experienced an exhilarating honeymoon with the market-
place.4  The Commission is seemingly born again; it has found
the first amendment and discovered at last that both the Con-
stitution and the public interest can be spiritually
accommodated.4
The Commission has adopted a laissez-faire regulatory phi-
losophy-the public can and should define the public inter-
401. Immediately after the Supreme Court handed down the Pac(Jica decision, the
FCC began assuaging licensee fears of censorship. Chairman Ferris and Commis-
sioner Brown ushered in this era of good-feeling by making placative speeches to
broadcaster associations. See Brenner, supra note 265, at 180; Krattenmaker & Powe,
supra note 106, at 1266 n.843; Note, Morality and Broadcasting, supra note 222, at-169-
70. Within days, the Commission handed down its first decision construing Pacfica
narrowly, albeit in the context of a petition to deny. "We believe that we should con-
strue [Pacij] consistent with the paramount importance we attach to encouraging
free-ranging programming and editorial discretion by broadcasters." WGBH Educ.
Found., 69 F.C.C.2d 1250, para. 10 at 1254 (1978). Subsequent decisions have been
faithful to this narrow construction. E.g., Video 44, 103 F.C.C.2d 1204 (1986); Kaye-
Smith Enterprises, 98 F.C.C.2d 670, para. 3 at 671-72 (1984); Pacifica Found., 95
F.C.C.2d 750, paras. 16-19 at 759-61 (1983); Decency in Broadcasting, Inc., 94 F.C.C.2d
1162 (1983). Deregulation has been in high gear ever since. See Deregulation of Ra-
dio, 73 F.C.C.2d 457 (1979); Deregulation of Radio, Report and Order, 84 F.C.C.2d 968
(1981), reconsideration denied, 87 F.C.C.2d 797 (1981), offd in part and rev'd in part,
Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 707 F.2d 1413 (D.C.
Cir. 1983), modified on remand, Deregulation of Radio, Second Report and Order, 96
F.C.C.2d 930 (1984). See also Fowler, The Boom Goes Bust; The Bust Goes Boom,
COMM. & LAW, June-July, 1984, at 23 [hereinafter Fowler, The Boom Goes Bust];
Fowler, The Public's Interest, supra note 60, at 215-16.
402. See Deregulation of Radio, 73 F.C.C.2d 457, paras. 59-62 at 482-83; Fowler, In-
troduction, 37 FED. COMM. L.J. 71, 72 (1985); Fowler & Brenner, supra note 53, at 217,
229. See generally Fowler & Brenner, supra note 53.
403. See Fowler & Brenner, supra note 53, at 209-10. In fact, the Commission has
been trying to shed some of its power in lobbying for first amendment parity for the
broadcast media. See Deregulation of Radio, 73 F.C.C.2d at 590,596 (Quello, Comm'r,
concurring); Fowler, The Boom Goes Bust, supra note 401, at 25; Fowler, Introduction,
supra note 402, at 72; Fowler & Brenner, supra note 53, at 242; cf. Fowler still stump-
ing for deregulation, upra note 38, at 86 (Fowler sees little hope for achieving
parity).
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est.4° The new role of the FCC therefore is merely to bolster
the market through structural regulations concentrating on
employment, ownership, and the like.4°s Content regulation is
out, as evidenced by the Commission's rejection of the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia's format doctrine,/° the
repeal and revision of significant content-oriented regula-
tions,407 the simplification of renewal procedures,4 w and a min-
imal trimming of the raised eyebrow through Congress'
lengthening of station license terms.4w
While this trend speaks well for first amendment principles,
its long-term effect should not be overestimated. The Commis-
sion retains its considerable weaponry. The raised eyebrow re-
mains a potent tool despite the lengthier license term. The
sword of Damocles still hangs high; it just takes a bit longer to
drop.4 1 0 And if formal action is needed, the Commission can fill
the gap with the more burdensome revocation or forfeiture
proceeding.41 ' Furthermore, the Commission has stressed that
its marketplace model does not reflect moral considerations, in-
dicating that it will not hesitate to act against licensees who ex-
perience a lapse in taste.412
404. Fowler & Brenner, supra note 53, at 210, 229. The notion is not a new one.
See H. WARNER, supra note 63, at 460: "The power of censorship which lies in the
listener's thumb and forefinger to shut off any offending or boring program by a twist
of the dial is the most effective control possible." See also FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438
U.S. 726, 772 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting): "I would place the responsibility and
the right to weed worthless and offensive communications from the public airways
where it belongs and where, until today, it resided; in a public free to choose those
communications worthy of its attention from a marketplace unsullied by the censor's
hand."
405. See Deregulation of Radio, 73 F.C.C.2d 457, paras. 57-58 at 482.
406. Changes in the Entertainment Formats of Broadcast Stations, 60 F.C.C.2d 858
(1976), affd sub noam. FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582 (1981).
407. Deregulation of Radio, Report and Order, 84 F.C.C.2d 968 (1981).
408. Simplified Renewal Application, 87 F.C.C.2d 1127 (1981), qffd sub nom. Black
Citizens For A Fair Media v. FCC, 719 F.2d 407 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert denied, 467 US.
1255 (1984).
409. In 1982, Congress amended the Communications Act to increase license terms
from three to seven years. See Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35,
§ 1241(a), 95 Stat. 357, 736, (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 307(c) (1982)). For an account of
the lengthy effort on the part of the broadcast lobby, see Tickton, At Last- Longer
Station License Terms, CoMM. & LAw Sept.-Oct., 1982, at 3.
410. See Krasnow, Cole & Kennard, supra note 60, at 777: "ITihe power to arch an
administrative eyebrow will continue to exist as long as the agency retains the power
of life and death." Recall that the Commission has refused to denounce, "Jawboning"
as a legitimate regulatory device. See supra notes 179.83 and accompanying text.
411. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
412. See Deregulation of Radio, 73 F.C.C.2d 457, paras. 98-99 at 492-93, pars. 115 at
496; infra note 413.
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Most importantly, the Commission is a political body, easily
galvanized by public and political pressure. 13 While the PMRC
has not yet been welcomed, that may be merely a temporary
situation.414 It is significant that Congress has been slow to leg-
islate the Commission philosophy.415 Until it is set firmly in
statutory stone, it could conceivably last only as long as the
commissioners who trumpet it. In the final analysis, Commis-
sion policy is eminently malleable.416 Members of Congress
have an uncanny ability to heat up the regulatory climate, and
413. See Albert, supra note 97, at 1345; Fowler, The Public's Interest, supra note 60,
at 215; Robinson, Watchdogs, supra note 106, at 183-87; Note, Morality and Broadcast-
ing, supra note 222, at 171; Note, Morality And The Broadcast Media, supra note 97, at
697. See also B. COLE & M. OETTINGER, supra note 69, at 22 (selection of commission-
ers is "little more than an exercise in political patronage"). Recent Commission ac-
tivity confirms the power of the public to motivate the Commission. In September
1986, after eight quiescent years, the Commission sent letters to three licensees, or-
dering them to respond to complaints of indecent programming. One of the letters
was sent to a Los Angeles Pacifica Foundation station and concerned complaints re-
ceived as a result of the broadcast of excerpts from a homosexual play and an inter-
view with the playwright. The program contained some objectionable language but
was broadcast between 10 p.m. and 11 p.m. and was preceded by a warning. BROAD-
CASTING, Oct. 27, 1986, at 144. Another letter was sent to a New York commercial
station and concerns the notorious announcer Howard Stern and his "sexual double-
entendre, bathroom humor and calculatedly tasteless jokes and insults." Jones, F.CC
Studies 'Indecency' On Radio, N.Y. Times, Nov. 22, 1986, at 9, col. 4. See also The
Grossest Guys on the Airwaves, NEwSWEEK, Nov. 17, 1986, at 80. The third letter was
sent to the University of California and concerns its noncommercial Santa Barbara
college radio station. The station played a song by the Pork Dukes called "Making
Bacon" at approximately 10 p.m. on a Saturday evening. See BROADCASTING, Nov. 10,
1986, at 82. The song is said to "describe sexual situations in explicit language." Jones,
supra. A copy of the complaint was sent to Tipper Gore, the head of the PMRC,
Communications Daily, Sept. 29, 1986, at 10, col. 1. The action was apparently
prompted by mounting public pressure to get tough with broadcast "filth", including
letter writing campaigns to the FCC and the Senate Commerce Committee. See
Jones, supra; BROADCASTING, Sept. 29, 1986, at 7. Industry insiders speculate that the
upcoming reconfirmation hearings for FCC commissioners moved the Commission to
quell the charge that it is soft on broadcast indecency. Keeping the open mikes open,
BROADCASTING, Oct. 20, 1986, at 98; BROADCASTING, Sept. 29, 1986, at 7.
414. See supra note 38.
415. See generally Krasnow, Terry & Longley, Rewriting The 1934 Communica-
tions Ac 1976-1980: A Case Study of the Formulation of Communications Policy, 3
CoMM/ENT L.J. 345 (1981); Tickton, supra note 409; Note, "Updating" the Communi-
cations Act New Electronics, Old Economics, and the Demise of the Public Interest, 3
CoMM/ENT L.J. 455 (1981).
416. The ease with which the Commission altered its course towards deregulation,
a massive shift in orientation, illustrates the ease with which it can shift back, espe-
cially if the modification pertains only to a single issue or subject. See also supra note
412 and accompanying text. For a discussion of judicial review of deregulation, see
Hagelin & Wimmer, Broadcast Deregulation and the Administrative Responsibility
to Monitor Policy Change: An Empirical Study of the Elimination of Logging Re-
quirements, 38 FED. COMM. L.J. 201, 259-65 (1986).
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a restless public with an issue can profoundly influence the
Commission, and therefore the rock and radio industries as
well.
Conclusion
Rock speech is regulable directly, indirectly, and informally
under modern construction of the Communications Act and the
first amendment. Rock speech exists within the jurisdiction
of the FCC, a domain where expression is considerably less free
than most realize. This restrictive atmosphere is a result of the
judiciary's failure to scrutinize rigorously the inhibitory effects
of the FCC's administration of a discretionary licensing
scheme, and to acknowledge and guard against the consequent
chilling effect on licensees' constitutionally protected behavior.
Additionally, the FCC and the Supreme Court in Pacif'a un-
dertook an unwarranted and unfortunate excursion into pro-
tected realms of expression to carve out a niche of direct
governmental control, framed by overtly majoritarian and sub-
jective standards, which essentially turn the first amendment
on its head.
Thus, rock speech is subject to formal action and informal
pressures which can be easily mobilized to affect its content.
Regardless of the desirability of this result, the constitutionally
desirable means of accomplishing it are through private rather
than governmental action and resolve.
The remaining question is one of likelihood, and perhaps this
is the most difficult question to answer. Likelihood is an ethe-
real concept in the world of pressure group politics; it grows
even wispier in the context of a politically-appointed agency ad-
ministering a "holy grail clause" 417 mandate. It is difficult to
predict how the Commission would react if the public defined
the public interest as cleanliness in rock radio. Further compli-
cating the inquiry is the fact that, regardless of the agency's
disposition toward letting the marketplace take care of the pub-
lic interest, the standard's pliability and the fickle nature of the
Washington winds mean content deregulation could become a
passing fancy or a temporary irrelevancy.
But those who wish to change the tone of public discourse
have every right to -attempt it. The first amendment exists so
that concerned Americans will always have the opportunity to
417. Krasnow, Cole & Kennard, supra note 60, at 762.
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change their society. But it also exists so that the government
will never be able to dictate the permissible tone of public dis-
course, absent extremely compelling reasons. Any movement
to quash or tame the content of contemporary music should be
a purely private one. It is submitted that the government, in-
cluding the FCC, has a constitutional responsibility to maintain
a strictly neutral and passive role in any public debate over the
content of protected expression. The judiciary has a constitu-
tional responsibility to so remind the Commission. Though the
power presently exists to regulate rock speech, it should not
exist and it should not be exercised.
The conflict presented by the most difficult first amendment
issues usually pits a very real, tangible, and highly visible pub-
lic evil against the constitutional principle of government
noninvolvement-an idealistic and often abstract legal concept
which seems far removed from social and political realities, and
is in fact invoked to protect against hypothetical, future
problems.41 The regulation of rock speech fits rather neatly
into the mold. When it is the sensibilities of our children at
stake, as well as deep-rooted values that may be all we can cling
to -in a world of whirlwind technological change, encroaching
decadence and Armageddon, it is especially tempting to grasp
the steady and seductive hand of the state for protection and
guidance. But it is politic to recall the wisdom of one commen-
tator that still resonates after half a century:
Quite apart from the question how far peace of mind is a good
thing in itself, it would be quixotic indeed for the law to at-
tempt a general securing of it. Against a large part of the fric-
tions and irritations and clashing of temperaments incident to
participation in a community life, a certain toughening of the
mental hide is a better protection than the law could ever
418. Mhe consequences of rigorously enforcing the guarantees of the First
Amendment are frequently unpleasant. Much speech that seems to be of lit-
tle or no value will enter the marketplace of ideas, threatening the quality of
our social discourse and, more generally, the serenity of our lives. But that is
the price to be paid for constitutional freedom.
Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50,88 (1976) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
See also Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24-25 (1971): ("[Verbal tumult, discord, and
even offensive utterance... [are] necessary side effects of the broader enduring values
which the process of open debate permits us to achieve. That the air may at times
seem filled with verbal cacaphony is, in this sense not a sign of weakness but of
strength.") Schauer, supra note 205, at 696 n.54 ("[Ilt is suppression and conformity
that come naturally, not tolerance, diversity and change") (citing Emerson, Toward a






As this Note went to press, the FCC issued a Public Notice
warning to three licensees that they had broadcast indecent
material, but declining to impose further sanctions.4 ° The
Commission also warned broadcasters generally that it would
henceforth strictly enforce its Paciftca mandate. The Commis-
sion expressly noted "that repetitive use of specific sexual or
excretory words or phrases is not the only material that can
constitute indecency" and that in many markets there is still a
reasonable risk that children may be in the audience after 10:00
p.m.421 However, the Commission stated that indecent material
could be broadcast "when there is not a reasonable risk that
children may be in the audience" if advance warnings are
given. 
4=
The Commission rejected the idea that the reduced protec-
tion in the broadcasting context was necessary to validate its
regulation of indecency. Rather, it opined that channelling is a
reasonable time, place, and manner restriction of indecent ma-
terial within Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.4=2 Specifically,
time channelling was necessary because of the indiscrete na-
ture of the broadcast.424
One warning was issued to a Los Angeles station for airing
"Jerker," a play which included explicit descriptions of homo-
sexual encounters.42- The Commission found the broadcast in-
decent and further found that it may have been obscene. It
therefore referred that matter to the Justice Department for
419. Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law qf Torts, 49 HARV.
L. REv. 1033, 1035 (1936).
420. Public Notice, FCC 87-153 (April 29,1987) [hereinafter Public Notice]. In Sep-
tember 1986 the Commission had asked the licensees to respond to complaints of inde-
cent broadcasting. See supra note 413. The Commission explained that no further
sanctions were in order because "prior rulings may have indicated to licensees that
only repetitive use of the specific words at issue in the 1978 Pacifica case would be
'actionable if broadcast prior to 10.00 p.m." Public Notice at 3.
421. Public Notice at 2.
422. Id. However, obscene material is proscribed at all times. Id. at 3.
423. 106 S. Ct. 925 (1986).
424. Public Notice at 2.
425. Pacifica Foundation, Inc., Memorandum Opinion and Order, FCC 87-138
(adopted April 16, 1987). The play was aired at 10:00 pm. with an advance warning.
Public Notice at 3.
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possible prosecution under 18 U.S.C. section 1464.4
Another warning was issued to a Philadelphia station for the
morning drivetime antics of radio personality Howard Stern.'
The station argued that the broadcasts could not be indecent
because they consisted entirely of innuendo and double enten-
dre. The Commission held "that in certain circumstances, innu-
endo or double entendre may be rendered explicit or capable
of only one meaning when intermingled with explicit refer-
ences that make the meaning of the entire discussion clear and
thus may give rise to actionable indecency."4'' However, the
Commission also noted it would treat such matters with cau-
tion.4"  The broadcasts themselves were actionable because
they "dwelt on sexual and excretory matters in a pandering
and titillating fashion that was patently offensive as measured
by contemporary community standards for the broadcast
medium."0
4 0
Most notably, the Commission issued a warning to a Univer-
sity of California radio station"' for broadcasting indecent re-
corded music at 10:00 p.m. which "contained a number of
patently offensive references to sexual organs and activities as
measured by contemporary community standards for the
broadcast medium."' 2 The Commission also determined to in-
quire into whether the University had exercised sufficient con-
trol over the station.4
426. Public Notice at 4.
427. Infinity Broadcasting Corp. of Pennsylvania, Memorandum Opinion and Or-
der, FCC 87-140 (adopted April 16, 1987).
428. Public Notice at 4.
429. 1&
430. I1 at 5.
431. The Regents of the University of California, Memorandum Opinion and Or-
der, FCC 87-140 (adopted April 16, 1987).
432. Public Notice at 5.
433. 1&
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